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ABSTRACT
The 1998 Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) grants indigenous peoples (IPs) in the
Philippines the right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) with regard to development
projects undertaken on their ancestral lands. My thesis explores whether the current practice of
generating such consent guarantees indigenous peoples the control over development,
particularly in relation to mining, that such procedures were designed to ensure.
Two case studies involving the Mamanwa and the Manobo tribes in Region XIII of Mindanao
suggest that the government agencies involved failed to follow the rules set out in the officially
approved guidelines that govern the conduct of the FPIC process.
The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) - the operating agency for FPIC in the
Philippines - does not seem to have either the facilitation skills or an understanding of the
complexity of issues involved required to achieve the goals of the 1998 IPRA. NCIP does not
have the resources it needs to do its job and at times appears powerless vis-a-vis the mining
companies and the Philippine government which has aggressively pursued the expansion and de-
regulation of the mining industry.
In my two representative case studies, the mining companies used the promise of financial
benefits at the outset of the consultations to short circuit the required FPIC process. Long-term
social and environmental impacts and benefits were hardly discussed. The responses of the
mining companies to concerns expressed by the tribes were not transparent. The Memorandums
of Agreement (MOAs) produced in both cases hardly mentioned what would be done to meet the
concerns of the aboriginal leadership before, during and after mining operations commenced.
Cultural erosion in many IP communities has led to the imposition of centralized decision-
making that works against the goals of the FPIC process. In addition, the traditional decision-
making procedures employed by IPs are inadequate to generate the kind .of conversation required
to ensure Free, Prior and Informed Consent.
Finally, most IP communities do not have a long-term development plans. They live on a day-
to-day basis merely trying to survive. In the absence of such plans, it is hard to see how the
tribes involved can really make informed decisions and ask for appropriate safeguards and
shared commitments.
Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence Susskind
Title: Ford Professor of Urban Studies and Environmental Planning
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The plight of indigenous peoples and their effort to assert their land rights are attracting attention
throughout the world.
The United Nations (UN) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights' and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights2 declare that all peoples have
the right to self-determination and should be able to "freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development" (Part one, Article one, 1966).
The International Labour Organization Convention No. 169 (ILO),3 recognizes the equality of
rights between indigenous peoples and the rest of the population of a nation, and declares that
"Indigenous and tribal peoples shall enjoy the full measure of human rights and fundamental
freedom without hindrance and destruction" (Art. 3).
A number of countries have responded to these international mandates by recognizing the rights
of indigenous peoples in their constitutions. Some, like Australia and the Philippines have also
1 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was ratified by 35 UN member nations in 1976. The
Treaty details the basic civil and political rights of individuals and nations. The rights of nations which apply to
indigenous communities include self-determination.
2 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights describes the basic economic, social, and
cultural rights of individuals and nations which includes the right to self-determination.
3 The ILO Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries was adopted in 1989
by the International Labour Organization. The Convention outlines the rights of Indigenous Peoples to consultation
and participation in making decisions concerning them and their development.
enacted laws recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples to own land. Despite these efforts,
however, many indigenous peoples have little control over development projects within their
ancestral lands.
Few countries have taken the rights and interests of indigenous peoples into account when
making plans for development projects (Errico, p. 1). The UN Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights reported in 2001 "with regret that the traditional lands of indigenous peoples
have been reduced or occupied, without their consent, by timber, mining and oil companies, at
the expense of the exercise of their culture and the equilibrium of the ecosystem" (MacKay, p.9).
Furthermore, development projects, particularly those in the extractive industries, have caused
the displacement of indigenous tribes and the disruption of their livelihoods. According to the
UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur on indigenous peoples' rights, the impact
of extractive industries is "one of the major human rights problems faced by (indigenous
peoples) in recent decades" (par. 56, UN Document E/CN.4/2002/97).
The negative effects of development projects, particularly those in the extractive industries, are
compounded by the complete lack of participation by indigenous peoples in decision-making
(http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbJL/2003/5.html retrieved on October 27 at 2:30 PM).
The exclusion of indigenous peoples from choices about development taking place within their
ancestral lands has stripped them of their right to self-determination - the means by which
"indigenous peoples may determine the nature and extent of their relationship with the state and
maintain control over their own institutions, territories, and resources without undue external
interference" (Morgan, 2007, p.283). Leyla Mehta and Maria Stankovich reiterate how the basic
human rights covenants of the UN recognize the right of peoples as individuals and social
collectivities to freely determine their economic, social and cultural development (n.d., p.3).
They further articulate how the fundamental human right to self-determination along with other
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights forms the bases for citizen participation and
consent in development projects and decisions (Ibid). According to Colchester and Ferrari, "it is
only since the mid 1980s that indigenous peoples have made their demands for recognition of
their right to give or withhold their free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) to actions that affect
their lands, territories and natural resources a central part of their struggle for self-determination"
(2007, p.2). Since then, the indigenous peoples' right to FPIC has been increasingly recognized
in international human rights treaties including the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples. Fergus MacKay reiterates this in his paper In Search of Middle Ground:
"new international laws and standard-setting exercises have widely accepted that indigenous
peoples should have the right to free, prior and informed consent to activities planned on their
lands" (2004, p.1).
BACKGROUND OF THIS STUDY
The 1987 Philippine Constitution indicates that the State recognizes and promotes the rights of
indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development (Sec.
22 Article II). In addition, the Philippine Constitution stipulates that the State shall recognize,
respect, and protect the rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) to preserve and
develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the
formulation of national plans and policies (Sec. 17 Article XIV).
Pursuant to the Constitution, the Philippine Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
(IPRA) in 1997 recognizing the inherent rights of IPs to their ancestral domains through the
principle of immemorial possession. This right is rooted in the occupation and utilization of lands
considered as communal property of indigenous communities who existed prior to the conquest
of Spain. As such, ancestral domains do not follow geographic divisions based on political
jurisdictions because they include the cultural area of activities, e.g. hunting ground, of the
ancestors of present-day indigenous tribes in the Philippines.
Section 13 of Chapter IV also specifies that the "State recognizes the inherent rights of ICCs/IPs
to self-governance and self-determination and respects the integrity of their values, practices and
institutions. Consequently, the State shall ensure the rights of ICCs/IPs to freely pursue their
economic, social, and cultural development." As such, the law guarantees the principle of free,
prior and informed consent (FPIC) defined as the "consensus of all members of the ICCs/IPs to
be determined with their respective customary laws and practices, free from any external
manipulation, interference coercion, and obtained after fully disclosing the intent and scope of
the activity, in a language and process understandable to the community" (g, Chapter II).
Section 7 Part III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the IPRA subject policies,
programs, projects, plans and activities to FPIC including:
a) Exploration, development, exploitation and utilization of natural resources within
ancestral domains/lands;
b) Research in indigenous knowledge, systems and practices related to agriculture, forestry,
watershed and resource management systems and technologies, medical and scientific
concerns, bio-diversity, bio-prospecting and gathering of genetic resources.
c) Displacement and relocation;
d) Archeological explorations, diggings and excavations in access to religious and cultural
sites;
e) Policies affecting the general welfare and the rights of ICCs/IPs; and
f) Entry of the military or paramilitary forces or establishment of temporary or permanent
military facilities within the domains.
My research focuses on FPIC within the context of exploration, development, exploitation and
utilization of natural resources within IP ancestral lands in the Philippines.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The exercise of self-determination, i.e. the right to determine and pursue political, social,
economic, and cultural development, necessitates the right to free, prior and informed consent.
The IPRA stipulates
The ICCs/IPs shall, within their communities, determine for themselves policies,
development programs, projects and plans to meet their identified priority needs and
concerns. The ICCs/IPs shall have the right to accept or reject a certain development
intervention in their particular communities (Section 3, Part III, IPRA IRR).
One of the controversial issues surrounding the practice of FPIC is whether it applies to mining.
Most mining projects in the Philippines started before the IPRA was enacted, at a time when
indigenous rights to ancestral lands were not legally recognized. Hence, mining companies
occupied and exploited natural resources within ancestral lands without the consent of
indigenous communities.
With the enactment of IPRA, a number of mining companies have sought FPIC from indigenous
tribes. As of June 2007, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) 4 has granted
90 companies a Certificates of Compliance indicating that FPIC has been documented5 . These
Certificates certify that the community has given consent to the entry and/or operation of a
company in their ancestral domain. Of the 90, 59 cover large-scale mining projects (Table 1).
The rest of the 31 are divided among industrial forestry management projects, construction of
dams for flood control and hydropower, small-scale sand and gravel extraction, and research.
Out of the 59 mining corporations that have complied with the FPIC process, 39 are operating in
Mindanao where just over 60% of the indigenous populations in the country lives. And out of
the 39, 18 are located in Region XIII otherwise known as CARAGA region (Table 1).
Table 1: Summary of Issued FPIC Compliance Certificate as of June 2007
Region No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of Total
Mining IFMA Dam/ Industri Research Others*
Projects Projects Hydro al Sand Projects
Projects and
Gravel
(small-
scale)
LUZON
Cordillera 2 0 5 0 0 1 8
Administrative
Region (CAR)
Region I: Ilocos 0 0 2 5 0 7
Region II: 2 0 0 0 0 1 3
Cagayan Valley
4 The NCIP, created by the IPRA, is tasked to oversee the implementation of the law.
5 Refers to the Certificate of Compliance issued by the NCIP attesting that the applicant or proponent has complied
with the requirements for securing the FPIC of affected indigenous communities in accordance with set Guidelines.
Region III: 1 0 0 0 2 1 4
Central Luzon
Region IV: 8 1 0 0 1 1 11
CALABAR &
MIMARO
Region V: Bicol 4 1 0 0 0 1 6
VISAYAS
Region VI: 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
Western Visayas
Region VII: 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Central Visayas
Region VIII: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Eastern Visayas
MINDANAO
Region IX: 3 0 0 0 0 0 3
Zamboanga
Region X: 3 0 0 0 0 0 3
Northern
Mindanao
Region XI: 11 2 2 0 0 .2 17
Davao
Region XII: 4 0 0 0 0 3 7
SOCCSKSSARG
EN
Region XIII: 18 0 0 0 0 0 18
CARAGA
Total 59 4 9 5 3 10 90
Source: NCIP Ancestral Domains Office (ADO)
* Others: Resource management/Livelihood, Telecommunications, etc.
Table 2: Details of Issued FPIC Compliance Certificate to Mining Corporations in the
CARAGA Region
Mining Applicant/ Location: Barangay/ Total Area Purpose Date
Proponent Municipality/Province (Hectares) Issued/
Signed
Explosives Basag, Taligaman, & de 2,703.20 Mineral 2/13/2007
Consultation and Oro, Butuan City, Agusan Production
Application del Norte Sharing
Agreement
(MPSA)
SEMCO Exploration MPSA 10/3/2006
and Mining
Corporation*
Apical Mining Jabonga, Tubay, Santiago, 7,764.00 Exploration 11/30/2006
Corporation Cabadbaran, Agusan del
Norte
SR Metals Incorporated La Fraternidad, Tubay, MPSA 11/30/2006
Agusan del Norte
PHILSAGA Mining Bayugan III, Wasian, & 3,555.4630 Exploration 8/6/2004
Corporation Sta. Cruz, Rosario, Agusan and Mining
del Sur; Consuelo San Operation
Andres, & Imelda,
Bunawan, Agusan del Sur
PHILSAGA Mining
Corporation*
PHSAMED Mining Sta. Cruz, Rosario, Agusan 409.00 MPSA 1/30/2007
Corporation (for del Sur
Bernster Exploration &
Agro-industrial Corp.)
Southern Agusan Gold Sitios Gacub, Bahay, MPSA 7/13/2007
Mine & Exploration Costan, Manhulayan; Brgy.
Corporation* La Purisima, Prosperidad,
Agusan del Sur
JCG Resources, Alegria, Tubod, & Mainit, 3,288.7676 MPSA 1/30/2004
Incorporation Surigao del Norte
Minimax Exploration Tapian, Mainit, Surigao del 14,164.00 Exploration 2/16/2004
Corporation Norte
Taganito Mining Taganito, Urbiztondo, 4,976.03 MPSA 8/7/2006
Corporation Hayanggabon, &
Cagdianao, Claver, Surigao
del Norte
Kalamazoo Mining Urbiztondo, Claver, MPSA 10/11/2006
Corporation Surigao del Norte
Oriental Synergy Urbiztondo, Claver, 74.00 Exploration 1/16/2007
Mining Corporation Surigao del Norte
North Dinagat Mineral Pantukan, & Adlay, MPSA 7/13/2007
Resource Corporation* Carrascal, Surigao del Sur;
Cagdianao, Claver, Surigao
del Norte
SEMCO Exploration Pakwan, Lanuza, Surigao 10,201.0479 Exploration 1/25/2005
and Mining del Sur
Corporation
PHSAMED Mining Javier, Guinhalinan, 1,215.00 MPSA 1/30/2007
Corporation (for Das- Barobo, Surigao del Sur
agan Mining Corp.)
TOTAL AREA 48,350.51
Source: NCIP Ancestral Domains Office (ADO) * - No data
It is against this backdrop that I want to explore FPIC in relation to mining in the Philippines,
particularly in the CARAGA region of Mindanao. What is the experience of indigenous tribes
regarding the granting of FPIC for mining operations?
Does the current practice for granting FPIC increase the control that indigenous peoples
have over development of their ancestral lands, particularly in relation to mining? Under
what conditions does the use of FPIC alter decisions with regard to the entry and operation
of mining corporations?
The notion of consent is central to the question I explore in my thesis. The right to say no is
supposedly an option in the exercise of FPIC. Often, the reality though is that consent is
assumed by mining companies and even by government offices involved. The FPIC process is
framed as a conversation about benefits that mining companies will provide. Conditions that do
not foster a free and informed consent, as my case studies reveal, result to the absence of an
enforceable right for indigenous peoples to say no to mining operations.
METHODOLOGY
I use case studies to examine how FPIC affects indigenous peoples' control of development
decisions on their ancestral lands.
Two cases are situated in the CARAGA region of Mindanao. They build on individual and
group interviews with members of the Mamanwa and the Manobo tribes, including tribal leaders
and members of the Council of Elders. Interviews with representatives of the concerned mining
corporations, namely, the Taganito Mining Corporation and the PHILSAGA Mining Corporation
were also completed. I interviewed NCIP Community Service Center staff directly involved in
the management of the FPIC process. Documents provided by tribal leaders, mining
corporations, and the NCIP with regard to the agreements reached in the FPIC process are used
to help frame my reports.
These case studies are supplemented with interviews with NCIP provincial, regional, and
national officials as well as with national officials of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resource's (DENR) Mine and Geosciences Bureau (MGB). I was also able to talk with several
lawyers dealing with IP concerns.
I have outlined the three following measures in order to lay out my analysis of the problem I
have set to answer in this thesis.
1. How are decisions made in each indigenous community? What usual methods are used in the
process governing FPIC in relation to mineral development? Are the decision-mechanisms
adequate to the task of a free, prior, and informed consent?
2. What development plans were in effect in the indigenous community prior to the FPIC
process? Has the development resulting from the FPIC process been consistent with the long-
term development plans of the indigenous community?
3. What are the on-going involvements of the indigenous community after mining
is approved? What kind of continuing monitoring and participation in the development activities
of the mining companies might be appropriate?
The second chapter begins with an articulation of the 2002 and 2006 Guidelines governing the
conduct of FPIC in the Philippines. While the 2006 guidelines has superseded the former, the
2002 guidelines was used in the case of the Taganito Mining Corporation (TMC) who sought the
FPIC of the Mamanwa tribe in Surigao del Norte. The FPIC process with the Manobo tribe in
Agusan del Sur employed both the 2002 and 2006 guidelines. The mandated FPIC activities as
well as who were involved and in-charge of them are tackled in this chapter.
The third chapter situates the mining industry in the Philippines. The Philippine government has
undertaken an active stance in promoting investments for the development of mineral resources
in the country. The Mining Act of 1995 has liberalized the country's mining industry. A
number of mining rights under the new law, the extent of mining, and the contribution it makes
to the economy are discussed in this chapter.
Chapter four tackles the overlap of mining right and indigenous lands. Indigenous tribes in the
country and their locations are identified, showing Mindanao to be significantly inhabited by IPs.
The data demonstrates an increasing coverage of mining applications and operations within
ancestral domains. Government has also embarked on 23 top priority mining projects, 18 of
which overlap with ancestral domains. Eleven of these are in Mindanao, five of which are in the
CARAGA/Region XIII).
The two case studies are presented and analyzed in Chapter Five. The first case is situated in the
province of Surigao del Norte, one of the four provinces comprising the CARAGA Region. The
case deals with the Mamanwa tribe of barangays 6 Taganito and Urbiztondo in the municipality of
Claver and the Taganito Mining Corporation (TMC). I have made a detailed presentation of
what transpired in the FPIC process according to the interviewees and the documents I have
obtained, incorporating my analysis as I narrated the events. The FPIC process in this case
started in February 2006 and concluded with a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in July 2006.
The second case demonstrates two FPIC processes undertaken with the Manobo tribe in the
municipality of Rosario of the province of Agusan del Sur. The FPIC processes in this case
present a shortcut undertaking compared to the Mamanwas in the first case. I have tackled the
cases in a thematic manner based on the measures I have set. Like the Mamanwa case, the
Manobos gave their consent and forged a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the
PHILSAGA Mining Corporation. In both cases, the mining companies have been in operation
for more than a decade in those ancestral domains.
Chapter Six ties the various chapters to provide a concluding analysis of whether FPIC increases
IPs' control of decisions over their ancestral domains. In the midst of an aggressive mineral
development in the country, there is tremendous pressure for indigenous communities to exercise
what could be a free, prior, and informed consent. The term "prior" is hardly applicable to
existing mining companies who are renewing licenses or permits. Mining companies continue to
operate as the FPIC process is on-going. The FPIC processes in both cases show a lack of
transparency and significant control of the process and outcome by the mining companies.
Instead of coming out as a neutral facilitator of the FPIC process, the NCIP' s lack of skills and
resources and the personal biases of officers involved in the process rendered them more
supportive of the mining companies' interests. The complexity of issues involved makes the
6 Barangay is the smallest unit of governance in the Philippines. A municipality is composed of barangays.
customary or current cultural decision-making process of indigenous peoples inadequate in
assisting them to arrive at a free and informed consent. With IPs' cultural erosion, left on its
own, the tribal decision-making breeds division and conflict among leaders and isolation of
members.
I recommend the use of a third neutral party acceptable to the mining company, the host
barangay government/s, and the IPs to facilitate the FPIC process to ensure a fair, equitable, and
legitimate outcome for everyone. The NCIP could take the responsibility of being the convenor
of the FPIC process. The consultations would do best to produce such an outcome if they are
framed as a negotiation of stakeholder interests instead of companies only informing IPs of what
they have pre-determined as benefits for them. I have included the barangay as part of the FPIC
process since mining companies have the option to charge the community development benefits
for the host barangays to the royalty fee due to the IPs. In addition, the FPIC process would have
to include an independent or joint Environmental Impact Assessment undertaken by external
advisors chosen by the parties. This EIA is intended to incorporate the concerns, i.e.
data/information questions and needs, of the host barangay/s and the IPs. The neutral facilitator
will also facilitate the Consensus Building among the IPs, ensuring an inclusive process where
community interests, representation, and transparency or feedback mechanisms are to be defined.
Much is to be done in building the capacities of IP communities to enable them to articulate and
manage their development plan without which the IPs continue to live in survival and thus
always end up having no choice but give their consent to mining companies. Lastly, to ensure
on-going shared decision-making on the development activities of mining companies within
ancestral domains, specific workable monitoring procedures would have to be part of the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) among parties, should consent be given by the IPs. This
builds the capacities of barangay communities and IPs to manage the lands when mining
operation is completed. More important, this recognizes the right of the IPs over their ancestral
domains.
CHAPTER TWO
FPIC IN THE PHILIPPINES
Since the enactment of IPRA in 1997, the practice of FPIC has been governed by two sets of
guidelines issued by the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). One is embodied
in Administrative Order (AO) No. 3 series of 2002 and a more recent version is contained in AO
No. I series of 2006 which supersedes the former. The diagram below illustrates the general
process that an applicant goes through in securing FPIC. This basically represents the 2006
Guidelines. Differences between the two sets of guidelines are covered in the subsequent
discussion.
Diagram 1: General FPIC Process
Regulatory Agency/
Applicant
Endorses request for
Certification Precondition
with required documents
NCIP Regional Level
Regional Director (RD)
directs the PO/CSC to hold
a pre-FBI Conference & FBI
and notifies the applicant
RD assigns officer to
determine overlap based on
AD Master List
Provincial Office (PO)/
Community Service Center (CSC)
Conduct of Pre-FBI Conference (within
10 days from receipt of application)I . I
PO notifies RD & Ancestral Domain
Area Representative of the
commencement of FBI
Applicant deposits FBI
Fee to the PTA
Conduct of FBI, preparation &
submission of report (within 9 days,
to commence after 5 days of
deposit of FBI Fee)
Conduct of Pre-FPIC
Conference (1 day)
4k
SConduct of FPIC
I Activities
covered u
6, A(Source: NCIP Ancestral Domains Office (ADO)
for projects
nder Section
55 days)
Activities for projects
covered under Section
6, B (20 days)
I Receives copy of the CNO I
r·II
I
I
The guidelines underscore the need to involve indigenous communities in decision-making in the
exercise of their right to FPIC. When it comes to projects that are subject to FPIC, the 2006
guidelines place them in one of two categories, namely, large-scale and small-scale, stipulating
different procedures for each. FPIC procedures for large-scale projects are governed by Section
26 while small-scale projects are covered by Section 27.
Table 3: Project Categories of Scale
Large-Scale Projects Small-Scale Projects (Part II, Sec. 6, B)
(Part II, Sec. 6, A)
Large-scale development, Small-scale exploitation and utilization of land, water and
exploitation and utilization of land, natural resources within the ancestral domains/lands as defined
water, air, and other natural under existing laws, rules and regulations of governing or
resources regulating agencies
Exploration of mineral and energy Commercial research undertaken by government, private
resources persons, or corporations or foreign entities for the purposes
intended directly or indirectly for commercial use, such as:
publication, documentation, paid lectures, among others
Programs, projects and activities Unsolicited government projects for the delivery of socio-
that may lead to the displacement economic services and development including projects of
and/or relocation of indigenous charitable institutions, and civic or non-government
peoples organizations, the direct and primary beneficiary of which are
ICCs/IPs who own the ancestral domain, except when the same
are formally coordinated with NCIP or as co-implementor in
connection with the latter's programs, projects or activities in
which case, no FBI/FPIC is necessary: Provided that the said
programs or projects are validated by the NCIP to be acceptable
to the intended ICC/IP beneficiaries, either because the same
conform with the community's ADSDPP7 or shall become part
thereof in the future
Resettlement programs or projects Activities that would affect their spiritual and religious
by the government or any of its traditions, customs and ceremonies, including ceremonial
instrumentalities that may introduce objects or access to religious and cultural sites, archeological
migrants into ancestral domains explorations, diggings, and excavations unless the council of
whether permanent or temporary elders/leaders require the conduct of the FPIC process
prescribed under Section 26
Management of protected or Programs/projects/activities not requiring permits from
environmentally critical areas, and government agencies
other related joint undertakings
Bioprospecting activities Feasibility studies for any program, project, activity or
undertaking relative to any of those enumerated in Section 6 (A)
7 The Ancestral Domain Sustainable Development Protection Plan refers to the plan formulated and adopted by a
particular IP community that embodies their vision, framework, goals, objectives, and strategies for the sustainable
management and development of their ancestral domain and all resources therein.
Industrial land use including the
establishment of economic zones
Large-scale tourism projects
Large-scale agricultural and
forestry management projects
Other activities similar or analogous
to the foregoing
[large-scale projects]
Occupation of military or organizing para-military forces,
establishment of temporary or permanent military facilities, or
military exercises within the domains, except when requested by
concerned elders/leaders in writing. Military operations within
ancestral domain areas when made in connection with hot
pursuit operations, securing vital government installations,
programs and projects against clear and imminent danger, shall
not require FPIC.
For large-scale projects to be undertaken within ancestral domains, the pertinent government
regulatory agency, after receiving the proponent's application for a lease, license, permit,
agreement and or concession, must endorse and send the application to a NCIP Regional Office
(Part II, Section 7). For projects not requiring permits from a government regulatory agency, the
application is filed directly with the appropriate NCIP Regional Office (Ibid). Note that the 2002
Guidelines do not distinguish between projects undertaken within ancestral domains. If ancestral
lands are involved, an applicant has to go through the pertinent regulatory agency which then
sends the necessary documents to the Ancestral Domains Office 8 (ADO) of NCIP and not to a
Regional Office. The IP communities are not generally privy to this stage of the process as these
mainly concern the applicant and government agencies. However, the knowledge of which
office the application is lodged is important to the community. As ground reality reflects,
informal processes occur even before formal process commences. In the Guidelines, the
applicant is required to submit during the pre-FPIC Conference an Environmental and Socio-
Cultural Impact Statement that is presumably based on a sound assessment on the ground. While
8 The Ancestral Domains Office evaluates the FBI and FPIC documentations and endorses the issuance of a
Compliance Certificate to the Commission when consent has been given by an IP community for a mining
corporation to operate in their ancestral domain.
the applicant is supposed to discuss with the community the impacts of its project, this is
apparently often not the case. Project applicants, like mining companies, would simply declare
that they have already submitted their EIA to the pertinent agency. Knowing where the
application for a permit is submitted will properly direct the community in getting accurate
information needed.
According to the 2002 Guidelines, documents which must be endorsed by a regulatory agency
are: a report on the nature and extent of the project, and a technical map indicating affected areas
(II, Section 7). The 2006 Guidelines, for large-scale projects, also requires these documents but
includes the specific names of the sites covered by the project, the duration of the project, and
the operational plan and project activities required by the endorsing regulatory agency (Part II,
Sec. 8, a&b). With regard to Mamanwa case, the mining company submitted an operational plan
covering 2004-2006 while the company was seeking the FPIC of the tribe for a 25-year operation
which was supposed to begin after the MOA was signed in July 2006. The Manobo case shows
that an Environmental Conversion and Protection Program being asked by the tribe were not
provided by the company. The NCIP has to exercise its authority in ensuring that these
documents are likewise submitted by the endorsing regulatory agency and that these are tackled
with communities. For projects not requiring a government license or permit, an abstract of the
project detailing the advantages and disadvantages of the project and a map of the affected area
are required (Ibid).
Upon receipt of the pertinent documents, the NCIP Regional Office must verify from its Master
List of Ancestral Domain Areas whether the area applied for by the applicant is within or
overlaps an ancestral domain/s (2006 Guidelines, Part II, Section 9). If no overlap exists as far
as the Service Center Head9 , and the designated Regional Officer are concerned, a Certificate of
Non-Overlap (CNO) is issued by the Regional Director to the applicant within three days, noting
though that in case an overlap will be later discovered, the applicant will have to go through
Field-based Investigation (FBI) and FPIC procedures (Part IV, Section 21). An FBI is a ground
investigation undertaken by an FBI Team to determine whether a project overlaps with or affects
an ancestral domain, the extent of the affected area, and the indigenous tribe/s whose consent
will have to be obtained (Part I, Sec. 5, f). In case of an overlap indicated by the Master List of
Ancestral Domain Areas, the Regional Director shall instruct the Provincial Officer to conduct a
Pre-Field Based Investigation (FBI) Conference followed by an FBI (Part II, Section 9). In the
2002 Guidelines, the area being applied for a project is presumed to overlap with an ancestral
domain. And so the conduct of an FBI is required in all projects securing the FPIC of concerned
ICCs.
While the Guidelines are clear on what documentary requirements are needed for endorsement,
there are information gaps and lack of documentation that may happen but are not remedied. As
the case of the Mamanwa tribes shows, the absence of accurate information has weakened the
tribe's position to evaluate the project and negotiate their demands such as housing for affected
population, mitigating impacts of mining encroachment on forestlands. The same case also
illustrates that the accuracy and comprehensiveness of documents to be endorsed can be
undermined by the same agency tasked to ensure its proper implementation because the FPIC
process continued uninterrupted despite the failure to provide the required documentation.
9 A Community Service Center is a field office. A cluster of CSCs is managed by a CSC Head.
Forming the FBI Team is the first step that the NCIP takes to move the FPIC process. The tasks
of the FBI Team are, among others, to review the endorsed documents from the applicant and
regulatory agency, prepare a work and financial plan that will be the basis for the cost for the
Pre-FBI and FBI processes that will be shouldered by the applicant, and submit a narrative report
about the field investigation fifteen (15) days after (2006, Part IV, Section 14; 2002, II, Sec. 9, c).
The firs two tasks mentioned above are accomplished during the pre-FBI Conference that is
presided by the Provincial Officer and conducted within ten days from the receipt of the
application or endorsement by the regulatory agency (Part II, Section 9). The report generally
contains information such as population and location of affected communities, result of
interviews with leaders, in order to validate the accuracy of the endorsed documents (Part IV,
Section 19). Perhaps, some of the more crucial information expected from the FBI is the
documentation of the community's traditional decision-making process (Part IV, Section 19) and
the identification of tribal leadership or group of elders.
Since the FBI lays the foundation of the FPIC process, the quality of the FBI Team report is
crucial. In the following cases, the lack of accurate information during the FBI stage jeopardizes
the IP community's claim and position during negotiation. Coming up with an accurate and
comprehensive report is a challenge for the FBI Team as time is limited. The FBI Team is set to
begin their work five (5) days after the applicant has deposited the money to finance the FBI
process and only has ten (10) more days to complete the process with the last day designated as
the pre-FPIC process (2006, Part IV, Section 18).
In relation to the conduct of the FPIC process, there is a general direction towards localization.
The 2006 Guidelines on the composition of the FBI Team reduced the number of members from
five (5) to three (3) and lodges the responsibility from the Regional Office (2002 Guidelines) to
the Provincial Office or Community Service Center (Part IV, Section 12). In fact, in the 2006
Guidelines, the Regional Office is not part of the FBI Team. This transfer of responsibility
makes the process more localized. The Provincial Office, at least geographically, is more
accessible to the IP communities. As opposed to the bigger jurisdiction of the Regional Office,
the Provincial Office has more focus and coherence in dealing with the issues familiar to its area
of direct jurisdiction. This localization of the FPIC process is also reflected in the composition
of the FPIC Team. The FPIC Team is constituted by the Regional Director (RD) immediately
after the RD receives the result of the FBI. It is composed of not more than six members coming
from the Provincial and/or Service Center. The team must include, whenever feasible, the
Provincial Legal Officer, one Engineer from the provincial or the regional office, and at least one
from the FBI Team (2006 Guidelines, Part IV, Section 22).
The FPIC Team is only stipulated in 2006. It is responsible for conducting the pre-FPIC
Conference and the FPIC procedures. During the one-day Pre-FPIC Conference, the FPIC Team
reviews with the applicant the results of the FBI, presents and sets the schedule of activities to
be undertaken in securing FPIC from the affected indigenous communities, and settles the cost of
the conduct of those activities. The 2006 Guidelines likewise states that during the pre-FPIC
Conference, the following must be accomplished:
Subsequent submission by the applicant of an undertaking, written in a language spoken
and understood by the community concerned, that it shall commit to full disclosure of
records and information relevant to the plan, program, project or activity that would
allow the community full access to records, documents, material information and
facilities pertinent to the same (Part IV, Section 20).
Subsequent submission by the applicant of an Environmental and Socio-cultural Impact
Statement, detailing all the possible impact of the plan, program, project or activity upon
the ecological, economic, social and cultural aspect of the community as a whole. Such
document shall clearly indicate how adverse effects may be avoided, mitigated and/or
addressed (Ibid).
The two major outputs appear overly ambitious. The first output assumes a capable person
versed in both the language of the indigenous people and the business sector that can make an
accurate translation on paper and to the people in the community. The second output is very
crucial to the understanding of the community as it pertains to project impacts. It is surprising
that there is no formal stipulation for this statement to be translated as the first. Again, one real
challenge of the FPIC process is communicating with the people. Many of the older generation
of indigenous communities communicate in a different tradition that use symbols and many did
not go through the formal school system. Translations on paper are essential but the greater
challenge in achieving the goals of FPIC is communicating what is on paper to the people in a
form that is accessible to them.
The activities discussed in the following below are mandatory as per the 2002 Guidelines and the
FPIC process for large-scale projects in the 2006 guidelines. The diagram of the mandatory
FPIC process/activities basically represents the 2006 Guidelines but differences are subsequently
discussed.
Diagram 2: Mandatory Activities for Projects under Section 6-A of 2006 FPIC Guidelines
(Projects Requiring Community Consultation)
Notice Postina/Servina
-oiePcir~ni~
Consultative Community
Assembly
(to include Validation of
list of elders/leaders &
manifestation of IP
Consensus Building
and Freedom Period
Decision Meeting I
RD directs Regional
Review Team (RRT) to
evaluate the report
ADO forwards MOA
to Legal Affairs Office
(LAO); LAO reviews
FPIC documents &
endorses report to
Commission en banc
(CEB) for approval
t
CEB issues
appropriate
Certification
Precondition to
concerned regulatory
agencylapplicant
FPIC Team submits report
to Regional Director (RD)
duly noted by concerned IP
Peoples Organization (PO)
MOA Execution and
Signing Source: NCIP Ancestral
Domains Office
1. Posting of notices
The 2002 Guidelines provides a more detailed outline of the notices to be posted. Aside from the
date and venue of the meeting, notice must include the objectives, nature, and scope of the
RD notifies applicant in
case of non-consent or
endorses FPIC
documents to ADO
(within 2 days)
RRT evaluates FPIC
reports & submits
appropriate
recommendation to RD
(within 5 days)
| •
r
project and the identity of the applicant (II, Section 14, a). The 2006 Guidelines meanwhile have
only specified the date, time, venue, and agenda of the meeting (Part V, Section 26). While both
Guidelines stipulate that the notices be posted in conspicuous areas within the affected
communities, the notices are at times too small to be seen given that they are in bond-size papers.
They are also at times posted within a short limited time, if not the day, before the meeting. It is
imperative, despite the lack of clear directive, that the notice be posted using the local language
of the community concerned. They must also ensure that the council of elders/leaders has been
served notice of the meeting.
2. Preliminary Consultative Meeting/Consultative Community Assembly
A significant modification in the composition of participants for the meeting concerning large-
scale projects is that affected communities are now represented by selected households only (Part
V, Sec.26, b). The selection of household representatives is decided by the community
themselves according to their customary decision-making. However, the process of selection is
not governed by strict guidelines. On the other hand, selection of household can trigger past
contentious issues of power sharing since the community is often not homogeneous as
demonstrated by the case experiences. Another modification in the 2006 Guidelines is that the
regulatory government agency, instead of the Council of Elders/Leaders as stated in 2002,
determine which areas are considered affected communities based on the Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA). While the new guideline succeeds in establishing affected communities and
impacts of mining in these communities, circumscribing the affected areas to communities
directly affected by the project further divides the community. In fact, when two communities
are identified as affected areas, the FBI Team, in consultation with the council of elders/leaders
can recommend to the FPIC Team separate assemblies (Part III, Sec. 10, f). Defining which
areas are affected or not based on EIA raises questions about direct and indirect impacts of
projects and how they are addressed by all the stakeholders.
During the Consultative Community Assembly, validation of elders/leaders, in cases where the
ancestral domain has not been titled or where the ICC has not formulated an ADSDPP, is
undertaken (Part V, Section 24). The 2002 Guidelines conducts the validation of elders/leaders
as a separate activity. Validating authenticity of customary leadership is difficult in a
community that has a migrant population. In the case of the Manobo tribe, migrant tribal group
who came to the community four decades ago has become part of their decision-making process.
But validating cultural leadership has threatened this integration into the community.
During the Preliminary Consultative Meeting/Consultative Community Assembly, the applicant
is supposed to present the costs and benefits of the proposed project, the perceived adverse
impacts to the community, and the mitigation measures, in addition to scope and operational plan.
But communities often attest that mining companies do not tackle the environmental impacts of
their project. What are often discussed at the outset are the financial benefits and social services
that communities could receive. This approach determines the course of subsequent meetings in
the FPIC process. Given that most IP communities are poor, flaunting benefits at the outset often
cause division among communities and their leaders as there would be those immediately lured
of the benefit offers. The 2006 Guidelines adds that the applicant should include a statement of
commitment to post performance bond to take care of consequential damages to the community
(Ibid). The community, including those for or against, is supposed to be given time to ask for
clarifications and air their views regarding the proposal. But the preliminary consultation is
often held for a half or whole day and companies take most of the time presenting. In the case of
mining, given the complexity of issues, the time allotted is inadequate to deal with questions and
clarifications from the community members. Also, mining companies as illustrated by my case
studies often lack transparency and manipulate the course of the discussions and the outcome of
the process. The NCIP/FPIC Team who is only allowed to facilitate and document the
proceedings often end up supporting mining companies.
3. Consensus Building and Freedom Period
Both guidelines define consensus building as the participation of the ICCs/IPs in the decision-
making processes primarily through their indigenous socio-political structures and the
affirmation of the decisions of their duly authorized representatives (2002 & 2006 Guidelines,
Part I, Sec. 4, a). This period follows the community assembly and is strictly for the community
members and their council of elders/leaders. Only the NCIP representatives to solely document
the proceedings are allowed. This period is for the community to exercise their "own traditional
consensus building processes in order to further discern the merits and demerits of the proposal
as presented in the preliminary consultative meeting/consultative community assembly" (2002
Guidelines, I, Sec. 14, d; 2006 Guidelines, Part V, Sec. 26, c). The problem with the Consensus
Building period is that it assumes that tribal communities have the capacity for an informed and
comprehensive exchange. Such assumption fails to consider that development projects entering
IP lands, e.g. dam/hydro, mining, involve issues that are so complex, i.e. multiple stakeholders
outside the FPIC process as well as technical and scientific considerations. The enormous task
of defining the interests of the community and a corresponding long-term development plan
which could coincide with the time-scale operation of a company cannot simply be left among
the IPs without due assistance. Furthermore, because of societal pressure and influences on IPs,
in many cases the culture of IPs has been eroded. Current customary/cultural decision-making in
a number of instances have isolated tribal members and accrued benefits only to leaders.
4. Community Assembly/Decision Meeting
In the 2002 Guidelines, during the Community Assembly, the household representatives shall
vote for the proposed project by raising their hands and the council of elders/leaders will explain
the vote (II, Sec. 14, e). But in the 2006 Guidelines, during this Decision Meeting, it is the
council of elders/leaders who formally convey to the applicant the decision of the affected
community members resulting from the Consensus Building and Freedom Period (Part V, Sec.
26, d). If during the Consensus Building and Freedom Period, it has been agreed upon that
decision-making requires the participation of the community members, then voting through hand
raising by community members present during the Decision Meeting shall be used; but if the
agreed upon traditional decision-making process is bestowed on the council of elders/leaders,
then this will prevail (Ibid). The strength or weakness of the tribal institution with decision-
making authority influences the outcome of FPIC. Bribery and corruption of tribal leaders
instigated by inimical interests is not uncommon at this stage. The lack of necessary skills and
knowledge to make a sound decision for the whole village is a tremendous challenge to tribal
leadership-and their decisions have to be made under time pressure.
In both guidelines, the terms and conditions for the approval of the proposed project shall be
translated into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to be signed by the applicant's authorized
representative, the authorized council of elders/leaders as designated by them, and the
Chairperson of the NCIP as the third party or the Regional Director where allowed (2002
Guidelines, III, Sec. 24; 2006 Guidelines, Part VIII, Sec. 46). The 2006 Guidelines requires a
Resolution of Consent (ROC)'l from the authorized IP elders/leaders in case of approval (Part V,
Section 28). In case of acceptance of the project, the MOA is drafted by the NCIP Provincial
Legal Officer or the Regional Legal Officer and the FPIC Team (2006 Guidelines, Part VIII,
Section 43). A version translated to the language of the IPs should also be made (Ibid). Again,
the crucial element of translation and communication plays a big role in the final agreement and
the ensuing negotiation for alternatives in case of non-approval. Because the FPIC process is
highly influenced by the proponent company as my case studies demonstrate, even if the MOA is
translated in the local dialect, the IPs need legal assistance during the review and signing of the
MOA.
Should the proposed project be rejected, reasons for the rejection has to be stated in writing,
including whether or not the community is open to other proposals of similar nature (2002
Guidelines, II, Section 15). An alternative proposal shall be subject to another FPIC process
(Ibid). The 2006 Guidelines requires a Resolution of Non-Consent (RNC)" to indicate the
rejection of the proposed project. The applicant may request for an explanation of the decision;
and if the applicant can address the reasons for the rejection of the project or can offer an
alternative or new proposal, the council of elders/leaders may require for another period to
10 A Resolution of Consent refers to the resolution adopted by the affected ICC/IP community through their
elders/leaders expressing their acceptance of the plan, program, project or activity.
" A Resolution of Non-Consent refers to the resolution adopted by the affected ICC/IP community through their
elders/leaders expressing their non-acceptance of the plan, program, project or activity and stating the reasons
thereof.
reconsider their decision, as long as this period does not exceed 15 days beyond the 55-day
period (Part V, Sec. 26, d).
Prior to the MOA signing, the 2006 Guidelines directs the NCIP Legal Affairs Office (LAO) to
review the document for legal advise before the Ancestral Domains Office (ADO) endorses this
together with the FPIC report to the NCIP Commission (Part VIII, Section 44). The MOA
signing, in case of approval of the project, or the written Resolution of Non-Consent, in case of
rejection, formalizes the issuance of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) by the concerned
indigenous community with respect to the entry and/or operation of the applicant.
CHAPTER THREE
MINING IN THE PHILIPPINES
MINERALS, PRODUCTION VALUE, ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION
The Philippines is rich in mineral resources. It is one of the world's top ten producers of gold,
copper, nickel, and chromite. In 2005, the country received the Mining Journal Awards for
being short-listed as among the 120 mining destinations in the world, i.e. among the top 120
countries that has made significant policy improvements to attract mining investment
(http://www.mgb.gov.ph/news/2005-1201award.htm retrieved on March 10, 2008 at 10:45 PM).
Out of the total 30 million hectares of land in the country, 9 million hectare or 30% is identified
to have high metallic mineral deposits (MGB Briefing Kit on Philippine Minerals Sector, 2004).
There is also an abundant non-metallic and industrial minerals in the country, among them are
limestone, marble, guano, dolomite, clays, feldspar, rock aggregates, and other quarry resources
(Ibid). The MGB's data on mineral reserves show that the country has about 7.1 billion metric
tons (BMT) of metallic mineral reserves and 51 billion BMT of non-metallic minerals. The
University of Hawaii's East-West Studies Center reports that the Philippines has the third largest
gold reserves in the world, the fourth largest copper reserves and the sixth largest chromite
endowment (Mining Revisited, 1999, p. 10). The MGB's 2006 data shows nickel reserves to
have increased to 1.53 BMT.
Another 1.5% or about 420,000 hectare of the total land area of the county is currently covered
by mining rights (MGB Briefing Kit on Philippine Minerals Sector, 2004). But adding up the
coverage of the mining rights issued by MGB in 2006, including leasehold contracts as of 2004
already yield a total of 627,854.84 hectares (Table 6). Since 1979-2003, metallic minerals have
accounted for 61% of the country's mineral production while the share of non-metallic minerals
was 39% (Ibid). Gold contributed 60% and copper 21%. In 2006, MGB reports that the gross
production value of mining (including non-metallic minerals) has reached 68.4 Billion Philippine
Peso (PhP) or US$ 1,299,957,61812. The share of metallic minerals is now more than 80% and
the rest comes from non-metallic minerals.
The Gross Value Added (GVA) 13 of mining has been increasing from 2002-2006. In 2002, it
was registered at 21% and has increased to 28% since. In 2006, the estimated GVA at current
prices in 2006 reached 59.7 Billion Philippine Peso (PhP) or US$ 1,134,612,132.
In addition, the mining industry's contribution to exports in 2006 amounted to 2.06 Billion US
dollars, a 151% increase from the US$820 Million record in 2005. Gold, copper, and
nickel are the top mineral exports with Japan, Australia, Canada, China, and Korea as major
markets.
The mining industry also generates income for national and local governments in the form of
taxes, fees, and royalties. A total of PhP 2,938.4 Million [US$ 55, 844.96] was collected by
12 All currency conversion for mining data is based on the Central Bank of the Philippines' January 2006 monthly
average rate which is PhP52.6171 to one US dollar.13 Gross Value Added measures the contribution of a particular sector to the country's GNP; computed by
subtracting the cost of production inputs from the gross output of a certain industry. Total GVA does not include
crude oil.
national and local governments in 2005. The estimated national and local taxes to be generated
for 2006 is PhP 3.1 Billion [US$ 58,916,207.85].
Chart 1: Proportions of Land Area in the Philippines with Potential for Metallic Minerals
and Area Covered by Mining Permits
Source: MGB Briefing Kit on the Philippine Minerals Sector (2004 Update)
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Table 4: Philippine Metallic Mineral Reserves, 1996
Mineral Estimated Reserves in Metric Tons
Gold 162,764,000
Copper 4,052,087,000
Nickel 132,747,000 (increased to 1.53 BMT in 2006)
Chromite 36,667,000
Source: MGB/AGHAM
Table 5: Taxes, Fees, and Royalties from Mining, 2005
Fees, Charges & Royalties collected by 210.2 Million Pesos US$ 3,994,899
DENR-MGB
Excise Tax Collected by BIR 177.9 Million Pesos US$ 3,381,030.12
Taxes Collected by National Government 2,319.9 Million Pesos US$ 3,807,125.44
Agencies
Taxes and Fees Collected by LGUs 230.4 Million Pesos US$ 4,378,804.61
TOTAL 2,938.4 Million Pesos US$ 55,844.96
Source: MGB Mining Industry Statistics released 30 March 2007
The Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Mining Act (DENR Administrative
Order No. 40 Series of 1996) also mandates that companies allocate 1% of the direct mining
costs'4/milling costs 15 for the development of host communities 16 and neighboring
communities/barangays (Section 134). In addition, the law requires the payment of a royalty fee
to the concerned indigenous community in the amount that is not less than one percent (1%) of
the contractor's gross output (Chapter IV, Section 16). The expenses that a mining company
incurs for community development could be charged against the royalty fee of the IPs (Ibid).
The MGB calculates the amount committed by mining companies for the development of host
and neighboring communities at PhP492 Million in 2006. This amount corresponds to 380
14 Direct mining costs refer to the expenditures directly incurred in all activities preparatory to and in the actual
extraction of the ore from the earth and transporting it to the mill plant for mineral processing.
15 Direct milling costs refer to the expenditures incurred in the mechanical and physical processing and/or chemical
separation of the ore from the waste to produce marketable mineral products.
16 A host community refers to the residents of the barangay/s outside the mine camp, where the mining project is
located.
barangays which are said to have benefited through the approved Social Development and
Management Program (SDMP) 17 of mining companies. As of March 2006, MGB record shows
32 mining companies with approved SDMP (http://www.mgb.gov.ph/). There are no figures
specific to what has been allocated and actually given to the indigenous peoples, apart from what
barangay governments are supposedly receiving.
MINING RIGHTS
In 1995, Republic Act 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 was enacted
to revitalize the mining industry. The law changed the mode of disposition of mineral lands
from a leasehold 18 system to mining agreements. The law establishes three mining rights:
Exploration Permit (EP); Mineral Agreement; Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA). The exploration permit grants the right to conduct exploration for a period of two years
subject to renewal upon the recommendation of the Director of the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau (MGB) (RA 7942, Ch. IV). An EP is allowed for a maximum of eight years after which
it has to be converted to a Mineral Agreement or a FTAA. Mineral Agreements are of three
kinds: Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA); Co-Production Agreement (CA); Joint
Venture Agreement (JVA). The MPSA is an "agreement where the Government grants to the
contractor the exclusive right to conduct mining operations" within a contract area 20 and shares
17 The SDMP refers to the plans and programs of a mining company in enhancing the development of the host and
neighboring communities. These programs include community development projects and activities such as
establishment, construction and maintenance of infrastructures including schools, hospitals, roads, and the like;
establishment of livelihood industries; and programs on education and health.
18 In the leasehold system, the government leases the area or gives surface rights to a contractor for a fixed rate or
rental and not on what or much was extracted.
19 Mining operations refer to activities involving exploration, feasibility, development, utilization, and processing
in the gross output" (RA 7942 Ch. V). In a CA, Government contributes inputs to the mining
operations other than the mineral resources, e.g. technology or personnel. And a JVA is where
both Government and the contractor organize a joint venture company with both having equity
shares (Ibid). In addition, Government is entitled to the gross output of the mining venture.
Only Filipino individuals (which include IPs) and corporations (at least 60% Filipino owned, at
most 40% foreign-owned) are allowed to apply for a Mineral Agreement. A Mineral Agreement
has a term of 25 years and renewable for another 25 years. The Exploration Permit and Financial
or Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) allows foreign corporations a 100% ownership of a
mining project. The terms and conditions for a FTAA including government share are
negotiated. The FTAA which fully liberalizes the law is a 25-year contract and is renewable for
the same period.
Table 6: Types of Mining Rights under RA 7942
TYPE OF MINING MAXIMUM TERM QUALIFIED
RIGHT AREA (HA.) PERSON
Exploration Permit 32,000 onshore 2 years; renewable to Individuals or
(EP) 81,000 offshore a maximum of 8 Filipino or foreign
years corporations
Mineral Agreement 16,200 onshore 25 years; renewable Individuals or
(MPSA, CA, JVA) 40,500 offshore for 25 years Filipino corporations
Financial or Technical 81,000 onshore 25 years; renewable Filipino or foreign
Assistance Agreement 324,000 offshore for 25 years corporations
(FTAA)
Source: MGB Primers
Mining is classified into large-scale and small-scale. Small Scale Mining Permit grants the
contractor the right to explore, develop, and utilize mineral deposits in areas 20 hectares or less.
The Small-scale Mining Act of 1991 (RA 7076) defines small-scale mining as referring to
20 Contract area refers to the land or body of water delineated for purposes of exploration, development, or
utilization of the minerals found therein.
activities which rely on heavy manual labor using simple supplements and methods and do not
use explosion or heavy mining equipment. Small-scale mining application is under the
Provincial/City Regulatory Mining Board (PRMB).21
As of January 31, 2008, the MGB has issued a total of 768 mining rights/tenements. This data
includes Individual Permits issued only until the 3rd quarter of 2006 and Lease Contracts as of
September 2004. As to applications, the 2006 3r d quarter data shows a total of 2,252 being
processed. In the same period, there are 18 operating metallic mines and 2,736 non-metallic
mines.
Table 7: Number of Approved and Registered Mining Rights as of January 2008
TYPE OF MINING RIGHT NUMBER OF ISSUED AREA (HA.)
AGREEMENT (APPROVED
& REGISTERED
Mineral Production Sharing 262 422.804.06
Agreement (MPSA)
Financial or Technical Assistance 2 47,308.26
Agreement (FTAA)
Exploration Permit (EP) 30 117,942.52
Mineral Processing Permit (MPP) 33
Leasehold Contracts/Patents 312* (as of September 2004) 39,800
Individual Permit (IP) 129* (2006 3rd Quarter Data) No data
TOTAL 768 627,854.84
Source: MGB (http://www.mgb.gov.ph/; Mining Industry Statistics released 30 March 2007; Briefing Kit on the
Philippine Mineral Sector, 2004)
21 The Provincial Regulatory Mining Board is the local implementing agency under the direct supervision and
control of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The Board is created
under Republic Act No. 7076 or known as "People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 ". The Board can award
contracts, settle disputes, formulate and implement rules and guidelines.
Table 8: Number of Mining Rights Application under Process as of 2006 3rd Quarter
TYPE OF MINING RIGHT NUMBER OF
APPLICATIONS UNDER
PROCESS
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) 1.278
Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement (FFAA) 55
Exploration Permits (EP) 590
Individual Permit (IP) 295
Mineral Processing Permit (MPP) 34
TOTAL 2,252
Source: MGB Mining Industry Statistics released 30 March 2007
Table 9: Number of Operating Metallic Mines
METALLIC MINERAL NUMBER OF OPERATING
METALLIC MINES
Copper (with gold & silver) 1
Gold (with silver) 7
Metallurgical Chromite (ore & concentrate) 2
Refractory Chromite 1
Chemical Grade Chromite 1
Nickel 5
Nickel Concentrate 1
TOTAL 18
Source: MGB Mining Industry Statistics released 30 March 2007
CHAPTER FOUR
OVERLAPPING MINING RIGHTS AND ANCESTRAL LANDS
Mining areas are often found where indigenous peoples dwell. The Philippines is said to be
home to 12 million indigenous peoples also known as Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs).
The IPs/ICCs are considered to be descendants of the original inhabitants who have managed to
resist colonization and have retained their customs, traditions, and way of life
(http://www.ncip.gov.ph/resources/ethno.php retrieved on March 15, 2008 at 5:00 PM). The
IPRA defines IPs/ICCs as
A group of people or homogenous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by
others, who have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded
and defined territory and, who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial,
occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language,
customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to
political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and
cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall
likewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from
the populations which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or colonization, or at
the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of
present state boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural
and political institutions, but who may have been displaced from their traditional domains
or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains (Chapter II, Section 3, h).
The ICCs/IPs in the country are composed of 110 ethnolinguistic groups found in the various
parts of the archipelago (http://www.ncip.gov.ph/resources/ethno alphabet.php retrieved on
March 16,2008 at 9:30 PM). The table below presents the major indigenous tribes found in the
three major regions of the Philippines.
Table 10: Major Indigenous Groups in the Philippines
LUZON
Cordillera: Collective Name "Igorot"
1. Tingguian
2. Isneg
3. Northern Kalinga
4. Bontoc
5. Sagada
6. Ifugao
7. Southern Kalinga
8. Itawis (Itawit)
9. Malaweg
10. Yogad
11. Gaddang (Gad'ang)
12. Kalinga-Isabela
13. Isinay
14. Bugkalot (Ilongot)
North, Central, & Southern Luzon:
Collective Name: "Negrito"
15. Alta
16. Arta
17. Agta
18. Aeta
19. Ayta
20. Atta
21. Ati
22. Dumagat
23. Sinauna
VISAYAS
Mindoro Group: Collective Name:
"Mangyan"
24. Tadyawan
25. Alangan
26. Iraya
27. Buhid
28. Taobuid
29. Hanunuo
30. Banngon
31. Ratagnon
Palawan
32. Agutaynen
33. Tagbanwa (Kalamianen)
34. Palaw'an
35. Malbog
36. Batak
37. Tau't batu
38. Cuyonin (Kuyonen)
39. Agutaynen
40. Tagbanwa
41. Kagayanen
Mindanao
Non-islamized: Collective Name "Lumad"
Major Clusters
42. Manobo
43. Bagobo-B'laan-T'boli-Tiruray
44. Mandaya-Mansaka
45. Subanen
46. Mamanwa
(There are 18 lumad groups under the major
clusters)
Source: International Work Group for Indigenous
2008 at 6:00 PM)
Islamized: Collective Name "Moro"
Badjaw
Maguindanaw/o
Iranun/Ilanun
Kalibugan
Maranaw/o
Pullun Mapun
Samal
Sangil
Tausug
Yakan
Affairs (http://www.iwgia.org/sw 16704.asp retrieved on March 15,
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Map 3: Mining Concessions and Applications
p~)
Source: Environmental Science bor Social Change
Figure 1: Summary of Data Showing Overlap Between Mining Areas and Ancestral
Domains
Source: ESSC, Mining Revisited, 1999
The cultural zones or domains of indigenous peoples comprise 13,116,817 hectares, that is, 44%
of the entire land area of the country (ESSC, 1999). With the IPRA, government began to
formally recognize the right of indigenous peoples to their cultural zones or domains by
awarding IPs/ICCs a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim (CADC) and a Certificate of
Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). Prior to the establishment of NCIP, a CADC was issued by the
DENR. When the NCIP was set-up, it continued to process applications for CADCs and also
took over the conversion process for CADCs to CADTs. The NCIP and the concerned IP/ICC
had to go through the same process of survey, delineation, and certification to convert the latter's
claim (CADC) to a title (CADT). In 2004, the NCIP removed the process for CADC application,
establishing direct application for a CADT.
In 1998, there were 181 CADCs issued by the DENR with a total area of 2,546,036 hectares
(ESSC, 1999). This figure is 19% of the total area of cultural zones or domains. At that time,
Area (Ha.) Percentage
Total land area of the Philippines 30,000,000 100%
Cultural Zones 13,116,817 44%
Total area of awarded CADCs 2,546,036
Total area covered by mining applications 9,093,886
Total area covered by mining concessions 295,534
Mining applications in CADC areas 1,199,849 53%
Mining concessions in CADC areas 28,111 1%
Mining applications in cultural zones 4,945.812 38%
Mining concessions in cultural zones 176,966 1%
mining applications reached 1,154 with a total area of 9,093,886 (ESSC, 1999). Mining rights or
concessions totaled to 295,534 hectares (Ibid).
A total of 4,945.812 hectares of mining applications were in cultural zones (Ibid). Also,
1,199,849 hectares of mining applications were within CADC areas. As to mining rights or
concessions, 176,966 hectares were located in cultural zones while mining concessions within
CADCs were at 28,111 hectares (Ibid).
The cultural zones/domains map above depicts only 145 CADCs representing 2,275,171 hectares
(Ibid). ESSC estimates that 53% of the 145 CADCs are covered by mining applications while
38% are within cultural zones. At that time, only 1% of mining activities were within CADCs
and cultural zones (Ibid). But given the applications, over half of the CADC area was projected
to be affected (Ibid).
This projection is not far from what it was as of February 2001 where indigenous lands covered
by mining applications already reached 14,498,526, that is, 48.3% of the total land area of the
country (http://projectgaling.blogspot.com/2008/02/after-edsa-mindanaoan-indigenous.html
retrieved on March 15. 2008 at 11:45PM). With the present government's 23 top priority mining
projects from 2004-2010, 18 are said to be located in ancestral domains (Ibid). And of the 18, 11
are in Mindanao. Five out of the 11 are in Region XIII.
Table 11: 23 Major Mining Projects of the Arroyo Government
Project Location Proponent Mineral Potential
Products Investment
1. Rapu Rapu Rapu Rapu Island, Lafayette Phil, Inc. (With Copper, 42,000,000
Polymetallic Albay Lafayette NL of Gold,
Project (Luzon) Australia, LG Collins and Silver, Zinc
KORES of South Korea)
2. Palawan HPP Bataraza, Palawan Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Mixed 180,000,000
Project (Luzon) Corp.and Coral Bay sulfides of
(The Project Mining Corp. (Sumitomo nickel and
consists of 2 Mining & Metals Corp.; cobalt
components: a Mitsui Co., Ltd & Nissho (HPAL
nickel processing Iwai Corp.,of Japan Process)
& limestone
mining)
3. Masbate Gold Aroroy, Masbate Filminera Resources Gold, Silver 100,000,000
Project (Luzon) Corp. (With Thistle
Mining Corporation of
Canada.)
4. Direct State Monkayo, Natural Resources Gold, Silver 2,000,000
Development Compostela Mining Development
Project Valley Corporation
(Mindanao)
5. Adlay- Surigao del Norte Case Mining and Devt. Nickel ore 15,000,000
Cadianao- (Mindanao, Corp and CTP (laterite)
Tandawa (ACT) Region XIII) Construction and Mining
Project Corporation (With QNI
Phils,Inc & BHP-
Billiton)
6. Nonoc Iron Nonoc Island Pacific Nickel Phils., Inc. Iron fines 7,000,000
Fines Project Surigao del Norte
(Mindanao,
Region XIII)
7. Siana Gold Surigao del Norte JCG Resources Gold 10,000,000
Project (Mindanao, Corporation
Region XIII )
8. Didipio Nueva Vizcaya Climax Arimco Mining Copper, 63,000,000
Copper-Gold (Luzon) Corporation (With Gold, Silver
Project Climax Mining Ltd of
Australia)
9. Teresa Gold Mankayan, Lepanto Consolidated Gold, Silver 80,000,000
Project Benguet Mining Corp.
(Luzon)
10. Padcal Tuba, Benguet Philex Mining Copper, 15,000,000
Copper Expansion (Luzon) Corporation Gold, Silver
Project (Pan Pacific Co. Ltd.)
11. King King Compostela Benguet Corp. and Copper, 532,000,000
Copper-Gold Valley Nationwide Development Gold, Silver
Project (Mindanao) Corporation
12. Tampakan South Cotabato Sagittarius Mines, Inc. Copper, 500,000,000
Copper Project (Mindanao) (With Indophil,Inc. MIM Gold, Silver
Holdings ofAust. &
Alsons Devt Co.)
13. Itogon Gold Benguet Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. Gold, Silver 10,000,000
Project (Luzon)
14. Canatuan Zamboanga del TVI Resources Devt. Gold, Silver 7,000,000
Gold Project Norte Phils., Inc. (TV1 Pacific,
(Mindanao) Inc.)
15. Far-Southeast Benguet Lepanto Cons. Mining Copper, 500,000,000
Gold Project (Luzon) Company (CRA) Gold, Silver
16. Boyongan Surigao del Norte Silangan Mindanao Copper, 500,000,000
Copper Project (Mindanao, Mining Corporation Gold, Silver
Region XIII) (Anglo American)
17. Pujada Nickel Davao Oriental Asiaticus (BHP-Billiton) Nickel 1,000,000,000
Project (Mindanao)
18. Toledo Toledo City, Cebu Toledo Copper Plc. Copper, 100,000,000
Copper Project (Visayas) Gold, Silver
19. San Antonio Sta. Cruz, Marcopper Mining Copper 100,000,000
Copper Project Marinduque Corporation
(Luzon)
20. Mindoro Mindoro Oriental Aglubang Mining Nickel, 1,000,000,000
Nickel Project (Luzon) Corp./Crew Development Cobalt
Corporation
21. Nonoc Nickel Nonoc Island Nonoc Processing Corp./ Nickel, 1,000,000,000
Project Surigao del Norte Philnico Cobalt
(Mindanao,
Region XIII)
22. Batong Pasil, Kalinga Batong Buhay Gold Copper, 200,000,000
Buhay Gold (Luzon) Mines Inc./ Gold
Project PMO/NRMDC
23. Amacan Maco, Compostela North Davao Mining Copper, 200,000,000
Copper Project Valley Corp./PMO/NRMDC Gold
(Mindanao)
TOTAL I 1 1 6,163,000,000
Source: MGB (http://www.meb.eov.ph n
23projects.htm)
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CHAPTER FIVE
This chapter presents what transpired during the process of securing the Free, Prior, and
Informed Consent (FPIC) by the Mamanwa tribe in the municipality of Claver, Agusan del Sur,
with respect to the application of the Taganito Mining Corporation for a Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement (MPSA) and the Manobo tribe in the municipality of Rosario, Agusan del
Sur in relation to the application of PHILSAGA Mining Corporation for a similar mineral
agreement.
My goal was to answer the following questions:
1. How are decisions made in each indigenous community? What usual methods are used in the
process governing FPIC in relation to mineral development? Are the decision-mechanisms
adequate to the task of a free, prior, and informed consent?
2. What development plans were in effect in the indigenous community prior to the FPIC
process? Has the development resulting from the FPIC process been consistent with the long-
term development plans of the indigenous community?
3. What are the on-going involvements of the indigenous community after mining is approved?
CASE ONE: THE FPIC EXPERIENCE OF THE MAMANWA TRIBE IN TAGANITO
AND URBIZTONDO OF CLAVER, SURIGAO DEL NORTE
FIELD-BASED INVESTIGATION (FBI)
On February 24, 2006, in accordance with the FPIC Guidelines of 2002, the NCIP Regional
Director constituted the Field Based Investigation (FBI) Team and instructed the members to
conduct a FBI in relation to the application of the Taganito Mining Corporation (TMC) for a
conversion of their Mining Contract to a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA). The
team was directed to carry out the FBI on February 27-28 and March 1-3 in barangays
Cagdianao, Hayanggabon, Taganito, and Urbiztondo of the municipality of Claver, Surigao del
Norte. In addition, the work order indicated that the team was entitled to claim from TMC their
travel allowances, per diems, and other actual incidental expenses incurred while on field
(Report on FBI and FPIC, Annex B). The 2002 Guidelines stipulate a fixed amount of PhP5,000
to be paid by the applicant to the NCIP for the conduct of FBI (Section 13, a).
According to the 2002 Guidelines, the FBI team was responsible for undertaking a review of
relevant secondary data within 15 days from the receipt of the work order before proceeding with
the FBI. Apparently, this task was not completed either because there were no available
secondary data sources pertinent to the project or because the time was too limited (2 days before
the FBI). In either case the FBI Team Report on March 6 did not indicate that a review of
secondary sources of data relating to the project had been completed.
The FBI team included the following members: 1) Mr. Eulo Nogan, the FBI Team leader, is the
Development Management Officer (DMO)-II in the regional office; 2) Mr. Josue Duhac,
regional Technical Assistance Affairs (TAA)-II; 3) Ms. Juralyn Lorchano, Community Affairs
Officer (CAO)-I representing the Community Service Center (CSC) office; and 4) Mr. Allan
Pareja, who according to the NCIP Administrative Officer (AO)-IV and also Officer-in-Charge
(OIC) of the CSC in Bad-as, is Technical Assistance Affairs (TAA)-I. The fact that he held this
position was never indicated in the documents describing him as FBI Team member. He was
simply identified as the Representative of the Commissioner in the FBI Team Report (FBI &
FPIC Report, Annex F). In three other documents he was simply referred to as FBI Team
Member (Annex G-1, I-1, M). The name of the AO-IV and CSC OIC of Bad-as, Mrs. Villarica
Lumancas, appears later in the FBI Report as an authorized member of the FBI Team (Annex F).
The 2002 Guidelines specifies that the FBI Team shall consist of not less than five members, two
of whom should come from the Regional Office while the other three are supposed to be from
the Provincial Office or the Community Service Center (CSC) (Section 9, a). In this case, the
FBI Team then had three members from the Regional Office and two from the CSC.
The Acting Provincial Officer who was also the Legal Officer indicated to me that the selection
of the FBI Team members was within the authority of the region. It was also noted that the FPIC
process was region-centered. The provincial office apparently had no knowledge that the entire
FPIC process was completed (Interviewee No. 5).
There were eight people interviewed during the FBI which included barangay officials, the tribal
council of elders and leaders in the four barangays (Annex F). A questionnaire was used to
ascertain how long the interviewees had lived in said barangays, whether they understood the
classification of the areas and what they know about the indigenous peoples in the area. One of
the answered questionnaires (designated as Annex C in the FBI and FPIC Report) reveals that
the interview took place on February 11, even before the Regional Director ordered the FBI
Team to undertake the FBI. This document is corroborated by a Certificate of Appearance
signed by two members of the FBI Team indicating that they were in the barangay on February
11 for the purpose of undertaking the FBI. The other NCIP staff is not one among those
indicated in the work order of the Regional Director. The Certificate of Appearance to the Local
Government Unit (LGU), the staff notes that he is part of the FBI Team. The list of authorized
FBI Team members in the March 6 Report does not include this person. It could be that he was
designated to undertake the activity on behalf of one of those FBI Team member designated by
the Regional Director. In the report, the CSC OIC of Bad-as was indicated as an authorized
member of the FBI Team.
The FBI Report confirmed that the MPSA application of the TMC was within the ancestral
domain claim of the Mamanwa tribe. It reiterated that the MPSA application covered four
barangays of Cagdianao, Hayanggabon, Taganito, and Urbiztondo without specifying the extent
of the application which is said to be 4,976.03 hectares (FBI & FPIC Report, Recommendation
for a Certification Precondition dated July 31, 2006). The Report did not indicate the estimated
population of Mamanwa in the project area. This lack of data had an impact on the
determination of the number of houses to be built by TMC for the Mamanwas in barangays
Taganito and Urbiztondo, the two IP "affected areas". According to the Mamanwas and an FBI
Team member, the TMC based the number of houses that needed to be constructed on the old
census, which indicated 48 households while the interviewees claimed that the current number of
households at the time of the FPIC process was 64 or 65 (Interviewees Nos. 1, 9). A TMC
officer likewise said that during the FPIC process, there were 60 families in Taganito and
Urbiztondo combined. Furthermore, the March 6 report did not contain the required initial
documentation of the existing decision-making process of the Mamanwa tribe or the list of tribal
leaders. Even with this very limited report relative to the requirement of the Guidelines, the FBI
Team nonetheless recommended going forward with the effort to secure the Mamanwa tribe's
Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC).
The FBI commenced and ended with a lack of data that added to the confusion that followed.
The missing documentation could have helped the Mamanwas make better decisions regarding
what might happen over the next 25 years. To illustrate, if the overlap of indigenous land and
mining areas had been verified, the Mamanwas might have demanded that the mining operation
not encroach on forestlands. As it turned out, the company simply guaranteed that there would be
no impact on forest lands (FBI & FPIC Report, Annex I-2 and 1-3). If the FBI Team was not
able to verify all the relevant data beforehand due to its lack of technical capability, it could have
recommended further verification as part of what needed to be done by the stakeholders as part
of their decision-making process. In other words, the FBI Team, if prepared adequately prior to
the preliminary consultative meeting, could have helped the Mamanwas frame a more complete
statement of their demands by helping everyone understand what questions still needed to be
answered and what data gaps needed to be filled. Perhaps the team members were under time
pressures from higher authorities to complete their assignment (as suggested by the timeline
outlined above). Nevertheless, in the end, the legitimacy of the Team and the process was
apparently compromised.
Two additional bits of evidence raise related concerns. The letter of the Team recommended the
issuance of a Certification Precondition despite the Team's acknowledgement that the only
secondary data submitted by the applicant were a request letter addressed to the Regional
Director (Annex A), a project location map (Annex A-1), and a three-year development plan
(Annex A-2) which actually covers the period from 2004-2006. During my interviews with the
Mamanwas, an FBI team member seemed to be trying to shape the answers of the interviewees.
Despite this, the Mamanwas managed to make some of their concerns known.
PRELIMINARY CONSULTATIVE MEETING
Surprisingly, four days after the report (March 10), the Regional Director issued a directive to
the FBI Team to conduct the Preliminary Consultative Meeting on March 13 (FBI & FPIC
Report, Annex G-l). The team informed the tribal leaders and elders of the aforementioned four
barangays and posted bond-size paper notices inviting members of the Mamanwa tribe in
adjacent municipalities that are part of the tribe's application for a Certificate of Ancestral
Domain Title (CADT). The notices were in English and Bisaya which is the local dialect of
migrants, but is understood and also spoken by most of the Mamanwa in the area.
The meeting which was announced to start at 8:00 AM actually commenced at 11:00 AM in the
Barangay (Taganito) Gymnasium. It ended at 3:00 PM. If the list of attendees is accurate (N.B.
many of the entries suggest that they could have been written by a few who are able to write),
there were almost 300 participants at the consultative meeting. Most of them appear to be
Mamanwa members from barangays Taganito and Urbiztondo along with a few from the
municipalities of Bakwag, Tubod, Gigaquit, and Alegria. The Mamanwa tribe's application for
an Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) is within these four municipalities and Claver. The
Mamanwas affirmed that that the meeting was attended by all tribal leaders (Interviewees Nos. 1
& 2). They indicated that the consultation was attended by most of the household members in
Taganito and Urbiztondo. According to an officer of the TMC, this meeting was "very
expensive"; costing PhP300,000 [US$ 5,725.45]22 (Interviewee No. 8).
This consultation is remembered by the Mamanwas as the one at which NCIP brought a tribal
datu/chieftain from another province who performed a ritual that was not in accordance with
their culture (Interviewee No. 9). This was noted by the Provincial Consultative Body (PCB)23
Chairman who is also a tribal council leader of Gigaquit (FBI & FPIC Report, Annex G-2). Also,
the Mamanwas remember this meeting as the venue where TMC presented benefits and promises
(Interviewees No. 1). The interviewees reported that very few questions had been asked. A
TMC officer confirmed that the meeting was more of a presentation of the company's plans and
activities (i.e. what their product is; what the process is they use in mining, and what the benefits
are that they provide to communities (Interviewee No. 8).
The 2002 Guidelines do not explicitly prohibit the Regional Director (RD) from attending the
consultative meeting (although the 2006 Guidelines do). The opening message of the Regional
Director at the Preliminary Consultative Meeting talked of the ownership rights of IPs to their
ancestral domain as mandated by the IPRA [and as such they have the right to decide whether to
22 All currency conversion for the Mamanwa case is based on the Central Bank of the Philippines' July 2006
monthly average rate which is PhP 52.3796 to one US dollar. I am using July 2006 as this is the month in which the
MOA was signed and the Compliance Certificate has been issued.
23 The Provincial Consultative Body is an advisory body created by the NCIP. It consists of traditional leaders,
elders, and representatives from women and youth sectors from different ICCs/IPs.
allow the company to continue operating within their ancestral domain]. He also made it clear
that the IPs should be grateful to the President and Senators for the creation of IPRA. More
importantly, the RD's opening statements underscored that the assembly was the moment for the
IPs to decide "if you want your living condition to change or not" (FBI & FPIC Report, Annex
G-2). He dubbed the activity as a critical determinant of the future of the IPs, whether their life
would yield success or failure. An NCIP officer noted to me that the NCIP Director should have
not been in the Consultative Meeting as this put pressure on the IPs (Interviewee No. 9).
A presentation of the benefits that the IPs would receive followed the RD's message. Here, the
officer of the TMC disclosed that the Mamanwa community would receive 16% of the amount of
the 1% of the direct mining costs that the company is paying to the barangay. According to him,
the benefits would also include housing materials, medical and educational assistance and PhP
500,000 [US$9,542.42] for livelihood projects. Another TMC representative discussed the
application of the company for a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement. His explanation
included information regarding TMC as being partly co-owned by the Japanese and supplying
nickel to Japan and Australia. The representative claimed that there were 219 regular employees
and more than 400 contractual and seasonal hires.
My interview with a TMC officer revealed that the company only started to pay 1% of the direct
mining costs to the barangays of Hayanggabon, Urbiztondo, and Taganito in 2000 in fulfillment
of the 1996 Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Mining Act (Interviewee No. 8).
Section 134 of the IRR mandates the allocation of 1% of the direct mining and milling costs for
the development of the host community and its neighboring communities. The company has the
option to charge the community development expenses from the 1% of the direct mining costs to
the 1% of the company's gross output which IPs are entitled to as royalty payment. A
community livelihood cooperative store, called Prime Investments, managed by the Community
Technical Working Group (CTWG) of Taganito is funded from the 1% of the direct mining costs
in 2000 (Interviewee No. 6).
The difference between the 1% of the direct mining costs and the 1% of the gross output as
royalty fee to the IPs and the aforementioned option of the company did not appear to be clear to
the Mamanwas. The PCB Chairman/ tribal council leader, during the open forum, commented
that 16% from the amount of the 1% of the direct mining costs was too small. The TMC
representative's and the NCIP FBI Team's response indicated that the tribe will end up with a
total benefit of 1.16%, with the latter not being clear of where the additional 1% was coming
from (Report on FBI and FPIC, Annex G2). Whether the two intended to confuse the IPs or
whether they themselves were confused, I have no way of telling. But their responses certainly
kept the IPs in the dark as subsequent discussions reveal.
Furthermore, it was not explained that the 1% of the direct mining cost is "in the hands of the
company" (Interviewees Nos. 6 & 8) and therefore the 16% from the 1% is something that does
not go directly to the tribe. The manner by which the 1% is accessed is through a project
proposal which is approved by the Mine Rehabilitation Fund Committee (MRFC) 24 in
accordance with the 5-year Social Development and Management Program (SDMP) of the
24 The MRFC is chaired by the Regional Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) and the Regional
Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources as co-chair. It also consists of
representatives from the local government units, the mining company/contractor, and non-government organizations
and peoples' organizations in the community.
company which is translated into an Annual SDMP (Interviewees Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 12). The rules
state that 90% of the 1% of the direct mining costs shall be allocated to implement the SDMP
and 10% is for the development of mining technology and geosciences and manpower training
and development (http://www.mgb.gov.ph/, MGB Primer on SDMP). TMC's 5-year SDMP was
approved in December 2002 with an allocation of PhP 8,904,072 for its implementation (MGB,
Approved SDMP, March 2006). But as earlier stated, the company did not start paying the 1% of
the direct mining costs in 2000 (Interviewee No.8).
The current CTWG Chairman who was TMC's Community Relations Officer (CRO) at the time
of the FPIC process indicated that the CTWG was established in 2000 to monitor the
implementation of the SDMP, i.e. 1% of the direct mining costs. But during the latter part of my
interview, he said that the first Chairman of CTWG was appointed in 2005, and the second in
2006-2008 of January, and that he is the third and he got elected January 10, 2008 without his
knowledge. A TMC officer confirmed that the CTWG is in an inchoate stage (Interviewee No.
8). The FBI member/CSC OIC of Bad-as communicated that the CTWG consists of 20 members
representing different sectors of the three "affected" barangays, namely the barangay captains,
church/religious sects, fisherfolks, farmers, women, the Department of Education, Health, the
Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), the NCIP, the MGB, the TMC, and two tribal leaders of
Taganito (Datu Rizal Buklas) and Urbiztondo (Datu Alfredo Oloriko). There are only two tribal
leaders on the CTWG since Hayanggabon, even if it is part of the considered "affected areas",
has no IP residents (Interviewees Nos. 1, 9, 12). The CTWG, according to the CTWG Secretary
acts as a "bridge between the community and TMC; the group is responsible for informing the
community how much money they have". She said that TMC holds assemblies to inform the
community of their money.
The first step in availing the 1% (as well as the 16% from the amount of the 1%), specifically for
livelihood purposes, is for a community member to submit a project proposal to the CTWG
(Interviewees Nos. 6, 8, 9, 12). The CTWG screens and endorses proposals for the MRFC which
then approves them. The TMC then releases a check for the purchase of the items in the
approved project, according to the CTWG Secretary. She added that what the project proponent
receives is not a check but the items indicated in the project proposal which is purchased together
with the beneficiary. The process for accessing the funds (from the 1%) for non-livelihood
projects is basically the same; only the proposal is first submitted to TMC's Community
Relations Officer (CRO) to ensure that technical matters, like those relating to infrastructure, are
dealt with by the company (Interviewee No. 12). The CRO then gives the proposal to the
CTWG to screen and then the CTWG gives it back to the CRO for further review (Ibid). The
CRO forwards the proposal to the CTWG which in turn submits the proposal to the CRMF for
approval (Ibid).
During my interview with the CTWG Chairman, he illustrated the scheme by which the 1% is
allegedly being appropriated, with the 16% (from the amount of the 1%) being divided equally
between the Mamanwas of Taganito and Urbiztondo. But what the CTWG Chairman failed to
disclose was that this scheme no longer exists. According to a TMC officer, the 16% that was
presented to the Mamanwas during the consultation as their share in the 1% direct mining costs
has been reallocated for barangays Hayanggabon and Urbiztondo (Interviewee No. 8). The
officer said that the CTWG passed a resolution in 2006 approving the new sharing scheme of the
1% of the direct mining costs with barangay Taganito (host community) having 48% share, and
barangays Hayanggabon and Urbiztondo with each a 26% share (Ibid). Did the CTWG
Chairman and the FBI Team member/ CSC OIC not know of this? At the time of my interview
with them, they were still talking about the 16% as being allotted for the Mamanwas of Taganito
and Urbiztondo. Why did the tribal leader of Urbiztondo who is part of the CTWG not mention
this change? The TMC officer said the new scheme was approved in 2006. Was it before the
Preliminary Consultative Meeting, during the succeeding activities or after the FPIC process?
Has this something to do with why the 16% was eventually not included in the Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA)?
Going back to the open forum that took place during the consultation, a comment related to
benefits concerned the small number of IPs being employed by TMC. The TMC representative
replied that there are slots for IPs. What they need to do is first file an application. He added
that the rotation of workers helps to ensure that more people can work for the company. But a
follow-up question revealed that the previous inquiry was meant to probe why the tribal leaders
of Taganito and Urbiztondo got employed without having to go through an application process.
There was no direct reply to this question. Neither was there an explanation of company policies
regarding the employment opportunities offered or the qualifications for hiring. The Mamanwas
present at the meeting would not have been able to come away with a sense of where they stood
in terms of the employment opportunities that TMC purported to offer. Whether deliberate or
not, their responses were ambiguous. Tribal members and an elder in Taganito noted that those
who are old are not accepted to work (Interviewees No. 1). Furthermore, they complained that
no one has worked as a regular employee among them since the Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) was signed with TMC. Only seven Mamanwas were able to work for 5.5 months. They
were replaced by another batch of seven who worked for the next 5.5 months. Their work
entailed loading and maintenance related to the shipment of ores.
A crucial question and comment that also came out during the open forum concerned the
selection of a particular datu/chieftain as the tribal leader of Taganito. The IP participant
disclosed that she was not aware that the datu was already the recognized tribal leader of the
Mamanwa in that barangay (Interviewees No. 1). An FBI Team member suggested that the IP
put aside her doubts about the datu being the tribal leader in order to foster unity (FBI & FPIC
Report, Annex G-2). The FBI Team leader underscored the IP's comment and publicly noted a
leadership conflict (Ibid). Note that the Guidelines instruct the FBI Team to conduct the
validation of leaders prior to the consultative meeting. There was no documentation to prove
that such verification took place. Nor did the elders and leaders I interviewed mention that any
such verification effort took place. But, there is a Certification document dated March 13 signed
by four FBI Team members certifying that the 15 IP names on the list are the tribal leaders of the
Mamanwa as recognized by their members. If the validation session took place on the same day
as the Consultative Meeting, why did the IP participant raise the question regarding the
designated tribal leader of Taganito? And also, if the validation took place before the meeting,
why did the FBI Team leader acknowledge a leadership conflict instead of informing everyone
that a validation of leaders had taken place immediately before the meeting?
The last question was raised by a tribal leader from the municipality of Alegria which is part of
the CADT application. He asked whether they could claim a share in the benefits that TMC
described (FBI & FPIC Report, Annex G-2). My understanding of his question is, because they
are part of the ancestral domain claim, even though they are not directly affected, is whether or
not they are supposed to be part of the consent being sought? TMC's reply was a general "we
will abide by what is written in the law" (Ibid). The FBI Team leader offered a follow-up "we
will abide with the law, especially with our custom and tradition" (Ibid). What exactly that
means though, the IPs could only guess.
Both the 2002 and 2006 Guidelines state that in cases where an activity, program, or project
affects only a portion of those in an ancestral domain, then only those community/ies shall need
to give their consent (Section 16, e; Section 10, b). Why then was this important matter not
elucidated during this meeting or in the following meetings that took place?
A consultation of four hours could hardly be expected to yield a meaningful exchange. I would
argue that not even a full day would be sufficient. This is the first time that the IPs and even the
NCIP heard what the company had to present. It is natural that things would not make sense
immediately and hence, that questions would be raised. But the answers to the queries of the
Mamanwas were vague and general. The consultation did not foster a better understanding of
where the Mamanwas stood in relation to the system of benefit-sharing or the company's hiring
policies. No one was able to explain the fees or benefits or the system for allocating them.
Critical elements of the FPIC decision-making that could well be a source of conflict, were not
explained either. There was very little time for the IPs to raise questions. The FBI Team's
responses sounded like TMC responses. They could have noted the Mamanwas' questions,
researched them and returned to present additional information and to discuss follow-up
concerns.
CONSENSUS BUILDING
On March 18, just five days after the Preliminary Consultative Meeting, a Consensus Building
activity was conducted in the NCIP Community Service Center office in Bad-as. At the outset of
the meeting, the Provincial Consultative Body (PCB) Chairman/tribal council of Gigaquit who
was facilitating asked how long the mining operation of TMC will run. The FBI Team replied
that to their knowledge, it would last for 25 years and added that further information on the
matter would be divulged during
the final consultation (FBI & FPIC
Report, Annex H). The initial
discussion focused on the
experience of the tribal leaders
with regard to the environmental
disadvantages associated with
having TMC. The leaders noted
that, fish had become scarce over time. The pollution/siltation of the river was also pointed out
by those I interviewed. The tribal leaders were ambivalent because while they had a working
knowledge of the environmental impacts created by mining in the area, they also cited TMC's
claim that the company was not using any chemicals in the process of mining ores.
The Consensus Building is supposed to be the time for the tribe to exercise its traditional
consensus building processes -- to weigh the costs and benefits of a proposed project. NCIP
officials affirmed that tribal communities have different customary decision-making processes.
In some tribes, the council of elders has all the decision-making power; in others it is the tribal
leaders. There are also tribes where the council of elders or the tribal leaders may or may not
consult the members before making a final decision.
It is not obvious what the traditional or customary decision-making process of each IP
community is. Who has decision-making power is a prevalent problem in ancestral domain title
applications and FPIC processes. As Commissioner Apostol indicated, "the problem is that there
are times when NCIP does not know the real leaders".
The question of a leadership conflict came out in my interviews, too. When asked how they
traditionally make decisions as a tribe, my interviewees remember their ancestors entrusting
decision-making power to their elders (Interviewees Nos. 1 & 2). Some said that the tribal elders
decided in consultation with the community; others said that the elders exercised the right to do
what they wanted (Ibid). According to those I interviewed, there are eight tribal elders in
Taganito and Urbiztondo (Interviewees No. 2). They did not know how many tribal elders are
there in the other municipalities/barangays covered by the ancestral domain claim (Ibid).
The election of tribal leaders emerged during the creation of the Office of the Southern Cultural
Communities (OSCC) in the late 80s when government began to engage with IPs through
various programs and projects (Interviewees Nos. 1 & 2). The interviewees expressed that they
have been accustomed to having tribal leaders decide for them (Ibid). According to them the
tribal leaders are elected by the community. There are 15 tribal leaders in the whole ancestral
domain covering five barangays in Claver. But as a Mamanwa pointed out during the
preliminary consultation, they were not aware of the tribal leader of Taganito as their present
leader since the death of their previous tribal leader (Interviewees No. 1). The FBI Team
member/CSC OIC recognized the presence of a power struggle for the position of tribal leader
among the Mamanwas. A tribal elder feeling displaced in the decision-making process
expressed that the tribal leaders are making decisions by themselves because of the money
involved (Interviewees No. 1). The other players in the leadership of the Mamanwas are the
tribal council members. When asked what the role of the tribal council is, the Mamanwas
pointed to the CSC OIC for explanation. According to the CSC OIC, the tribal council is
responsible for policy-making while the tribal leader approves the policies and is the signatory to
agreements made on behalf of the community. A tribal leader is chosen for his knowledge and
capacity to engage with government and other entities (Interviewees No. 2).
The leadership conflict is manifested in the gaps of information flow within the Mamanwa
community. Mamanwas from Taganito said that there was no community meeting called by the
tribal leaders after the Preliminary Consultative Meeting and before the Consensus Building to
get the opinions of the tribal members (Interviewees No.1). The Mamanwas of Urbiztondo said
the same thing; there was no consultation with them conducted neither by their tribal council nor
by their tribal leader prior to the Consensus Building session or in the entire FPIC process
(Interviewees No. 2). The FBI Team member/CSC OIC also said that she was not aware if any
meeting took place among members and leaders of the tribe. Apparently, in Urbiztondo, there is
a faction between their tribal council members and their tribal leader. The interviewees
conveyed that the tribal leader did not want to meet his tribal council and the latter in turn did not
meet community members as they were waiting for a meeting with their tribal leader
(Interviewees No. 2). There is also a conflict between tribal elders who feel disregarded in the
decision-making of the tribal leaders (Interviewees No. 1). A tribal elder disclosed that if there
are tribal meetings, not everyone attends because there is a faction between tribal leaders and
tribal elders (Ibid). Another interviewee disclosed that the community members do not have any
respect for their tribal leader anymore as he is often drunk (Interviewee No. 9). The interviewees
do not also remember that their tribal leaders met between the five-day period after the
Preliminary Consultative Meeting and the Consensus Building (Interviewees No. 1). But they
acknowledged that the tribal leaders have factions and because of this it could have been possible
that while there was a meeting among tribal leaders, not everyone was there (Ibid). The TMC
Information, Communication, and Education (ICE) Officer also noted that she "do not know
what to do with the Mamanwas" because there is division among them.
During the Consensus Building, the tribal leader of Urbiztondo suggested that if they could not
come to an agreement, then they should not allow TMC to operate. But the PCB Chairman/tribal
council leader noted that they cannot disagree because TMC already exists. During my
interviews, when asked if they could have said NO to TMC, the Mamanwas from Taganito felt
that they had no choice; if they denied consent to TMC, the company will still operate because
"it will anyway be or has already been approved by higher authorities" (Interviewees No. 1).
Another batch of interviewees from Urbiztondo expressed that they have been told by TMC that
whether they give their consent or withhold it, the company will continue to operate
(Interviewees No. 2). Two other tribal members expressed that all they could do was to add
conditions or demands since TMC has been there since 1986 (Interviewees No. 3). Denying
TMC their consent meant no agreement and therefore no benefits for them while the company
continues to operate (Interviewees No.1). They feel that their situation does not allow them to
withhold consent (Ibid).
A representative from TMC thinks though that with the decision-making process of the
Mamanwas, they could not be manipulated (Interviewee No. 8). The officer clarified that TMC
started its operating contract in 1989; exploration started in 1986 but the contract then was with
the Hinatuan Mining Corporation (Ibid). The former Community Relations Officer (CRO) of
TMC expressed that during the FPIC undertaking, they felt that the Mamanwas had the power,
that whatever their demands were, TMC was at the bargaining end. He added that they could not
do something against this situation because the FPIC is required by law.
NCIP officials generally assert that FPIC gives the IPs the right to decide whether to allow a
company or not. Two officials though think that IPs give their consent primarily because of their
lack of education and because of the economic benefits offered (Interviewees Nos. 7 & 13). The
National Director likewise think that without adequate support for the formulation and
implementation of an Ancestral Domain Sustainable Development and Protection Plan
(ADSDPP), it could happen that IP communities end up having no choice but to give their
consent. But he pointed out that there are cases where other IPs have taken the decision to
manage mining in their ancestral domain.
According to the NCIP OIC Provincial Officer (PO), the Mamanwa tribes in the province have
not received assistance to formulate their ADSDPP; the assistance is currently focused on the IPs
in the province of Agusan del Sur. He shared that the monthly budget for the province is
PhP10,000 [US$ 190. 85], PhP5,000 [US$ 95.42] of which is allotted for office rental and the
remaining PhP5,000 [US$ 95.42] for monthly maintenance and operating expenses (MOOE).
The CSC OIC added that the two Service Center offices too have only PhP5,0000 [US$ 95.42]
each used for rental (PhP2,600) [US$ 49.62] and MOOE (PhP2,400) [US$ 45.80]. What the
national office does, according to the Director, is source out funds from the social funds of the
President or from other government agencies or funding institutions that has funds along the
lines of what could be projects for ADSDPP formulation or implementation.
Traditionally, the Mamanwas are food gatherers. Prior to the entry of Hinatuan in 1986 which
was replaced by TMC in 1989, they have relied on the forests for resources to sell such as
orchids and honeybee, and to produce mat (Interviewees Nos. 1). But according to the
Mamanwas, with the presence of TMC their livelihood sources became less accessible (Ibid).
And like many IP communities in the country whose lives have been one of struggle for daily
survival, they do not have a long-term development plan for their community. Nor has the NCIP
assisted them in this regard due to its lack of funding. The absence of a long-term development
plan has impacted on the Mamanwas' articulation of their demands as discussed below.
Given the feeling of powerlessness, the tribal leaders, during the Consensus Building, went on to
identify their demands which they noted they had to present to TMC by March 23, five days
from this consensus building session. These demands were: (Report on FBI & FPIC, Annex H).
1. Royalty fee of PhP1 million per year [US$ 19,084.84]. This fee should be given directly
to the IPs. Besides this fee, social services should be provided.
2. Housing. Concrete housing should be provided to the Mamanwas of Taganito and
Urbiztondo, being directly affected by the mining operation. In addition, the demand
included house and lot for the Mamanwas in areas considered not to be affected by the
mining operation but are within the ancestral domain claim. Four tribal houses should
also be provided in specific locations for areas considered not to be affected but which
are part of the ancestral domain.
3. Employment. The demand simply states that TMC should provide employment,
including regular positions, to the Mamanwas belonging to the ancestral domain. In
addition, the tribal leaders from the all the five municipalities covering the ancestral
domain should be given a monthly honorarium. The amount was not specified.
4. Scholarship/Educational Assistance. The company should provide schools and teachers;
financial support for elementary, secondary, and college students; driving training and
other capacity buildings for Mamanwas.
5. Health. The company should construct health centers and provide medicines, a midwife
or a nurse or possibly a doctor specifically for Mamanwas in Taganito and Urbiztondo;
install a household water system.
6. Environmental concerns. The demand simply states that the mining operation of TMC
should not overlap with primary forests. Also, the leaders demanded that the company
should allocate a rehabilitation fund which they could access after the lifetime of the
mining operation.
7. Livelihood. The company should provide the Mamanwas fruit seedlings and other
sustainable crops.
8. Others. Allow the Mamanwas to ride in the TMC bus service. TMC should also provide
the Mamanwas their own jeepney for use in cases of emergency.
The demands do not match the time scale of the operation of the mining company, to say the
least. While the tribal leaders may have heard that the MPSA is for 25 years, the implications of
this are certainly not thought out as reflected in their demands. But who is supposed to be
facilitating an informed, comprehensible, and comprehensive exchange of ideas among the
leaders and even between the leaders and their members? Who was supposed to explain to them
that the IRR of the Mining Act provides for the allocation of a Mine Rehabilitation Fund and that
there are rules governing the disbursement of this fund? Who was supposed to guide them in
understanding the technical data regarding the extent of the application vis-a-vis the ground
reality or current operation in order to ascertain whether an encroachment on primary forests is
taking place or even just make sense of the environmental implications of the mining operations
over a period of 25 years (in addition to 20 years that the company has been operating)? How
were they supposed to know what employment positions exist in the company, what capacities
and skills do each require, and what capacity building therefore should they be demanding over a
period of 25 years? How were they supposed to know which among their demands could be met
in a year or two, in 5 years or 10 or 20 or 25 years, or which among demands are in fact already
included in SDMP funded by the 1% of the direct mining costs?
The NCIP maintains that their role in the consensus building session is to document the
proceedings as mandated by the Guidelines. A member of the FPIC Team shared that if they
ever give advice to the leaders, it is done in private (Interviewee No. 9). Another NCIP officer
disclosed that when they think that the IPs' demands are weak, they intervene by advising them
in areas like increasing the amount of financial benefit, the number of employment, and
educational assistance (Interviewee No. 5). An NCIP Commissioner invoked the rules that
during the Consensus Building, the NCIP or the FBI Team does not provide any input
(Interviewee No. 13). When asked how they assist communities to understand the complexity of
the issues since NCIP is also tasked to protect the rights of the IPs, he replied that before the start
of mining operations, NCIP validates if there are provisions for environmental protection. He
added that there have been lapses but that they are minor. According to him, there have been
more advantages provided by mining companies, e.g. scholarship, who were given consent and
of which they have approved. The National Director added that they invite experts to elucidate
matters for the IPs. But he noted that the IP community should be the one to express what they
do not understand so that NCIP can bring in the expert. The DENR MGB National Director too
added that they also come in to give clarification regarding mining, the benefits according to the
law and the risks involved but only when requested. An NCIP official commented that MGB is
not required to attend; he said MGB is also regarded as pro-mining (Interviewee No. 5). The
present OIC Regional Director asserts that there is an advantage in the exclusion of government
or the NCIP in the process because an official might have his/her own bias on the matter being
deliberated upon.
Does the customary decision-making process stand up to the task of arriving at a free and
informed consent? The tribal leaders were talking among themselves. And yet they were not
dealing with an issue that is confined among IPs. They are dealing with complex issues that
involve multiple policies and stakeholders and long-term implications, i.e. costs and benefits, to
the environment and to their lives. But a TMC representative claimed that since they do not have
any processing plant, they are just doing "pure mining", even the "common tao" [regular
individual] understands mining and its implications (Interviewee No. 8). As an FBI Team
member conveyed, during the Preliminary Consultative Meeting, the TMC presented the
disadvantages of mining nickel, particularly soil erosion, and also their reforestation efforts and
desiltation process (Interviewee No. 9). But an NCIP official opined that the presentation of
companies are often limited to small disadvantages which are mitigated (Interviewee No. 7). But
Director Wandag himself asserts that not many understand mining and logging; that the rate of
soil erosion differs among minerals being extracted. He added that nobody raises questions
though because communities may not also understand the technologies being proposed by
companies for mitigation of adverse effects. Director Wandag and the NCIP Acting Provincial
Officer recognized that IPs have an idea of the effects of mining but it is not adequate because
there are technical aspects of the issues involved. On the other end, the NCIP Regional Director
admitted that NCIP has a bit of understanding of the technicalities surrounding mining. The
NCIP Acting Provincial Officer confirmed that even NCIP personnel lack technical knowledge.
Leaving the IPs alone to discuss among themselves by invoking customary decision-making does
not provide the much needed support for a meaningful appreciation of the long-term and broad-
scale implications of their options. Their discussions are determined according to the
presentation of companies, i.e. financial benefit, livelihood, scholarship, and employment. Even
these benefits, as reflected in the demands of the IPs, are not framed within a 25-year
consideration.
Furthermore, all NCIP officials interviewed define what is just, equitable, and genuine
participation as depending on the customary decision-making of the IPs. This definition misses
the point that the customary decision-making process of a certain tribe could be isolating its
members, especially women who are not part of the tribal leadership structure. This also breeds
the division and politics between and among tribal leaders and elders. While these conflicts are
often reinforced by companies, deliberately or not, as the case would illustrate, they and the
NCIP suffer the resurgence of questions as to who the right leaders were that they should have
negotiated with or are supposed to be negotiating with. The agreement ends up being
unsustainable.
On the other end, the NCIP's role being solely a documentor does not support an informed
decision-making process during the Consensus Building. What is happening is, for those who do
not intervene as they say, they could be allowing the biases of powerful tribal leaders or elders to
determine the outcome of the meeting. For those who intervene in the Consensus Building or
outside of it, they could be imposing their biases to influence the decision of the IPs.
FINAL COMMUNITY ASSEMBLY
A letter dated March 22, 2006 from the Regional Director instructed the FBI Team to conduct
the Final Consultation Meeting the following day (March 23) in barangay Taganito (FBI & FPIC
Report, Annex I-1). The tribal elders knew that the meeting was to be held on that day.
In this final meeting, the tribal leaders presented their demands as agreed upon in the Consensus
Building meeting. The tribal members, too, were present. This time, the tribal leader of
Taganito (Datu Rizal Buklas) himself performed the prayer ritual. The Mamanwas I interviewed
remembered this as the meeting where the 15 tribal leaders of the ancestral domain were called
on stage (Interviewees No. 1). They said that while they were present only the tribal leaders
negotiated the deal with TMC (Ibid) on stage. They acknowledged though that the tribal
members agreed that their corresponding tribal leader could sign what was agreed upon with
TMC (Ibid). What process each community or the entire tribe went through to bestow that right
on their tribal leaders was not explained. I would assume that given past practices that tribal
leaders have been the decision-makers in the tribe, this was just taken as the case that applies to
the FPIC being sought for by TMC. The tribal members also recalled the presence of the
Regional Director at that time in this assembly (Ibid).
The FBI Team read the consolidated demands of the tribal leaders on stage. At the outset, the
TMC representative asserted that the discussion should focus on the written demands and any
additional claims should be dealt with later (FBI & FPIC Report, Annex I-2 and I-3). Regarding
the PhP1 million [US $ 19,084.84] royalty fee that the tribe requested, the TMC representative
pointed out that the company is already paying a royalty fee to the government being the owner
of the land designated as a mineral reservation (Ibid). As such, he asserted that no other payment
would be made by the company (Ibid). The tribal leader of Urbiztondo commented that TMC's
practice of paying only to the government in previous years is a manifestation of the lack of
respect for the rights of the IPs (Ibid). The TMC representative argued that going through the
FPIC process was an expression of respect for the tribe (Ibid). The PCB Chairman/tribal leader
of Gigaquit ended up defending that what they are requesting might not be a royalty fee but
rather a share of the profits (Ibid). The TMC representative commented that what was requested
in the demands was a royalty fee and therefore that is what the negotiation should cover. Again,
he stressed that because TMC is already paying government a royalty fee, no royalty fee could
be paid to the IPs (Ibid).
The NCIP Regional Hearing Officer, Atty. John Edwin Luneta, opined that there was a conflict
with this royalty fee being requested by the tribal leaders because it was already being paid to
government which owns the land (Ibid). Note that there was continuing confusion regarding the
royalty fee vis-a-vis the 1% of the direct mining costs which came out during the Preliminary
Consultative Meeting. In this Final Consultative Meeting, the tribal leader of Urbiztondo also
brought up that to their understanding they did not have a clear share yet from the 1% of the
direct mining costs; they were just being allotted a measly 16% share (Ibid). The reply of the
TMC representative was that their 16% share from the amount of the 1% of the direct mining
costs was all that was required by law and that they were part of the planning [referring to the
CTWG in which the datu is a member] (Ibid).
During the meeting, the confusion regarding royalty fees was reinforced by mixing the matter
with conversations regarding land ownership and whether the ancestral domain had a title or not.
Datu Hedi, the PCB Chairman, asked what the conversation meant; did it mean that there was no
clarity that the area was an ancestral domain (Ibid). Atty. Luneta replied that there is currently
an application for a title to which the TMC representative claimed that the area is therefore not
yet clear as an ancestral domain. But did not the FBI result establish that the area is an ancestral
domain which is why the FPIC process was being undertaken?
The NCIP Regional Hearing Officer explained that TMC could not accept the term royalty fee
since the company is already paying government a royalty fee (FBI & FPIC Report, Annex 1-2
and 1-3). So he proposed that in order for the meeting to proceed, the NCIP should study the
accurate or proper term to use, as would TMC (Ibid). The tribal leaders succumbed and asked
that they be informed of the so-called study (of the proper term) in order to understand the matter,
that is, when they have acquired an ancestral domain title (Ibid). The NCIP Acting Provincial
Officer at that time had to assuage the fears of the tribal leaders regarding the formal recognition
of their ancestral domain. Why would an NCIP Regional Hearing Officer not know that given
the fact that an FPIC process was undertaken, it was clear that the area was an ancestral domain
and that the FBI had established this in its report? Did it matter if the Mamanwa tribe had a title?
Did they not apply for a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in 2004? And why was it
that TMC was willing to give other benefits to the Mamanwas if they were not considered part of
an ancestral domain? Why would an NCIP officer make NCIP's own rules ambiguous, unless of
course, he himself did not understand the rules?
In my interview with the tribal leader of Urbiztondo, he said that it was clear to the tribal leaders
that they negotiated for a fixed amount of PhP1 million [US$ 19,084.84] instead of 1% of the
gross output because they had no idea as to or any way of knowing how much the gross output of
the company would be. What the tribal leader knew was that TMC negotiated for PhP500,000
[US$ 9,542.42] because they also had to pay others [fees]. But an FBI Team member revealed
that TMC considered PhP1 million to be large (Interviewee No. 9). A TMC officer shared that
the company thought even PhP500,000 [US$ 9,542.42] was huge and they are concerned with
how the IPs would use or manage the money (Interviewee No. 8). Furthermore, the officer
indicated that the demands of the IPs were not realistic. The interviewee added that the company
was reluctant to grant a considerable amount; given the educational level of the IPs (Ibid). In
addition, the TMC officer commented that the IPs already had so much meaning that there were
three mining companies excluding TMC already operating in the two barangays and providing
benefits to them (Ibid). The FBI Team member/CSC OIC confirmed that the following
corporations are in Urbiztondo: the Taganito Mining Corporation (TMC), the Oriental Synergy
Mining Corporation (OSMC), and the Kepha Mining Corporation; In Taganito, there is TMC.
According to an OSMC employee, OSMC is providing the tribal elders of Urbiztondo with a
monthly honorarium of PhP3,000 [US$ 57.25] and a half sack of rice each. A CTWG officer
and former TMC officer commented that with so many mining companies in the area, the IPs
might end up being indolent (Interviewee No. 12).
The concern of the TMC officer regarding the judicious management of the PhP500,000
[US$ 9,542.42 ] (which eventually was called livelihood benefit and not royalty fee) was
validated by the tribal members. According to them, the TMC was afraid that the money would
not be used properly; they know this to be the reason for the decision to release the said amount
of money only if there are project proposals, even when the money is deposited in the bank
account of the tribal organization (AMPANTRIMTU) 25 representing only barangays Taganito
and Urbiztondo (Interviewees No. 2). The signatories to the account are the chairman, and the
treasurer of AMPANTRIMTU, and the NCIP FBI Team member/CSC OIC of Bad-as. The
TMC Information, Communication, and Education (ICE) officer said the company does not have
anything to do with the release and monitoring of the money (from the
PhP500,000/US$ 9,542.42) once it is deposited in the bank account of the tribal organization.
The NCIP CSC OIC said she supervises the release and use of the funds for individual IP
households, ensuring that at least a greater part of the amount goes to its intended purpose.
The FBI Team member/CSC OIC narrated her experience with the release of funds for the IPs
who have availed themselves of the funds PhP500,000 [US$ 9,542.42]. She said that those who
have been granted PhP 6,000 [US$ 114.51] which is the maximum one can get through a project
proposal have not been using the money properly. Some of them, according to her, would not
spend all the money on what they stipulated in their proposal, but would buy a radio, cell phone,
go drinking or singing in videoke bars. Those IPs, she said, would presume the money was
theirs. An NCIP official thought that what the IPs did with their money was their problem
(Interviewee No. 7).
25 AMPANTRIMTU refers to the tribal organization that is the signatory to the Memorandum of Agreement. It is
headed by the tribal leader of Urbiztondo (Datu Alfredo Oloriko) as the Chairman and the tribal leader of Taganito
(Datu Rizal Buklas) as Vice-Chairman. The organization covers only the two considered "affected areas" which are
Taganito and Urbiztondo.
A-s of inLerview date Jaiinuary 1I,
2008) the remaining balance of the
PhP500,000 [US$ 9,542.42]
livelihood benefits was
PhP130,000 [US$ 2,481],
according to the NCIP CSC OIC.
Every time AMPANTRIMTU and
she approve a proposal, she makes
sure that she releases the money in public with a picture taking (to safeguard herself from
allegations). She also keeps a record of all the transactions with the bank and the Mamanwa
recipients of the livelihood benefit. She explained that the PhP500,000 [US$ 9,542.42]
livelihood benefit is released by TMC in two tranches as the MOA stipulates. The first one, she
said, was issued in June 2006, while the second tranch was distributed in December 2006.
Mamanwa households who have availed themselves of the funds have used them for livestock
(hog, carabao) raising, and for starting mini-stores. I saw a number of grocery items in the new
houses (which was also their mini-store) constructed by TMC for households in Urbiztondo. But
the location of their houses is not accessible as they complained of except for some employees of
the Oriental Synergy Mining Company (OSMC) who will have an office nearby. Given that the
Mamanwas do not have any experience or training running small-scale business, and given their
daily needs, they would likely end up consuming the grocery goods they are supposed to sell.
The CSC OIC also conveyed that AMPANTRIMTU has also started communal coconut
production on a combined total of 36 hectare land in Taganito and Urbiztondo. The project she
said started in May (or June) 2006. This information is revealing for the MOA was only signed
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in July 18, 2006 (FBI & FPIC Report, Attached Copy of the MOA). The AMPANTRIMTU was
organized in June 22 (Interviewee No. 9). At the time of the MOA Ratification in June 23, the
PCB Chairman/tribal leader of Gigaquit did not agree that AMPANTRIMTU should be the
signatory to the MOA since it only represented the Mamanwas in the barangays of Taganito and
Urbiztondo (FBI & FPIC Report, Annex K). But the AMPANTRIMTU eventually turned out to
be the MOA signatory. This conflict is discussed further in the latter part of this case study.
With regard to the demand of a royalty fee, was the decision not to grant the IPs their entitled
royalty fees only a semantic matter? The 1996 IRR of the Mining Act clearly provides the term
royalty payment for the IPs which should not be less than 1% of the gross output of the company
(Section 16). If we were to stick to the argument of the TMC and the NCIP Regional Hearing
Officer, the royalty fee that TMC is paying government is called the "government share" and
takes the form of an excise tax (Section 212). So the royalty fee for the IPs, the government
share and the 1% of the direct mining costs are different from one another but are interrelated.
Did the TMC representative and the NCIP Regional Hearing Officer know this? Why did they
fail to explain that the company is allowed to count the royalty fees for IPs in calculating its
government share/royalty fee and that the expenses for community development from the 1% of
the direct mining costs could also be charged towards towards the 1% royalty fees for the IPs? If
they clarified these matters, it could then turn out that the 16% of the amount of the 1% of the
direct mining costs could have been negotiated by the IPs, contrary to what the TMC
representative declared that the 16% was already determined by law. But it seems that TMC had
already determined that the benefits for the Mamanwas will have to be the PhP500,000
[US$ 9,542.42] livelihood assistance already mentioned in the Preliminary Consultative
Meeting. This could explain why the 16% supposedly offered to the IPs during the Preliminary
Consultative Meeting was later reallocated for the barangays, as a TMC officer explained. The
TMC representative's comment that the PhP500,000 [US$ 9,542.42] is huge apparently made
sense for the company not to grant the tribe a royalty fee of 1% of the gross output. The
responses of the company during this critical meeting which was supposedly a negotiation
certainly kept the Mamanwas in a state of confusion, apprehension, and submission.
Without any further discussion and
resolution of the tribal leaders'
demand for a PhP1 million royalty fee
[US$ 19,084.84], the meeting
proceeded to the demand for more
housing. The TMC representative said
that the tribal leaders specifically
demanded 48 houses for Mamanwas in
Taganito and Urbiztondo. But the Mam;
FBI Team member explained that TMC
number of houses on the old census in 1P
number of houses needed was based on 1
households at the time of the FPIC proce
already 35 (CSC OIC said 34) households in Taganito; Urbiztondo has 29 households (CSC OIC
said 31) (Interviewees Nos. 1, 4 & 9). This means that they needed 64 or 65 houses, not 48. At
the time of my interview, there were already 14 houses constructed for the Mamanwas in
Taganito which were occupied (Interviewees Nos. 1). More than half of the households had not
been provided housing yet (Interviewees Nos. 1, 3). For Urbiztondo, there were already 20
houses built (Interviewees No. 4). The Mamanwas in Urbiztondo though was going back and
forth from their old houses to the new houses constructed by the company. They said that the
location of the new houses was not suitable; they were "placed up in the mountains".
The Mamanwas complained that their demand for concrete housing was not considered
(Interviewees Nos. 1 & 2). They
ended up with light wood materials
as the Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) stipulated using low-cost
housing of light materials (MOA,
July 18, 2006). The FBI Team
member/CSC OIC explained that
TMC could have made its decisions
based on its knowledge of other IPs in other areas where concrete housing is not deemed
appropriate to the culture. The Mamanwas also remarked that until the time of my interview with
them, there was no household water or sanitation or electricity as had been promised
(Interviewees Nos. 1, 2 & 4). The MOA stipulates that the housing and water and toilet and
electric facilities shall be implemented on a staggered basis starting in 2006. The MOA
underscored that the electricity would be at the "expense" of the IPs. I assume this means that
the monthly electric bills would be shouldered by the Mamanwa households. But this
arrangement was not clear with the IPs. They repeatedly complained of the lack of the
aforementioned facilities; that they had only an electric post; and they never mentioned that they
were supposed to pay for household electricity which they expected to be installed (Interviewees
Nos. 1 & 2). During my visit to the housing site of Urbiztondo, there were hollow blocks in the
area which according to the Mamanwa residents were going to be used for the construction of
communal water and toilet facilities. Again, they said the MOA stated that these facilities would
be provided for all households.
As to the housing for Mamanwas in other municipalities covering the ancestral domain, two
tribal leaders suggested that the funds should be drawn from their share of the 1% of the direct
mining costs (FBI & FPIC Report, Annex I-2 and 1-3). The TMC representative asserted that the
company could not decide on the matter as only the tribe could make a decision regarding the
share that the other unaffected areas could have (Ibid). But he added that TMC was willing to
build four tribal houses as requested (Ibid). During my interview, the FBI CSC OIC confirmed
that three concrete tribal house buildings were already constructed.
Another point tackled during the meeting was the employment demands of the tribal leaders.
Here, the TMC representative clarified that employment with the company depends on vacancy
and qualification while he told the tribal leaders that Taganito and Urbiztondo Mamanwas would
be given priority (FBI & FPIC Report, Annex I-2 and 1-3). He said that TMC would also like to
have Mamanwa regular employees (Ibid). What positions existed in the company and what the
corresponding qualifications were was not elaborated. Regarding monthly honoraria for tribal
leaders, he said that this demand would be integrated with others and asked that an exact amount
be specified (Ibid). With what "other concerns" this demand was to be integrated, was not stated.
As noted earlier, the Mamanwas claimed that no one has become a regular employee yet among
them but there were those who have worked in loading and maintenance on a shifting basis;
seven Mamanwas for 5.5 months, replaced by another batch of seven for the next 5.5 months
(Interviewees Nos. 1). The MOA stipulated eight for casual and rotational employment; this was
supposed to be divided into four for drilling/exploration and four for loading/maintenance.
A number of training sessions had been provided by the company (Interviewees Nos. 1, 2, 8, 9).
Four women from Urbiztondo and another 15 from Taganito had undergone handbag and mat
making training (Interviewees Nos. 1 & 2). The CSC OIC estimated 25 graduates. They said
this handicraft training, conducted from December 5-23 by the Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI), was the idea of the TMC Information,
Communication, and Education (ICE) officer.
According to them, the TMC ICE officer told
them that their products would be displayed
and marketed in Surigao, i.e. at the provincial
level. The TMC ICE officer confirmed that
she was connecting with other non-
government organizations and trying to find
markets for the products of the Mamanwa
women. The Mamanwa women said it took
18 days for a bag to be completed. They said
many nf thom had nnt finiched nn-
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A training center managed by the CTWG was created by TMC with the use of the 1% of the
direct mining costs (Interviewees Nos. 1). Trainings in the areas of heavy equipment operation,
repair, electronics, and driving are provided by the Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA) (Interviewee No. 11). TESDA has already produced 4 Mamanwa graduates
(two in Taganito and two in Urbiztondo) trained in mechanical automotive repair (Interviewees
Nos. 1, 2 & 9). The FBI Team member/CSC OIC informed me that there were seven slots in the
said trainings for the IPs. While others initially participated in the training, they did not finish
because the trainings did not include allowances (Interviewees Nos. 1 & 9). Hence, the trainee
did not have any income to sustain their families (Ibid). There is a PhP50 [US$ 0.95] per day
allowance though during the on-the-job (OJT) training phase (Ibid). In addition, the TESDA
selection criteria included the ability to write or sign one's name.
Regarding the demand for scholarship, the TMC representative assured the tribal leaders that
even if they did not ask for this, TMC would still have provided them (FBI & FPIC Report,
Annex I-2 and 1-3). He said TMC would provide s for students and trainings for Mamanwas
related to driving, operating heavy equipment, and running drilling machines (Ibid). The MOA
requires these trainings and further states that those trained IPs could be "integrated into the
TMC workforce if already qualified". As to the scholarships, it guarantees to "expand the
existing non-formal Learning Center with subsidized teachers" and "provide financial assistance
to four deserving college students in Surigao Colleges (Ibid).
The Mamanwas confirmed that there is a school building that could be used as an Alternative
Learning Center (Interviewees Nos. 1 & 9). They also recognize that two Mamanwa teachers
and the school supplies were being subsidized by TMC from the 1% direct mining costs (Ibid).
The two teachers of elementary education were paid an allowance of PhP3,000 per [US$ 57.25]
month and provided free health services (Interviewee No. 9). While there are four slots for
college scholarship from both barangays, there was only one scholar, Michael Denapa, at the
time of my interview (Ibid). Michael wanted to take up mining/geological engineering but since
this course was not offered in the province, he ended up taking civil engineering (Ibid).
With regard to the demands on health services which includes a health center complete with
medicines, a midwife/nurse and possibly a doctor in the two barangays, the TMC representative
replied that these were already included in the "social services" (FBI & FPIC Report, Annex 1-2
and 1-3). He meant that these services were already part of the social development plan funded
by the 1% direct mining cost (Interviewee No. 9). But Mamanwas disclosed that only the
check-ups were free and only those working at TMC were provided with free medicines
(Interviewees Nos. 3).
The TMC representative likewise guaranteed during the meeting that the mining area did not
encroach on forestlands and that a rehabilitation fund has been deposited in a government
account (FBI & FPIC Report, Annex 1-2 and 1-3). Lastly, the TMC representative promised that
they would have more bus stops and would permit Mamanwas to ride when there were no more
employees who needed a ride.
What was eventually given to the Mamanwas reflected the absence of a long-term consideration
of the quality of their lives. Even an NCIP official admitted that the benefits for the Mamawas
were small (Interviewee No. 7). While he admitted that the IPs' use of funds was a concern, the
share [from the 1%] is rightfully theirs; the company should have given it to them; what the
Mamanwas did with their money was their problem (Interviewee No. 7). The official added that
what the company could assist the Mamanwas in building their capacity to manage their benefits
wisely (Ibid).
The tribe did not have an Ancestral Domain Sustainable Development and Protection Plan
(ADSDPP). Their demands reflected the absence of a long-term vision or plan. They accepted
what was offered to them, in part, because they lacked important information. If that information
had been provided by the parties and if NCIP had facilitated a more meaningful discussion, the
Mamanwas would probably have broadened their demands - thinking in terms of a 25-year time
horizon for themselves as well as for future generations. The company would have realized that
the PhP500,000 [US$ 9,542.42] was not much as the long-term plan that could have resulted
from the information-sharing would have indicated timeframe and incremental use of funds for
the welfare of the community.
The NCIP FBI Team seemed to lack the capacity to figure out what information should have
been put on the table and what the necessary skills were to facilitate information-sharing and
problem-solving appropriate to the situation. These limitations could have been due to a lack of
training. It could also have been the product of the biases of the individuals involved. Whatever
the reasons were, the FBI Team reinforced a less than ideal process even if the Mamanwa tribe
got some benefits via the MOA.
RATIFICATION OF THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
The FBI Team leader wrote a letter June 19, 2006 to the tribal leaders inviting them to a meeting
at the CSC Bad-as office on June 23 "to present what has been discussed in the meeting in
Butuan City, Agusan del Norte with respect to the demands of the tribe after they were analyzed
by the Board of Directors of the TMC" (FBI & FPIC Report, Annex J). There is no document
that shows what transpired at the Butuan meeting. An FBI Team member though confirmed that
a third meeting held in a hotel in Butuan took place (Interviewee No. 9). This was where the
MOA was drafted. The CTWG Chairman who was formerly TMC's Community Relations
Officer (CRO) also affirmed that it was at this third meeting that the MOA was drafted. If one
does not include the consensus building of the tribal leaders (as this was just among themselves),
indeed the third meeting was the Butuan meeting.
An FBI Team member claimed that all the tribal leaders were present in the Butuan meeting
(Interview No. 9). Was the MOA drafted then during the meeting or was it simply presented? It
seems unlikely that it could have been drafted within a day with the tribal leaders providing their
input on matters that never came up in the previous meetings but which became part of the MOA.
The letter likewise states that the draft MOA would be discussed before it was presented to the
Taganito and Urbiztondo tribal assembly (FBI & FPIC Report, Annex J). The document in the
local or Visayan dialect, when translated in English also says that the meeting was to "also
include the discussion on the Mamanwa tribes found within these aforementioned barangays"
(Ibid).
In the previous meetings, the tribal leaders of all five municipalities comprising the ancestral
domain have been the ones "negotiating" with TMC. This was the first time that the decision-
making process was framed as being confined to Mamanwas in Taganito and Urbiztondo.
The June 23 meeting turned out to be the time for the ratification of the MOA (FBI & FPIC
Report, Annex K and K-l). This MOA is allegedly the result of the draft MOA and the "analysis
of the Board of Directors of TMC" as the letter of the FBI Team leader stated. After the reading
of the MOA, the PCB Chairman/tribal council leader of Gigaquit demanded that a "vehicle to
haul their product to the market" should be included in the MOA. An NCIP officer went on to
enumerate the benefits that TMC had already agreed to provide (Ibid). Here, it was clear that the
PhP1 million royalty fee [US$ 19084.84] that was being demanded became a PhP500,000
[US$ 9,542.42] livelihood assistance (Ibid). It could be assumed that this became clear with the
tribal leaders during the drafting of the MOA, if they were indeed present at the event. It turned
out that the 16% of the amount of the 1% of the direct mining costs would not be part of the
MOA. Who decided the amount PhP500,000 [US$ 9,542.42]? Clearly, TMC decided it was not
using the term "royalty fee" as it asserted in the supposedly final community assembly on March
23. The NCIP and the TMC never got to do the so-called "study of the proper term" [referring to
the use of the term "royalty fee"] that they promised to undertake.
The FBI Team leader asked if the tribe had an "organized group that will be used as the
contracting party with TMC" (Ibid). Surprisingly, the tribal leader of Urbiztondo claimed that
Taganito and Urbiztondo that they have agreed on/organized a group which they call
AMPANTRIMTU (which is roughly translated as Association of Mamanwa Tribe in Taganito
and Urbiztondo). At this point, the PCB Chairman/tribal leader of Gigaquit registered that this
was not agreeable to them because they wanted the organization to represent the five
municipalities covering the ancestral domain (FBI & FPIC Report, Annex K). The Visayan
documentation shows that the FBI Team leader acknowledged this remark and suggested that the
organization be called CLAGIBATUAL (which is translated as Organization of Mamanwas in
Claver, Gigaquit, Bacuag, Tubod, and Alegria) to which the Datu supposedly agreed (Annex K-
1). The English documentation notes that the response of the FBI Team leader to the datu's
remark was "that is good if it is also acceptable to the TMC" (Annex K).
The FBI Team leader later informed the Resident Mine Manager of TMC in a letter dated June
28 that in the aforementioned meeting of the tribal leaders, they agreed to call their organization
CLAGIBATUAL (FBI & FPIC Report, Annex L). The attached list of officers of the
organization indicated the two tribal leaders of Taganito and Urbiztondo as the Vice-Chairman
and Chairman, respectively (Ibid). All the rest are designated as Board of Directors (Ibid).
At this point, the issue of who got to decide or gave consent became unclear. And the question
subsequently divided the tribe and tribal leaders. Now there were two organizations.
AMPANTRIMTU, according to an FBI Team member was organized on June 22 with Datu
Oloriko as the Chairman (Interviewee No. 9). This was the day before the third meeting.
ANOTHER FINAL COMMUNITY ASSEMBLY AND MOA SIGNING
The Regional Director, on June 29,2006 ordered the FBI Team to conduct "another consultation
meeting" on the following day (June 30) (FBI & FPIC Report, Annex L-2). In this assembly,
the benefits previously discussed were read by NCIP as part of the MOA (FBI & FPIC Report,
Annex L-3 and L-4)). NCIP declared that the Mamanwas through the CLAGIBATUAL
approved the MOA and gave their consent. (Ibid). Mamanwas present affixed their signature to
a statement authorizing Datu Oloriko (Urbiztondo), Datu Rizal Buklas (Taganito), and Datu
Emiliano Hedi (PCB Chairman/Head Claimant of ancestral domain title) to sign the MOA with
TMC (Annex L-5). The statement declared that those Mamanwas were members of
CLAGIBATUAL (Ibid).
The MOA signing took place in July 18, 2006 at the Gateway Hotel in Surigao del Norte,
according to the CTWG Chairman who was TMC's Community Relations Officer then. The
MOA was signed by five TMC officers, by the NCIP Regional Director, and by the three
abovementioned tribal leaders. Witness signatories were the 12 other tribal leaders, the Officer-
in-Charge of the Regional Office of the MGB, and the Mayor of the province. The twist in the
story is that the three tribal leaders signed as representatives of AMPANTRIMTU not
CLAGLBATUAL. It could be that the tribal members who affixed their signatures as
CLAGIBATUAL authorizing the three tribal leaders to sign the MOA gave their consent to
AMPANTRIMTU as the contracting party to the MOA.
Both the 2002 and 2006 Guidelines state that when an activity, program, or project affects only a
portion of an ancestral domain, only those communities within an affected area shall give their
consent (Section 16, a; Section 10, b). The NCIP Provincial Officer referred to these Guidelines.
Commissioner Apostol affirmed the same point and defined affected areas as the geographical
location of the applicant's activity. The NCIP Regional Director suggested that the affected area
includes the surrounding communities as well. The Director of the DENR Mines and
Geosciences Bureau (MGB) explained that for them the affected area is the impact area which
covers only the immediate operations of the mining tenement. According to him, progressive
mining companies are open to considering an expanded impact area. He added that MGB and
NCIP have not yet together delineated what should be considered secondary and primary impact
areas. He added that they still need to sit down to determine what constitutes a realistic impact
area.
While tribal leaders from the five municipalities covering the ancestral domain were
"negotiating" with the company, it was not clear to them that an IP organization representing
only the Mamanwas in the two barangays would be the signatory to the MOA. If they
understood this, it seems unlikely that AMPANTRIMTU would have been organized the day
before this third meeting. Nor would the PCB Chairman/tribal leader of Gigaqut have agreed that
AMPANTRIMTU would be the only contracting party. Now the Mamanwas are divided.
The IPRA and the Guidelines define FPIC as "the consensus of all members of the ICCs/IPs
which is determined in accordance with their respective customary laws and practices..." (g,
Chapter II; Section 5, d). Since the FBI did not document what the current customary decision-
making of the Mamanwa tribe was, it would have been best to verify the matter in the course of
the FPIC process. The FBI Team and the TMC could have not assumed that the tribal decision-
making process was contrary to what has been taking place - that ALL tribal leaders have been
"negotiating" all through out. If such decision-making process was not going to be eventually
recognized, the FBI Team and the TMC should have brought up the matter at the outset so that
the tribal leaders could have addressed this during their Consensus Building session. If one
would say that the customary decision-making is confined only within the Consensus Building
session as it seems to be defined, then is this not determining what customary decision-making is
for the tribe? NCIP officials, when asked what equitable, fair, genuine participation is, say that it
depends on the customary decision-making process of the tribe. But when the tribe indicates that
their customary decision-making includes all tribal members or leaders of the ancestral domain,
suddenly they are told that the decision-making depends on the law; customary decision-making
suddenly becomes not part of the law. This contradiction reflects the conflict that it breeds
among members and leaders of indigenous tribes.
In addition, the 2002 Guidelines state that the council of leaders within the ancestral domain
shall determine whether or not a given activity or project affects the entire ancestral domain or
only a portion of it (Section 16, a). While in the same section the law states that only those
affected shall give their consent, the determination of who are affected is bestowed to the tribal
leadership. As mentioned, this concern was not integrated in the FPIC process so that decision-
making process regarding who should decide and/or be the signatory to the MOA could have
been tackled and resolved early on within the tribal leadership instead of pitting them against one
another. Given the way the way the final part of the part was handled, the leadership conflict got
resolved through the assertion of power by TMC and maybe the concerned tribal leaders of the
"affected areas".
THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
To sum up, the only benefit with a specific amount in the MOA is the PhP500,000 livelihood
assistance [US$ 9,542.42]. This money was used by Mamanwa households for livelihood
projects such as mini grocery stores and livestock raising. The rest the benefits in the MOA are
funded from what is already in the 1% direct mining costs that is being paid to the barangay
governments on a project basis; may be except for the housing of the Mamanwas which
according to TMC's ICE officer is on top of the PhP500,000 [US$ 9,542.42] and outside of the
1% direct mining costs. While the two tribal leaders of Taganito and Urbiztondo are members of
the Community Technical Working Group (CTWG), there is no guarantee that they are able to
negotiate for the welfare of the Mamanwas. If they were able to before TMC sought for their
FPIC, granted they knew they were part of the CTWG, they would have not asked for what they
wrote down in their demands which most were already told to them as existing. But then again,
their demands were shaped by what was presented in the Preliminary Consultative Meeting.
When their demand for a fixed financial payment was more than what was presented, they
received ambiguous statements and information.
Let me add a number of salient points regarding the MOA. The MOA covers the Rights of TMC
which basically turns the situation around - now it is TMC which is exercising its right to FPIC
on their mining areas and operations (Article Two, B, d). The full cooperation of the
Mamanwas are required for TMC to be able to exercise unhampered and uninterrupted mining
operations within the MPSA areas and also the peripheral properties of the company (Article
Two, B, a & b). The question is not why these are in the MOA, provided these were part of the
discussions which apparently did not come out in the documentations or in my interviews, but
whether the Mamanwas understood what these agreements meant. The Mamanwas, through the
two tribal leaders who are signatory to the MOA, filed a complaint last February 5, 2008 to the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation Commissioner against the company, alleging
displacement and neglect of their condition (http://www.mindanao.com/blog/?p=3366 retrieved
on April 25 at 7:00 PM). The two chieftains also alleged that the agreements were not fully
explained and admitted that they signed the MOA so as to get their share the soonest (Ibid). The
IP leaders did not have any legal counsel who could have reviewed the MOA with them prior to
signing. The 2006 Guidelines accommodates complaints relating to the interpretation and
implementation of the MOA through the Regional Hearing Officer who shall decide on the
matter. NCIP's Commission is authorized to decide on complaints regarding irregularities in
carrying out the FPIC process after a certification of compliance has been issued.
In the section regarding the Commitments and Obligations of the AMPANTRIMTU, the
Mamanwas have basically relinquished their rights over their ancestral lands, providing "free
access to ANY properties covered by the IPs ancestral domain", and guaranteeing the company
their full cooperation including "consenting in writing to the creation of a lien, mortgage or other
appropriate encumbrance over the MPSA in order to secure financing..." (Article Two, C, 2, 3 &
4). The Rights of the AMPANTRIMTU covers the right to receive the benefits stipulated in the
MOA, the right to receive rehabilitation compensation in accordance with the law, and the right
to a dialogue with the company in case of conflicts in the implementation of the MOA (Article
Two, D, 1, 3, 4). It is interesting to note that one of the rights guarantees the Mamanwas to an
"informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of this
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Memorandum and related documents, contracts, agreements, and studies" (Article D, 2). The
details of this provision could be further threshed out to give meaning to this right.
This leads me to the absence of a mechanism for the monitoring of the MOA. The NCIP is
assigned the obligation to ensure the implementation of the MOA (E, 2). In effect, NCIP is
tasked to monitor the MOA. But NCIP admitted that they do not monitor the MOA, only the
PhP500,000 [US$ 9,542.42] livelihood assistance (Interviewee No. 9). Another NCIP official
said, the monitoring is supposedly done by the NCIP Provincial, but the office has no monitoring
system yet (Interviewee No. 5). The CTWG only monitors the 1% direct mining costs
(Interviewees Nos. 9, 12). But when asked how the group is monitoring the 1% payment since
the company holds the money, he said that the respective sectors represented in the CTWG do
their own monitoring (Interviewee No. 12). But the 2002 Guidelines state that the MOA should
contain the monitoring and evaluation schemes (Section 23, i).
The MOA contains no provision regarding environment protection except the part that stipulates
the existence of a Mine Rehabilitation Fund which shall be used for damages resulting from the
mining operation (Article Two, A, 7). Environmental impacts are said to be monitored by the
Provincial Multi-partite Monitoring Team (MMT) which is tasked by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to monitor a company's or a contractor's
compliance with environmental laws and regulations in accordance with the rules on
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). According to the MGB Director, the MMT is headed by
the DENR and MGB, and consists of the local government/barangay units, non-government
organizations, and community organizations. The NCIP Director and the Director of the Mines
and Geosciences Bureau indicated that matters relating to environmental concerns, e.g. EIA, go
through the DENR's rules and regulations. As a Commissioner confirmed, when it comes to
mining, it is the business of the DENR/MGB; he said NCIP's concern is the welfare of the IPs
(Interviewee No. 13). One of course would wonder how the environmental impacts of mining
are not related to the welfare of the IPs. An IP commented that the MOA does not contain
environmental protection provisions; if there are efforts on the part of the company, it is not part
of the MOA; what the MOA, contains, according to him, is all about money (Interviewee No. 10).
Again, the Guidelines stipulate that the MOA should include detailed measures to
conserve/protect any affected portion of the ancestral domain for watersheds, mangroves,
wildlife sanctuaries, forest cover, and the like (Section 243, g).
The CTWG Chairman/former Community Relations Officer (CRO) of TMC also noted that
CTWG has nothing to do with complaints regarding the implementation of the MOA; it is the
CRO who handles the matter. The MOA stipulates a section on Conflict Resolution (Article VH).
Where the conflict is between and among the IPs, the traditional dispute resolution process of the
IPs shall be used (Article VII, 2, a). Conflicts between the IPs of the two barangays and TMC
shall be subject to a Panel of Arbitrators consisting of one representative each from the two
parties and an NCIP officer chosen by the two parties (Article VII, 2 b). The decision of the
Panel is deemed final, non-appealable and immediately executed (Article VII, c). According to
the Mamanwas, if there are conflicts, they understand that NCIP is the one in-charge; they can
file a complaint with NCIP and the legal officer will take care of talking to the company
(Interviewees Nos. 1). The MOA confirms that conflicts not covered by the provisions on
conflict resolution shall be subject to NCIP (Article VII, 2, d).
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Clearly, the Mamanwas do not have any on-going involvement with the implementation of the
MOA after having signed it. They are simply recipients of the benefits stipulated therein. The
MOA does not provide for any monitoring and evaluation that could forge a relationship between
partners since the Mamanwas are the owners of the ancestral domain and the company is
utilizing their land for the next 25 years. But to monitor a MOA entails articulating among other
things the details required by the Guidelines. The MOA is too general and limited that one
wonders what could be jointly monitored by the parties. The scholarship provision for instance
stipulates four college students to be financially assisted. One is going to monitor for 25 years
that four college students were provided scholarships by TMC. A provision on cultural
sensitivity generally states that the company shall recognize and respect the AMPANTRIMTU in
preserving and developing their culture without any details on how the company will go about
doing this.
In the end, the NCIP endorsed the MOA and signed it as a third party. In my view, the way the
FPIC was carried out disregards the intent that FPIC be used as an empowerment tool. The IPs
ended up having very little control over what happened to their land even though they
supposedly gave their Free, Prior, and Informed Consent.
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CASE TWO: THE FPIC EXPERIENCE OF THE MANOBO TRIBE IN ROSARIO,
AGUSAN DEL SUR
There were several FPIC processes that took place in Rosario with respect to the application of
the PHILSAGA Mining Corporation (PSMC) for a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
(MPSA).
The NCIP Regional Office informed me that the documentation of the proceedings of the FPIC
processes is with the national office. But the national office was unable to locate the
documentation of the FPIC process that took place in Rosario but was able to provide me that of
the Taganito Mining Corporation and the Mamanwa tribe in Claver, Surigao del Norte which I
used for the first case. Nonetheless, there are a number of salient points that could be drawn out
from the interviews I conducted last January and the Memorandum of Agreements I have
obtained.
CURRENT CULTURAL DECISION-MAKING
The Manobos remember that traditionally, the datu/chieftain who was recognized as the
"spirited" one, the strongest among the other datus exercised decision-making power in the tribe
(Interviewees Nos. 16). But over time, due to the development of civilization and the
introduction of religion, they said that their customary decision-making system had to adapt
(Ibid). They said that also due to various laws, such as the Local Government Code and the
IPRA, their decision-making system went through changes (Ibid).
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Currently, compared to the Mamanwas in the first case, the current decision-making of the
Manobos in Rosario is exercised by the tribal council of elders. The members of the council of
elders are elected by their fellow "genuine" IP leaders and also the IP migrant leaders. There are
18 datus/chieftains comprising the council of elders coming from the six barangays of the
ancestral domain. The 18 council of elders represent the six barangays through the tribal
organization called CAMMPACAMM 26. There are eleven barangays in the municipality of
Rosario. The CAMMPACAMM represents the recipient of the Certificate of Ancestral Domain
Claim issued at that time by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in
June 1998. At present, CAMMPACAMM is undergoing an application for a Certificate of
Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The current Chairman of the organization, Rodging Reyes,
known as Datu Mabantao II, replaced his father who died in 2005. He conveyed that the
perimeter survey confirming a 22, 554.9457 hectares as part of the ancestral domain has been
completed.
According to him too and other council of elders, before NCIP validated and finally recognized
in December 10, 2007 who the "genuine" IP leaders as a result of the tribe's application for an
ancestral domain title, the CAMMPACAMM considered even the IP migrants who came from
nearby municipalities as part of the decision-makers in the organization (Interviewees Nos. 16,
23). As one tribal leader confirmed, he was once considered as part of those making decisions in
CAMMPACAMM; there were 13 of them coming from Bayugan 3; but now that has changed;
there are only seven from Bayugan 3 who sit as decision-makers in the organization; he
acknowledged that he is not part of the council of elders (Interviewee No. 19). These IP
26 CAMMPACAMM stands for the six cultural areas of the ancestral domain of the Manobos in Rosario. These
cultural zones are: Cabantao, Maligaya, Marfil, (areas of) Pamintigan, Caulisihan, Maputi, and Matanog.
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migrants whose ancestors came to Rosario in the late 1950s are now simply recognized and
designated as "tribal leaders" (Interviewees Nos. 16, 19, 23). According to the council of elders,
NCIP's validation of "genuine" leaders is based on establishing genealogical roots which has to
show that one's roots were within the areas claimed (Ibid). So even if one is a Manobo leader in
the area but one's ancestors only migrated there, then one could not be considered a "genuine" IP
leader, i.e. he could not be elected to the council of elders. He is known as a tribal leader but his
jurisdiction is within his own clan or area (Ibid).
But the interviewees said that CAMMPACAMM, being the decision-making body consists of
the tribal council and council of elders. When asked who comprise the tribal council, they
replied that it is the sectoral leaders and the tribal leaders (Ibid). When asked to clarify who and
what the sectoral leaders are, there was much confusion on this too. The council of elders ended
up asserting that they are likewise known as sectoral leaders. Apparently, the confusion is due to
the situation that there are also tribal leaders, i.e. IP migrants, who call themselves sectoral
leaders (Interviewee No. 17, 19). The idea of a sectoral leader came when the ancestral domain
was divided into management areas facilitated by the DENR (Interviewee No. 19) who awarded
the Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim (CADC) in 1998. These areas were known as sectors
(Ibid). A list of 15 sectoral areas shows nine members of the council of elders as sectoral leaders
(Profile of the Manobo Tribe in CADC 153, Environmental Science for Social Change, 2005). It
could be then that the other sectoral leaders could either be tribal leaders, i.e. IP migrants, or
other "genuine" Manobo sectoral leaders who are not in the council of elders. An IP migrant
tribal leader though said he is a sectoral leader too because he manages his own clan or area or
sector of IP migrants (Interviewee No. 17, 19). In my subsequent discussions, I would be using
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council of elders and tribal leaders to distinguish the two groups of Manobos in Rosario, those
whose ancestors were "rooted" in the area, and those who migrated. I will also use the term
sectoral leaders to refer to "genuine" Manobo datus/leaders who are not elected to the council of
elders.
While the CAMMPACAMM still includes the tribal leaders as part of the organization, and that
they could register their opinions and recommendations during assembly, it now got clear to the
council of elders that the decision-making should be confined among the council of elders as per
result of the NCIP having "screened the leaders" (Interviewee Nos. 16, 23, 24). From 44 IP
leaders consisting of tribal leaders, sectoral leaders, and council of elders, the decision-makers
have been reduced to 18 datus/chieftains comprising the council of elders (Interviewee Nos. 16,
23).
In making a decision, the council of elders meets first to discuss and resolve matters among
themselves; then they go back to the barangay tribal chieftain to inform him of the results of the
discussions and he in turn is responsible for disseminating the information to the tribal members
(Interviewee No. 23). The CAMMPACAMM Chairman asserted that it is the council of elders
who make the decisions and not him. Yet, later he admitted that when he thinks that a decision
made by the council of elders is "not good", he does not allow its approval. The Vice-Chairman
of CAMMPACAMM confirmed that it is the council of elders who makes the decisions and not
the Chairman. But a tribal leader conveyed otherwise; he thinks that the Chairman is the one
making the decisions; that he was even responsible for selecting the Vice-Chairman and other
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officers (Interviewee No. 19). According to the council of elders, their functions include the
formulation and implementation of policies in the ancestral domain (Interviewees Nos. 16).
The changes in the decision-making process of the tribe, instead of moving towards the creation
of inclusive mechanisms for the participation of tribal members became more confined to a
select few - the CAMMPACAMM officers and the council of elders. The NCIP verification of
"genuine" IP leaders brought the concentration of power in the hands of the CAMMPACAMM
leadership. As an effect, tribal members whether migrants or "genuine" are further isolated in
the decision-making process and new conflicts have been generated among tribal leaders, i.e. IP
migrant leaders, and "genuine" IP leaders. Now, the Manobos do not only struggle against the
non-IP migrant settlers but are also pitted against one another. I understand the concern that IP
migrant leaders at times overpower the "genuine" IP leaders. But the process of empowering the
latter in a manner that IP migrants would appreciate entails more than a verification process of
establishing who is "genuine" and who is not. This requires a process where the IP leaders,
migrants or "genuine" should negotiate among themselves how they could creatively share
power not only among themselves but with their members.
With the previous decision-making structure which included IP migrant leaders, one would see
in the following discussions that this already posed a number of dangers such as the lack of
transparency in the transactions with PHILSAGA and the confinement of benefits among leaders.
In my view, NCIP failed to consider these dangers in carrying out the process for the verification
of "genuine" IP leaders as part of the requirements for the tribe's application for a Certificate of
Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). NCIP was simply concerned with carrying out the required
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verification activity without due consideration of its implications among the Manobos, whether
migrants or "genuine" in the ancestral domain. This is not uncommon in government agencies
where accomplishments are often measured by whether an activity has been conducted or not
rather than by its outcomes and impacts.
BAYUGAN 3, WASIAN, AND STA. CRUZ MOA
Who then decided in the FPIC process for PHILSAGA's application for supposedly an
exploration [for gold] permit in barangays Bayugan 3, Wasian, and Sta. Cruz? The council of
elders remembered that a community consultation was conducted in May 2003 at the Bayugan
Catholic Church (Interviewees Nos. 16, 23, 24). They said the NCIP Regional Director at that
time attended the said event (Ibid). Present too were representatives from the PHILSAGA
Mining Corporation, the FBI Team leader Mr. Eulo Nogan, and member Mr. Hosue Duhac, and
other NCIP personnel from the province (Ibid). On the part of the Manobos, there were tribal
leaders, sectoral leaders, and council of elders (Interviewees Nos. 16, 17, 24, 25). The council of
elders maintained there were community members but a tribal leader qualified that only those
who were available came, and whoever was brought by the datus with them (Interviewees Nos.
16, 17).
CAMPACAMM officers disclosed that the council of elders, sectoral leaders, and tribal leaders
had second thoughts whether to give PHILSAGA their consent or not (Interviewees Nos. 16, 23).
But they said that there was pressure from the NCIP Regional Director then to speed up the
process (Ibid). According to the council of elders, the NCIP Director conveyed in his message
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during the assembly that "blessings are here; your difficulty or poverty will [now] disappear"
(Ibid). The council of elders disclosed that they demanded for a PhP150,000 [US$ 2,856.75]27
monthly royalty payment but that the NCIP Regional Director told them that was too much
(Interviewees Nos. 16). So they said the tribal council and council of elders proposed for
PhP25,000 [US$ 476.13] per month which was accepted by the company (Ibid). When asked
why the amount was reduced at such, the council of elders admitted that the company agreed to
give a cash advance of PhPh150,000 [US$ 2,856.75] so the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
got drafted (Ibid). Another CAMMPACAMM officer confirmed too that the MOA was already
there, they were just made to add (Interviewee No. 23). This statement apparently indicates that
the community consultation they were referring to which they said was held in May 2003 was
the "Community Assembly" which the 2002 Guidelines designate as the venue to convey the
decision of the IPs to the company (Section 13, e). All throughout the interviews, this was the
only consultation that they referred to was conducted. The other that they mentioned was
already the MOA signing which they said was held in Bunawan (Interviewees Nos. 16). The
CAMMPACAMM Chairman too confirmed he attended this event to sign. He said, in the
previous meeting/consultation, he was not around and he felt that he could have been the one
who made the decision. The stories point to the absence of a Preliminary Consultative Meeting.
The English version of the MOA provided by the NCIP national office is dated May 15, 2003.
One of the datus/leaders in Wasian has no signature. The Visayan version of the MOA provided
by CAMMPACAMM which the council of elders said they first signed is likewise dated May 15,
27 All currency conversion for the Bayugan 3 MOA is based on the Central Bank of the Philippines' May 2003
monthly average rate which is PhP 52.5072 to one US dollar. I am using May 2003 as this is the month in which the
MOA was signed.
110
2003 and all datus had their signature on top their handwritten names. In the English version, in
which the council of elders claimed followed later, the names of all signatories are typewritten.
In the Visayan version, only the names of the PHILSAGA President and the NCIP Regional
Director are typewritten; the names of the datus are all handwritten. Among the datus who are
signatories to the MOA, six are in the list of the council of elders. As the council of elders
admitted, before the validation of "genuine" IP leaders conducted by NCIP, decision-making was
shared with IP migrant leaders.
The experience of the Manobos with respect to NCIP's role is no different from that of the
Mamanwas in Taganito and Urbiztondo. There was apparently a significant amount of pressure
from the NCIP Regional leadership. But in Rosario, the Regional Director did not seem to have
a double-sided message. I surmise that this is because with the Mamanwas, there was a
Preliminary Consultative Meeting where there was considerable presence of tribal community
members, while in Rosario he directly dealt with the CAMMPACAMM leadership which was in
existence for about eight years when the tribe's FPIC was sought for. This organizational
presence/absence in my sense also explains why in Taganito and Urbiztondo, the mandated
activities as per 2002 Guidelines were followed, while in Rosario there seems to be a serious
disregard of the FPIC process.
Compared to the Mamanwa tribe in Taganito, the Manobo tribe of Rosario had an established
organization when PHILSAGA sought for their FPIC. CAMMPACAMM is said to have been
organized in 1995 (Profile of the Manobo Tribe in CADC 153, Environmental Science for Social
Change, 2005). While the decision-making process then included the tribal leaders, i.e. IP
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migrant leaders, it reflects a centralized system. Compared to the Mamanwa experience in the
first case, the Manobo tribal leaders and council of elders did not mention about the involvement
of the community members in the FPIC process. The idea of community members having taken
part in the process was only indicated by a tribal leader who said "those who were available and
brought by the datus/chieftains came" (Interviewees Nos. 16, 17). The tribal secretary of
Bayugan 3 herself and another Manobo who is a member of KABUHIHAN, an IP Women's
Association, confirmed that they were not aware of the FPIC process or activities that took place
(Interviewees Nos. 18). They said that they only learned that FPIC took place when they heard
that the datus/chieftains were receiving an honorarium (Ibid). As to the Consensus Building
period, a council of elder disclosed that there was no discussion among the council of elders at
that time (Interviewee No. 2). He said that the IP leaders per barangay decided on their own
even if there was only one MOA; two Wasian council of elders decided not to give their consent
but the MOA indicates that there were other leaders in Wasian who signed the agreement. The
council of elders of Bayugan 3 and Sta. Cruz said they agreed to give their consent together with
other sectoral and tribal leaders (Interviewees Nos. 16).
According to a council of elder from Wasian, he did not agree because the 1% from the gross
output that the company was offering was too little for him; he said if they agreed to 5% which
he tried to demand, he could have agreed; but the company told them that the law only stipulates
1% (Interviewee No. 25).
As NCIP officials say, what is fair, equitable, and genuinely participatory depends on the
customary decision-making process of the tribe concerned. But by all indications the decision-
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making process of the tribe does not at all guarantee genuine participation and a fair and
equitable outcome for the community. Left on their own, the CAMMPACAMM leadership was
deciding without due consultation and thorough consideration of the matter with their members
as well as fellow leaders in the other barangays of the ancestral domain. If one is to follow the
FPIC Guidelines stipulating that only the consent of the affected barangays of the ancestral
domain should be involved in the FPIC process, even this criterion was apparently not followed.
There seems to have been no consultation of tribal community members in the three barangays.
With regard to a discussion or a Consensus Building among the IP leaders in the three barangays,
they each went on their own and ended voting prior to considering the merits and demerits of the
proposal within a long-term timeframe. It appears that the leaders succumbed to the PhP25,000
[US$ 476.13] monthly royalty payment because they were given a PhP150,000 [US$ 2,856.75]
cash advance by the company.
The worst thing was that NCIP was around. In the stories, the leaders had in fact pointed out that
they felt pressured by the Regional leadership. The information that needed to be discussed on
the table as mandated by law was supposed to have been facilitated by the NCIP FBI Team. But
as the story unfolded, the NCIP Regional leadership had its bias. The FBI Team apparently did
not have the power to carry out their task independently.
As to the PhP150,000 [US$ 2,856.75] cash advance, the PhP100,000 [US$ 1,904.50] was
divided among 20 council of elders, sectoral leaders, and tribal leaders of the affected barangays
(Interviewees Nos. 16). The PhP50,000 [US$ 952.25] went to CAMMPACAMM; the money
was spent on office rental and administrative matters (Ibid). The PhP 25,000 [US$ 476.13]
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monthly payment better known among the IP leaders as honorarium continued to be divided
among the 20 council of elders, sectoral leaders, and tribal leaders (Interviewees Nos. 16).
During the interviews, the council of elders communicated that PHILSAGA has stopped giving
them the PhP25,000 [US$ 476.13] monthly honorarium because there is no longer an exploration
activity in Bayugan 3 (Interviewees Nos.16). The council of elders thought that the PhP25,000
[US$ 476.13] was for the exploration period which was what the MOA period is, that is, from
May 2003 to May 2008 (Ibid). But they then realized when they ceased to receive the payment
that the said benefit is only given when there is drilling activity (Ibid). The leaders said that they
did not scrutinize the Visayan version of the MOA which they first signed. The last drilling
activities, according to a council of elder were from the months of February 2007-July 2007
(Interviewee No. 21). A payment voucher from PHILSAGA indicated that the amount of
PhP25,000 [US$ 476.13] was still issued in June 8, 2007 for the royalty payment agreement.
While the PhP25,000 [US$ 476.13] monthly honorarium had stopped, a PHILSAGA officer
claimed that they continue to supply 12 sacks of rice to the tribal council and council of elders in
Bayugan 3 and three sacks of rice for the leaders of Wasian (Interviewee No. 30). The council of
elders confirmed this statement to be true (Interviewees No. 16). But the MOA does not contain
a provision regarding this benefit. An account voucher provided by the officer of PHILSAGA
shows PhP36,450 [US$ 694.19] as payment for the rice subsidy to the IP leaders of Bayugan 3,
Wasian, and Sta. Cruz (April 23, 2007). The ten sacks of rice for Sta. Cruz leaders are part of
the current MOA with them which is tackled in the following section.
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The council of elders said that they understood that their consent was being sought for an
Exploration Permit (EP). But the MOA indicates an application for a Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement (MPSA). And it states that PHILSAGA is obliged to provide the 1% of the
gross output to CAMMPACAMM of which 70% shall go directly to the community according to
the allocation to be determined by CAMMPACAMM (No. 1, a). Further, the MOA states that
the 30% shall be left with PHILSAGA as this fund shall be supervised by the NCIP to support
projects for the "good of the community" (No. 1, b). It is on the third page of the MOA that the
PhP25,000 [US$ 476.13] is stated as monthly payment to the "legitimate tribal sectoral leaders of
Bayugan 3 within the exploration period only" (No. 9).
According to the Director of the Ancestral Domains Office (ADO), the FPIC process for
Exploration Permit and for Mineral Production Sharing Agreement is separate. This was
confirmed by the Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB). But he added that
NCIP should ensure that when IPs give their consent for exploration, it should follow that this is
carried out for the exploitation and production operation. He said that that it is difficult to deal
with a change, i.e. allowing exploration and later on disallowing exploitation and production
when mineral reserves have been found.
I think the IP leaders were told as they narrated that PHILSAGA is seeking for their consent for
exploration without clarifying that the mining agreement they were applying for was an MPSA.
And this is so because in the event that ore reserve is found, they can then proceed to
exploitation and production without having to go through another FPIC process. And the
company, in my view, did not clearly communicate the message that they were applying for an
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MPSA because an exploration does not require the 1% of the gross output as benefit to the IPs
since the company has no income yet. And as in the case of Sta. Cruz which is later discussed,
even when the company is already transporting ore for processing, it is still able to still justify
that the mining operation which it categorizes as development is still considered under
exploration stage since it is not yet profitable.
Note that in Bayugan 3, PHILSAGA has a processing plant. A PHILSAGA officer claimed that
the company has been paying 1% of the direct milling costs to the barangay of Bayugan 3 (Ibid).
Furthermore, he informed that Bayugan III also has a Community Technical Working Group
(Ibid). The process for the release of the 1% of the direct milling costs is similar to that in
Taganito. The 1% of the direct milling costs is released only when there is a resolution coming
from the CTWG who approves a project based on the 5-year Social Development Management
Plan (SDMP) of the company (Ibid). The resolution in turn is approved by the Mines
Rehabilitation Fund Committee (MRFC) which consists of the MGB Regional Director, the
Provincial Governor, the NCIP Regional Director, the Municipal Mayor, a non-government
organization representative, and one of the council of elders of CAMMPACAMM (Ibid). The
PHILSAGA officer though admitted that the 1% direct mining costs is still in the hands of the
company and it is released directly to beneficiaries of approved projects (Ibid). But he said that
there should be a separate local government bank account where the fund should be deposited
(Ibid).
There is a disconnection between the benefit that is being provided to the barangay, i.e. 1% of
the direct milling costs, and that of the Manobos which is also the case with the Mamanwas in
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Taganito and Urbiztondo. But in this case it is more pronounced as it appears that the 1% of the
direct milling costs that is going to the barangay has not been part of the conversations among
the IP leaders, PHILSAGA, and NCIP. The problem with bringing in this information is that it
could drag in the barangay government and the CTWG into the FPIC process which they are not
officially part of and subject them to a negotiation of the 1% of the direct milling costs to
formally include the Manobos which shall be reflected in the MOA of the latter with the
company. This is also the problem faced by the FPIC process of the Mamanwas; while there
were more information provided to them regarding the 1% of the direct mining costs that was
going to the barangay and the projects where the money has been spent, in the end, the
Mamanwas did not have any royalty fee that could have been drawn from the said funds because
the FPIC process does not include the barangay government and CTWG members. In fact, at
first the Mamanwas were offered to have 16% from the amount of the 1% of the direct mining
costs going to the barangay but they eventually were denied of this share in the MOA. The
rationale was that this share was already allocated for them by the barangay and the CTWG but
as it turned out, this "supposed" share was later reallocated to two barangays upon the decision
of the CTWG. This is how the Mamanwas ended up with a PhP500, 000 livelihood assistance
instead of a so-called royalty fee. The conflict arising from the separate process of negotiation
with the barangay government/CTWG and with the IPs is acknowledged by the
CAMMPACAMM leadership. An officer of the organization commented that the local
government does not know its place given the IPRA (Interviewee No. 23). An NCIP officer
from the province remarked that many are against FPIC, even the local government units
because of the said competition for the pie (Interviewee No. 28).
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Going back to what the PHILSAGA officer claimed, the said council of elder though never
mentioned being a member of MRFC nor of the CTWG. He simply said that since the
exploration had stopped, they have stopped receiving the PhP25,000 [US$ 476.13] monthly
honorarium; he confirmed that the 12 sacks of rice for Bayugan 3 are still being provided; this is
true for the three sacks of rice for the Wasian leaders (Interviewees No. 16). But the MOA
mentions that a 30% from the 1% direct milling costs belongs to the tribal people and that this is
where medical benefits for them shall be taken from (No. 4, b). But in the course of the
interview, the PHILSAGA officer conveyed that the MOA was approved up to the NCIP
regional level but it did not reach the national office (Ibid). The English version of the MOA I
got though came from the national office and at the top of the notary page is the signature of the
NCIP Chairperson at that time indicating a Commission en Banc's Resolution No. 076 dated
August 6, 2004. But the PHILSAGA officer asserted that there was no Compliance Certificate
issued by the NCIP national office with regard to the FPIC process that took place (Interviewee
No. 30).
The council of elders never conveyed the MOA as not having been approved at the national level.
What they knew was that exploration was finished and that the MOA will soon expire. But the
statement of the PHILSAGA officer might explain the absence of documentation regarding this
case. Nonetheless, the MOA indicates a very confined process among PHILSAGA, the
CAMMPACAMM leadership, and the NCIP Region. And the NCIP Region seems to have
proactively influenced this process because they had a chance of accessing and supervising 30%
of what would have been paid from the 1% gross income of the company in the event that an
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exploitation of minerals took place. That money would have been used to fund the works of
NCIP in Rosario.
The Community Relations Officer of PHILSAGA though noted that there is an on-going MOA
(outside the FPIC MOA) between CAMMPACAMM and PHILSAGA with regards to the use of
the latter of the water source which is within Bayugan 3. PHILSAGA is paying
CAMMPACAMM and the IP leaders of Bayugan 3 PhP15,000 [US$ 366.41]28 per month (Ibid).
A company voucher dated June 8, 2007 has been released to the CAMMPACAMM Vice-
Chairman. The Vice-Chairman confirmed that he receives the amount every month; he said
PhP9,000 [US$ 219.84] goes to CAMMPACAMM account while PhP2,000 [US$ 48.85] goes to
the tribal leader, PhP1,000 [US$ 24.43] goes to the Manobo whose area is where the water
comes from, PhP1,500 [US$ 36.64] goes to the Bayugan 3 tribal chieftain, and PhP1,000
[US$ 24.43] is used as a transportation fund for the council of elders of Bayugan 3.
FPICs and MOAs in Sta. Cruz
PHILSAGA started in May 17, 2001, according to the Community Relations Officer of the
company. He explained that before PHILSAGA, mining operations in the area have undertaken
a number of mining corporations starting with the BANAHAW Mining Corporation whose
ownership was transferred from one company to another and was eventually bought by
PHILSAGA (Ibid).
28 The currency conversion for the Bayugan 3 water rights MOA is based on the Central Bank of the Philippines'
January 2008 monthly average rate which is PhP40.9381 to one US dollar. I am using January 2008 since the month
of the MOA is not indicated but the year when the MOA was signed is indicated to have been in 2005.
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Alcorn Mining Corporation, a partner of PHILSAGA, went through the process of securing the
FPIC of the tribe under the leadership then of Datu Mabantao, the deceased father of the current
CAMMPACAMM Chairman (Interviewees Nos. 16). But according to the council of elders, the
mining application of Alcorn then was pending because the area they applied for was also the
area applied for by the PICOP Resources Incorporated for Industrial Forest Management
Agreement (IFMA) (Ibid). So in the end, the consent given by the tribal leadership did not
materialize (Ibid). The second MOA that the council of elders remembered was signed by the
former NCIP Regional Director (Ibid). But they said that the current NCIP Regional Director
invalidated this after calling for a review of the process undertaken (Ibid). The council of elders
provided me a copy of the said MOA. They said there were no minutes of the consultations that
transpired and the signatories were a combination of the council of elders and tribal leaders.
There is also a copy of the Sta. Cruz MOA which shows NCIP being represented by the former
NCIP Chairperson who is now the Commissioner for Region XIII. She has not signed the
document though. Also, the said Sta. Cruz MOA is signed by a combination of council of elders
and tribal leaders. This MOA which is an English version is dated January 22, 2006. There is
also a more recent MOA which is a Visayan version dated January 22, 2007 but which the
former NCIP Chairperson has not also signed. But she issued a Compliance Certificate (i.e. that
the company has complied with the FPIC process and that the community has given its consent)
signed and dated January 31, 2007 (NCIP Compliance Certificate Control No. CCRXIII-07-01-
61). But the said 2007 MOA appears to be a translation of the English MOA dated January 22,
2006. The year could have just been a typographical error. I will use the MOA dated January 22,
2007 in the next discussions since this is dated as the most recent and that the provisions
stipulated are the ones being implemented as per interviews with the council of elders, tribal
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leaders, and the company representative. The PHILSAGA project as reflected in this MOA is
known as the Anoling [Sta. Cruz] Gold Project.
An additional note regarding this MOA and the Compliance Certificate; both are consistent with
the application number of the Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) but the former
stipulates 405 hectares of mining operation but the latter has 409 hectares. Equally important,
the life span of the agreement is stated to be ten years and renewable for another five years
(MOA, No. 2.7). But the Compliance Certificate from the National Chairperson at that time
states that the term of the agreement is 25 years and renewable to another 25 years (No. 5). This
is the term of an MPSA.
A picture shown by a PHILSAGA officer has a caption "tribal community assembly meeting"
and was dated January 10, 2007 (Interviewees No. 30). He identified those in the picture as Datu
Mabantao II (CAMMPACAMM Chairman), Mr. Eulo Nogan and Mr. Josue Duhac (FBI Team
leader, and member), Forester Caldeo (from Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office), Mr. David Egerani (a VSO29Mining Specialist detailed at the Provincial Governor's
Office). If the date of the picture is compared to the Work Plan for the FPIC process prepared by
the FBI Team leader, Mr. Eulo Nogan, January 10 appears as the "Community Assembly" (2002
Guidelines) where the final decision of the council of elders was supposed to be conveyed to
PHILSAGA. So was there a Preliminary Consultation as indicated in the Work Plan? No one
has a copy of the minutes of the Preliminary Consultative Assembly/ Consultative Community
Assembly, if it ever took place. The PHILSAGA Community Relations Officer (CRO) showed a
29 The Volunteer Service Organization is an international development charity that sends volunteers across the globe
to work with disadvantaged communities.
copy of the voucher paid to the NCIP Regional Office in the amount of PhP199,000
[US$ 4068.34] for the conduct of the entire FPIC process. The voucher is dated December 20,
2006. This FPIC process was already subject to the 2006 Guidelines which took effect in
October 2006.
Like in the case of Bayugan 3, the company agreed to give the Sta. Cruz IP leaders a cash
advance of PhP250,000 [US$ 5,110]30(Interviewees Nos. 16). This amount is indicated in the
MOA as royalty fee representing the first five months of mining exploration that already started
in April 2006 (No. 3.1). The MOA also stipulates another PhP150,000 [US$ 3,066.59] cash
advance that shall cover the first three months of 2007 (Ibid). But the council of elders never
mentioned this amount. In addition, another provision states that should PHILSAGA already
proceed to mineral production, the PhP50,000 [US$ 1,022.20] will be replaced with a 1% royalty
fee based on gross income (No. 2.3).
The story of the council of elders missed the Consensus Building among the six IP barangays
consisting of the ancestral domain. The decision to give consent was made among the leaders of
Sta. Cruz and the leadership of CAMMPACAMM. And it seems, like in the case of Bayugan III,
the cash advance offer and the monthly honorarium was influential to the leaders' decision.
The council of elders said that 50% of the PhP250,000 [US$ 5,110] cash advance was used for
livelihood assistance projects (small farms and hog raising) for sectoral ("genuine") IP leaders of
30 All currency conversion for the Sta. Cruz MOA is based on the Central Bank of the Philippines' January 2007
monthly average rate which is PhP 48.9143 to one US dollar. I am using January 2007 as this is the month in which
the MOA was signed and the Compliance Certificate has been issued.
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Sta. Cruz (Ibid). The 20% was used for projects by tribal community members while the 10%
was used as mobilization, e.g. meetings, by the tribal council of Sta. Cruz and the remaining 20%
went to CAMMPACAMM for office rental and administrative expenses (Ibid.). According to
the council of elders too, they have been receiving the monthly royalty fee of PhP50,000
[US$ 1,022.20] as contained in the MOA.
The council of elders and tribal leaders remarked that PHILSAGA is not doing exploration
anymore; they are traveling ore already to the processing plant located in Bayugan 3. They
confirmed that a 1% royalty fee was being paid already but that they do not know how much is
the 1% gross output of the company (Interviewees Nos. 16, 23). A tribal leader shared that the
said royalty fee already released by PHILSAGA were in the amount of PhP61,000
[US$ 1,247.08] released in October 2007 and PhP42,000 [US$ 858.64] issued in December 2007
(Interviewees Nos. 17). He added that 50% of the amount was for the IP leaders of Santa Cruz
and 50% was for the tribal community (Ibid). The amount was allegedly deposited to the
account of the CAMMPACAMM (Ibid). There are three signatories to the account of the
organization: the Chairman (Datu Mabantao II), the Business Manager (Datu Gawahon), and the
Secretary (Datu Tumowahong II). But as pointed out earlier by the tribal leader, no audit has
been conducted in two years (Ibid).
A PHILSAGA officer confirmed that the company has been giving a 1% royalty fee from the
gross income to CAMMPACAMM on top of the PhP50,000 [US$ 1,022.20] monthly royalty fee
for exploration (Interviewee No. 30). He said they have released the amount of PhP23,000
[US$ 470.21] last January 2008 as payment for the production period of October-December 2007
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(Ibid). The 1% royalty fee he said is released on a quarterly basis (Ibid). He added that they
have not removed the PhP50,000 [US$ 1,022.20] royalty fee for exploration because the 1%
royalty fee from the gross output did not exceed PhP50,000 [US$ 1,022.20] yet as they are not
really into the stage of mineral production yet but rather they are still into mineral development
(Ibid). But then he mentioned that the company is already paying a 1% direct mining costs to the
local government of Sta. Cruz (Ibid). The check, he said, is being given to the barangay
treasurer; the barangay council then takes care of how it is allocated (Ibid). But there seems to
be a contradiction in what the officer has said, if PHILSAGA is not into mineral production yet,
why is it paying a 1% direct mining costs to the barangay? Also, as a tribal leader confirmed,
PHILSAGA issued PhP61,000 [US$ 1,247.08] for the tribe last October 2007 (Interviewee No.
17). This contradicts the PHILSAGA officer's claim that they are still giving the PhP50,000
[US$ 1,022.20] monthly royalty fee on top of the 1% of the gross income because the latter has
not reached an amount bigger than PhP50,000 [US$ 1,022.20].
Here one can see again how local government benefits are negotiated separately from the
benefits of the IPs. And because of this, the Manobos end up getting less knowing only that the
reason is because of the company not getting enough profit yet without figuring out that the 1%
of the direct mining costs being paid to the local government has something to do with what they
are getting.
During the "negotiation" with PHILSAGA, the IP leaders were told that there would be an
exploration and in the event that signs of gold reserve is found, exploitation and production shall
be undertaken (Interviewees Nos. 23, 25). But the leaders do not understand why PHILSAGA is
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already transporting ore to the milling site and yet they say that they are not into production yet,
they are only in the stage of development which they explain is still part of exploration. The
Engineer in the mining sites and the CRO of PHILSAGA explained that development simply
refers to the construction of mining tunnels and claimed that while there are ores being processed
already, the amount is considered not profitable at this point. Engineer Manuel Barbas qualified
that only when they have done intensive drilling at sea level would their operation be profitable
since the ore reserve, he said would be more accurate at that point.
Another benefit stipulated in the MOA is the provision of ten sacks of rice for the tribal council
leaders for Sta. Cruz (No. 3.3). The council of elders and tribal leaders confirmed that they have
been receiving this, including the sectoral leaders (Interviewees Nos. 16, 17). Each leader is
allotted one sack of rice (Ibid).
Another interesting agreement in the MOA is the section that gives priority to CAMMPACAMM
as the provider of sand and gravel and timber for the mining operation of PHILSAGA (No. 41).
This provision is confirmed by the Community Relations Officer (CRO) of the company and
council of elders who shared that CAMMPACAMM supplies timber for the underground tunnels
for the mining operation of PHILSAGA. The Manobos are engaged into falcatta and gmelina
production. It is estimated that 60% of the Manobos in the ancestral domain are into tree
production ((Profile of the Manobo Tribe in CADC 153, Environmental Science for Social
Change, 2005). In addition, other suppliers of timber pass through CAMMPACAMM
(Interviewees Nos. 16). CAMMPACAMM gets PhP.50 cents [US$ .01 cents] per board foot of
timber supplied by other sources (Interviewee No. 30). A tribal leader and a council of elder
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complained that PHILSAGA's payment for the timber is often delayed from two to four months
(Interviewees Nos. 17, 24).
As to employment, nobody is able to say how many Manobos in Sta. Cruz are employed by
PHILSAGA. Datu Tumowahong conveyed that he at times substitutes his in-law who is a
security guard for the company, earning PhP205 [US$ 4.19] per day. According to Datu
Triumph, a tribal leader, for underground mining one can earn a minimum of PhP 1,500
[US$ 30.67] per 15t day of the month, only when there is work. He added that maximum
earning is PhP8,000 [US$ 163.55] per square meter but this is divided among 10-15 workers. He
estimates that one meter takes about three days to mine. According to the contractor hired by
PHILSAGA to manage one of the mining tunnels, the salary of contractual workers depends on
their output; the highest is PhP3,000 [US$ 61.33] per 15 days; and the minimum is PhP2,000
[US$ 40.89] per 15 days (Interviewee No. 32). Being a contractor, he receives 5% of the gross
income of his workers and what is left is divided among his workers and also including him
(Ibid). The contractual workers include the rake operators, the timber men, those who shovel the
blasted pieces of ore, and those who put them in sacks (Ibid). The said contractor has 35
contractual workers under him but he himself does not know how many IPs or non-IPs is in his
team (Ibid). The project Engineer Mr. Manuel Barbas that maximum employment could reach
260 but currently they only have 160 workers in the three tunnels. But he said he does not have
the list of employees; since they are on a contract basis, the contractor supposedly has the said
list.
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Like the MOA in Taganito, employment is said to be based on skills and qualifications (No. 4.2).
The difference is that the application is subject to the recommendation of the sectoral leaders,
approved by the tribal chieftain and noted by the CAMMPACAMM Chairman (Ibid).
Also, CAMMPACAMM is given the authority to identify and approve two deserving students
who will be given college scholarship assistance by PHILSAGA (MOA, No. 4.4). The council
of elders did not seem to know of this power as manifested in the way they conveyed the
situation that PHILSAGA has not provided the scholarship assistance yet. The
CAMMPACAMM shall also determine the beneficiaries of the dental and medical mission that
PHILSAGA will conduct in collaboration with NCIP (MOA, No. 4.6). In addition, a PhP10,000
[US$ 204.44] shall be allocated annually for health services (Ibid). The council of elders claimed
that health and medical assistance provision has not been provided by the company.
There are several reasons why I think these "other benefits" are not being provided. It could also
be that the company thinks they are already getting or will be getting these benefits through the
1% direct mining costs paid to the barangay. Also, CAMMPACAMM has not been formally
claiming these benefits and as such PHILSAGA has not proactively provided them. And I think
this is because CAMMPACAMM has not set a long-term plan where they could integrate a
programmatic schedule of availing these benefits. And the lack of a long-term program is due to
the absence of an Ancestral Domain Sustainable Development and Protection Plan (ADSDPP).
But it is also because the CAMMPACAMM leadership does not have the time to really focus on
the concerns of the organization and the tribal community. They have not as an organization
thoroughly reviewed the MOA since they have signed it. The Chairman admitted having limited
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time as he works as an extension worker/ technician in the government Fiber Industry
Development Authority in the nearby province of Agusan del Norte. He is only able to go home
to Rosario during week ends. Because of this limitation, he disclosed that he often sends
representative to meetings. A council of elder too shared that the Chairman is also very young
[indicating his lack of experience] (Interviewee No. 24). Also, it seems that the leaders have
been focused on the honorarium benefit and their supply of timber for PHILSAGA. In addition,
the MOA in itself is general. There is no time frame or schedule for the release of funds for the
annual health services, the construction of the health center, the provision for two college
scholarships, etc. But the MOA stipulates that an implementation schedule should be provided
by PHILSAGA to NCIP. Given the complaints of the council of elders, either NCIP has not
received the document or that NCIP has not informed and provided the leaders a copy of the
document. Lastly, there is no monitoring and review mechanism which could hold parties to
account for the implementation of the MOA. As a CAMMPACAMM officer said, after the
MOA they had nothing to do with the company, they just wait or request for the release of their
benefits (Interviewee No. 23). The lack of a mechanism where parties could come together and
review the MOA and even thresh out details which were not articulated creates an informal
condition whereby CAMMPACAMM is reduced to a requesting party when availing of the
benefits. It could also be that CAMMPACAMM would not want to feel being perceived as
"requesting" for benefits every now and then.
A disturbing provision in the MOA talks about the company providing relocation and a financial
assistance of PhP40,000 [US$ 817.76] to every displaced IP family due to mining operation (No.
4.3). No one mentioned of this provision and I did not have a copy of the MOA until after the
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interviews. But given what appears to be a shortcut FPIC process and a centralized tribal
decision-making, I wonder how the amount was determined and whether concerned families
were part of the decision-making during the Consensus Building of the tribe, if it took place. As
I claimed earlier, there could have been a discussion only among the IP leaders of Sta. Cruz and
the CAMMPACAMM leadership. But this apparently did not consider the implications of the
displacement and relocation provision of the MOA, or it could be that this was not discussed
with them or that they do not remember this because the focus of the conversations have been on
the cash advance, the monthly honorarium, and the supply of timber to PHILSAGA.
PRIOR DEVELOPMENT PLANS
The Manobos of Rosario are engaged in more livelihood sources than the Mamanwas in the first
case. Rice and corn production are major sources of household income (Profile of the Manobo
Tribe in CADC 153, Environmental Science for Social Change, 2005). They are grown in rice
paddies and in upland areas. Buyers usually go to the Manobo households to purchase rice and
corn which they in turn sell in the market. The Manobo households also grow abaca, coffee, root
crops, and fruit trees such as banana, rambutan, marang, durian, and lanzones. These produce
are usually brought to the market to be sold. Rosario is a highway town, so other municipalities
could easily access the produce of the communities. The basic problem that Manobos face in
their agricultural livelihood is the lack of capital primarily to finance farm inputs, e.g. chemical
fertilizers (Ibid). In addition, the Manobos also engage in poultry and livestock production, e.g.
chicken, pig, duck, cattle, and goat, to augment their income (Ibid). Swine production is a
primary source of income used for the education of Manobo children and for emergency
purposes. The Manobos likewise are into planting production tree species, primarily falcatta,
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and also gmelina. There are no figures as to the extent of this activity but ESSC's documentation
estimates 60% of the Manobos in the ancestral domain are into tree production. Small-scale
mining in the form of gold panning and tunnel operation is also an additional source of income
for the Manobos in Rosario. Rosario is said to have a rich deposit of gold, making it the center
of gold mining in the province of Agusan del Sur (Profile of the Manobo Tribe in CADC 153,
Environmental Science for Social Change, 2005). A gram of gold dust is sold for about PhP600
[US$ 14.66]31 at a minimum (Ibid). Tunnel operation normally involves seven workers and a
financier who is often not from the place or who is a non-IP migrant. Gold from small-scale
mining activities is mainly sold in the nearby municipalities of San Francisco and in Butuan as
well as in Davao City (Ibid). Small-scale mining is rampant in Bayugan 3 and Sta. Cruz. The
estimated annual average household income from engaging in small-scale mining activity as a
part time source of income is PhP38,000 [US$ 928.23] (Ibid).
But like the Mamanwas in the first case, the Manobos of Rosario do not have an Ancestral
Domain Sustainable Development and Protection Plan (ADSDPP) yet (Interviewees Nos. 16, 23).
They have started in October 2007 to collect the required data that will inform them in the
formulation of their ADSDPP (Ibid). The Chairman also admitted that they have not designated
their sacred and burial grounds. A PHILSAGA officer commented that the tribe should at least
have a five-year development plan to guide the way royalty payments are being used
(Interviewee No. 30). He said that currently, the said payments are not used properly by the
tribe; they are just being divided among the IP leaders (Ibid).
31 Small-scale mining income currency conversion is based on the Central Bank of the Philippines' January 2008
monthly average rate which is PhP 40.9381 to one US dollar.
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The MOA stipulates that PHILSAGA shall provide CAMMPACAMM PhP100,000
[US$ 2,044.39]32 for the protection and management of the ancestral domain's environment, e.g.
watershed, and sacred grounds based on the tribe's Ancestral Domain Sustainable Development
and Protection Plan (ADSDPP). In my opinion, this is the reason why NCIP and
CAMMPACAMM are currently pursuing the development of the latter's ADSDPP; there is
available funds from PHILSAGA for implementing parts of the ADSDPP plan.
MONITORING
There is no provision on monitoring in the MOA. As the CAMMPACAMM leadership
confirmed, once the MOA has been signed, they have no business in the mining operation of the
company (Interviewee No. 23). Like the Mamanwas in Taganito and Urbiztondo, the Manobos
in Rosario have become mere recipients of the benefits stipulated in the MOA. When asked how
the company guarantees that the royalty fee they are paying the IP leaders of Sta. Cruz is really
1% of their gross income, the Community Relations Officer (CRO) replied that these could be
verified through the report submitted to the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB) as well as the
documents from the Central Bank and the Bureau of Internal Revenue verifying their income.
The CAMMPACAMM leadership admitted not knowing what is supposed to be in the MOA
(Interviewee No. 23).
32 This currency conversion is based on the Central Bank of the Philippines' January 2007 monthly average
(PhP48.9143 to one US dollar) as the amount is part of the MOA with Sta. Cruz.
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UNDERSTANDING FPIC
How do the parties understand FPIC? The CAMMPACAMM leaders disclosed that the
NCIP/FBI Team did not really explain what the FPIC Guidelines contain, the details of the
process and the implications of what they were going through (Interviewees Nos. 22, 23). The
IP leaders admitted that the only thing they understand about FPIC as explained to them by NCIP
is that they have the prerogative to give or withhold their consent to a company who wants to
operate or continue operating in their domain (Interviewees Nos. 21, 23). The Chairman noted
too that when there is illegal activity in the area such as small-scale mining, this should be
reported in order to get subjected to their FPIC. The leaders emphasized that if they do not give
their consent, the company has no power (Ibid). But they contradicted themselves when they
admitted that PHILSAGA has been there for a long time and also the company according to them
had already negotiated with the barangay and so they had no choice but to ask for benefits
(Interviewees Nos. 17, 21, 23).
But the amount of benefits that the IP leaders agreed to does not seem to have a clear basis. It is
only apparent that the amount was determined by the company offering for cash advances in the
two MOAs which I surmise the leaders found to be relatively huge. The FPIC which was
supposed to be a process for weighing the costs and benefits of PHILSAGA's gold mining
project was reduced to the royalty payment or honorarium of the IP leaders. In my sense, this
was a convenient source of income for the IP leaders, including getting a percentage share in the
sale of timber which they have been given priority to supply. If one reviews the MOAs, in no
better way do they capture what the Mamanwa leader in Claver commented, that the "MOA is all
about money" (Interviewee No. 10).
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An NCIP Regional officer herself narrated a case involving two datus/chieftains in Remedios T.
Romualdez in Agusan del Norte who had different positions regarding the entry of a mining
company in their area; one datu is for the operation of the mining company while the other is
against. The NCIP Regional officer candidly shared that she talked to the datu who was against
and told him that when he dies, he has no money while the other datu has. So she asked the datu
what then would he prefer; with this, the officer said she was able to convince the datu to give
his consent.
Another NCIP Regional officer who is based in the province asserted that she sees no
weaknesses in the FPIC process; she said that the communities are the ones deciding, not the
leaders (Interviewee No. 29). But then she later admitted that she was not part of the FPIC
process that took place. Also, she thought that the IP leaders do not understand the
environmental impact of mining, that the focus of the process was more financial. Yet, she also
claimed that the 55-day period for the FPIC process is too long for investors, they get impatient
that is why some of them violate the rules.
The CAMMPACAMM leadership disclosed that given their limited understanding of the FPIC,
they did not as well know what should be in the MOA, what they were supposed to negotiate
(Interviewee No. 23). Among the information that were not explained to the IP leaders were the
environmental implications and mitigation technologies (Interviewee No. 25). The
CAMMPACAMM leadership admitted that they do not know the difference in terms of
implications between open pit mining and underground mining which PHILSAGA uses. The
2006 Guidelines stipulates that the MOA should contain detailed protection or conservation
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measures of the affected areas of the ancestral domain critical for watersheds, mangroves,
wildlife sanctuaries, and forest cover (Section 45, g). But the MOA with Sta. Cruz simply states
that PHILSAGA shall submit to NCIP their Environmental Conversion and Protection Program
(NO. 2.8). A council of elder confirmed that they have been requesting for the company's
Environmental Protection Plan but as of interview date, the CAMMPACAMM has not received
any (Interviewee No. 24).
When asked whether the FPIC process strengthened their decision-making, most of the answers
are equated to the honorarium, rice provision, and share in supplying timber to the company.
But somewhere in the conversation, some IP leaders made comments regarding their decision-
making as having been centralized and divided, with IP leaders of the three barangays and the
CAMMPACAMM leadership cornering most of the benefits. As a tribal leader and a council of
elder pointed out, there is no unity in the tribe (Interviewees No. 17, 25). They commented that
the way decision-making is carried out with the FPIC process does not fit the idea of being a one
ancestral domain where decisions are supposed to be shared among tribal members and leaders
(Ibid). He added that even if the ultimate decision is made by those affected, there must be a
process for sharing information and knowledge as well as explaining the various positions and
concerns of all tribal members and leaders in order to have a clearer understanding and bigger
picture of the matter being decided upon by their colleagues in the affected areas (Ibid).
A PHILSAGA officer views FPIC in terms of the benefits they provide to the tribe. The officer
enumerated a number of benefits, e.g. basketball court, water system, that they have provided
aside from those stipulated in the MOA for the MPSA (Interviewee No. 30). In addition, he said
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that FPIC has helped because community members have been given "proper information". It
turned out that what he meant was, before there were community members who were against
them because they had their own tunnel, i.e. small-scale mining activities, but then they agreed to
PHILSAGA operating in their area for a compensation (Ibid).
135
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Philippine government enacted the Mining Act of 1995 to maximize the development of the
country's mineral resources to spur economic development. There is no doubt that mining
makes a considerable contribution to the Philippine economy. In recognition of the
environmental degradation caused by mining, however, the Mining Act of 1995 and its Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) contain environmental and social provisions viewed
by the Mines and Geosciences Bureau as significant improvements. Like the IPRA, the Mining
Act mandates that companies obtain the "prior informed consent" of indigenous communities
before Mineral Agreement, FTAAs, or mining permits can be approved. The IPRA explicitly
includes the term "free" in the description of tribal consent required before mining companies
can enter and operate in indigenous domains. Mining companies entering or renewing permits to
operate (such as the Taganito Mining Corporation and the PHILSAGA Mining Corporation)
have been subject to the process of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC) established in the
IRR of the IPRA and its pertinent Guidelines.
The 2002 and 2006 Guidelines prescribe the FPIC process. Neither of the two cases I studied,
however, followed the rules. Both cases involved renewal of operations. This makes the term
"prior" in the FPIC not applicable. Nonetheless, if NCIP had followed its own rules, they would
have been forced to decide whether indigenous peoples could grant free and informed consent
"after the fact."
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The FPIC process in both cases was very rapid. The Manobo case was clearly cut short
compared to the Mamanwa process. The FPIC with the Mamanwas went through all the
mandated activities while the process with the Manobos combined consultation and decision
meeting in a way that the regulations never intended.
How are decisions made in each IP community? What decision-making methods are used?
Are the mechanisms adequate to determining free, prior, and informed consent?
AN ASSESSMENT OF NCIP'S ROLE IN THE FPIC PROCESS
The FPIC timeline were driven by the NCIP Regional Office. Why they scheduled things as
they did is not clear. It is not unusual for government offices to focus on getting done with an
activity since they are often evaluated based on the number of activities they complete. In other
words, the NCIP and FBI Team were not worrying about meeting the underlying goals of the
FPIC process - empowerment of IPs, i.e. a tool for self-determination. If this had been the case,
they would not have been so determined to speed everything up.
There are probably other factors that affected the decisions of the NCIP regarding its
management of the FPIC process. And these factors could very well explain why NCIP failed to
guarantee an informed process free of manipulation. For one, NCIP lacks the funding it needs to
meet its obligations. The pressure exerted by the NCIP Regional leadership in the Manobo FPIC
process in Bayugan 3, Rosario seems to have been influenced by the provision in the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that NCIP will get to supervise a portion of the royalty
payment to the IPs for the implementation of projects for the tribal community. This is
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apparently the case with Sta, Cruz, Rosario as well. PHILSAGA agreed to provide the tribal
organization, CAMMPACAMM, the amount of PhP 100,000 [US$ 2,044.39] for the
implementation of its Ancestral Domain Sustainable Development and Protection Plan
(ADSDPP).
The conduct of the FPIC activities, with the exception of Consensus Building efforts, is financed
by the mining company. The FBI Team receives a per diem for the conduct of its activities, the
rental of transportation vehicles, and expenses for communication materials. These are
shouldered by the mining company.
The PhP199,000 [US$ 4,068.34] issued by PHILSAGA to the NCIP Regional Office does not
match what appears as a shortcut process in Rosario. The FBI Team work plan contains a total
amount of PhP32,000 [US$ 610.71] for the conduct of the Consensus Building process in Sta.
Cruz, Rosario. The Consensus Building process, though, is not supposed to be shouldered by the
company since it involves only the IP leaders and in some cases the tribal members. In the case
of the FPIC process in Taganito, PhP300,000 [US$ 5,725.45], is likewise considered huge by an
officer of the TaganitoMining Corporation given that there were only two consultation meetings.
Given the amount of money provided by the companies, it would have been possible to conduct
all the required FPIC activities in Rosario, including additional consultations in both cases.
In the two case studies, the FBI Team members displayed a simplistic understanding of their
facilitation responsibilities during the FPIC process. NCIP officials I interviewed agree that
facilitation simply means allowing the conversation among the parties to flow. But this
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disregards the fact that the company comes to the negotiation table with disproportionate
financial resources and knowledge as well. In other words, there is a power imbalance. To
facilitate, therefore, means to ensure that no party is controls the conversation. But the FBI
Team and the Regional Hearing Officer allowed the company representatives to drive the
conversation during the preliminary consultation and during the final decision meeting. Instead
of supporting the IPs by pushing for clarification on the part of the Taganito Mining Corporation,
the NCIP allowed ambiguous and evasive responses from the TMC representatives. Worse, their
replies also followed the company representatives' line of thinking.
The aforementioned situation reveals two things: NCIP' s lack of facilitation skills and its failure
to understand pertinent provisions in the Mining Act. During the FPIC process, the IPs were
confused about the difference between the royalty payment (to which the law entitles them) and
the 1% of the direct mining and milling costs paid to local government for community
development purposes. The NCIP failed to manage the exchange of information in a way that
enlightened the IPs on this matter. They, themselves, seemed confused in their replies to the IPs
which only reinforced the position of the TMC. In the case of Rosario, these issues apparently
were not brought out during the conversation, and NCIP did nothing to inform the Manobos
about the 1% of the direct milling and mining costs being paid to the concerned barangays.
There is a need to enhance the facilitation skills of NCIP staff and to upgrade their knowledge of
the relevant provisions of the Mining Act and the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) law.
Giving Free, Prior, and Informed Consent involves more than giving or withholding consent, it
means negotiating the terms under which mining might proceed. Also, NCIP staff need to
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enhance their documentation skills to better capture the salient features of the discussions that do
take place among the parties. NCIP' s lack of funding is a serious obstacle to training its
personnel.
The way the FPIC process was carried out by the NCIP could also be attributed to the personal
biases of the FBI Team members and the Regional leadership. In both cases, the Regional
Director indicated to the IP leaders and the tribal communities that they had the opportunity to
get themselves out of poverty by giving consent to the mining companies. The FBI Team could
have felt pressured by the Regional Director's bias which was clearly manifest in all his public
messages.
NCIP officers also admitted to giving advice to the IPs regarding the benefits they should
demand and even to giving consent assuming the benefits were sufficient. But such acts reflect a
bias that reduces the FPIC process to nothing more than a conversation about money. This might
grow out of a genuine concern about the economic conditions facing the IPs, but it could also
demonstrate a lack of understanding about the complexity of issues surrounding mining and their
long-term implications for the IP community.
NCIP's confidential coaching could reflect their view that the mining companies are here to stay;
there are just too many stakeholders outside the FPIC process exerting pressure, e.g. including
local governments and national officials. The NCIP may think that the only option is for IPs to
negotiate for a share in the benefits of mining. This reflects a sense of powerlessness in light of
the clout of mining companies. The NCIP Regional Hearing Officer clearly demonstrated this
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powerlessness when he reinforced the TMC representative's argument that the royalty fee being
demanded by the Mamanwa tribal leaders could not be granted because TMC was already paying
the government a royalty fee. The NCIP FBI Team tended to show deference to mining
company representatives compared to the IP leaders and tribal community members.
This behavior is not strange. In the Philippines, respect often gets equated with power. And
power is often defined solely in terms of socio-economic status or political muscle. So, despite
the pronouncements that the IPs do possess power as a result of the FPIC provision of IPRA,
they have not been accorded a level of respect equal to that bestowed on mining companies
during the FPIC process. If the NCIP officers conducting the FPIC process considered
themselves powerless in relation to the mining officials, they in turn regarded the IPs as
powerless in relation to themselves, in addition to being powerless against the mining
corporation. This mapping of social and positional position allowed the team to disregard the
concerns raised by the IPs and to identify with the reasoning behind the companies'
unwillingness to negotiate benefit offers.
For how could the Memorandums of Agreement been approved by the national leadership
despite lacking what the Guidelines stipulate as minimum content? The MOAs are so general
that environmental and cultural protection provisions are more or less ignored. The conflict
resolution provision of the English version of the Mamanwa-TMC-NCIP MOA is detailed
compared to its Visayan version. The MOA of the CAMMPACAMM (Sta. Cruz)-PHILSAGA-
NCIP is solely about financial benefits. It is apparent, too, from the documents and interviews
that the only part of the MOA discussed with the IPs in each case were those pertaining to the
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benefits they would receive. Other stipulations in the MOA were set by the NCIP and the
mining companies. Looking at the non-financial provisions of the MOA negotiated with the
Mamanwas, it is hard to see how the IPs could have agreed on their inclusion if they were
actually discussed. My sense is that they were not reviewed until after the MOA was ready for
signing.
Did the NCIP do enough to ensure a free and informed FPIC process for the IPs in both cases?
The answer is clearly NO. The timeline of the FPIC process was what the mining companies
wanted. The leadership of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau and the NCIP thought that the
FPIC process took too long. I would assert that the manner in which it was facilitated by the FBI
Team was more in keeping with the interest of the mining corporations than the welfare of the IP
communities. The FPIC process should probably be facilitated by a neutral party whose job it
would be to ensure a fair process. The role and functions of such a neutral is elaborated in the
pages that follow.
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE METHODS USED IN THE FPIC PROCESS
Preliminary Consultation, Decision Meeting, and MOA Drafting
The Preliminary Consultative Meeting is usually conducted within a half or whole day. This is
not adequate for a meaningful consultation. What takes place is mere information dissemination.
Even the information presented is highly selective. As NCIP officials themselves acknowledged,
mining companies present only the advantages and benefits. If ever adverse effects, particularly
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environmental impacts, are tackled, they are presented as negligible and are oversimplified with
regard to corresponding mitigation technologies.
There needs to be a genuine admission of the long-term environmental impacts of mining
operations. Companies should not assure communities that no environmental damage is going to
take place. This runs contrary to what communities actually see happening. The community
members may not have a very high level of educational attainment, but they are not stupid.
Despite the assertion of some mining company representatives and NCIP officers that the IPs are
smart, they treat them as if they do not understand their own best interest.
The historical marginalization of indigenous peoples brought about by colonizers, commercial
logging and mining companies, and government has been possible because society has viewed
IPs to be uneducated and uncivilized. This view continues to find expression in the lack of
transparency and manipulation that IPs are subjected to during the FPIC process. One could say
that the reason for such deceptive tactics is to safeguard the interests of the mining companies at
the expense of the communities. This is the prevailing view. I believe that the broader picture
(including the details of the costs, particularly of the environmental impacts that communities
will bear) are not presented because those concerned think that the IPs will not understand. I am
not saying that everything will be understood by the IPs, but it is the responsibility of the
company to translate into intelligible findings what they understand to be the likely impacts of
their project.
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No one expects the mining companies to know all the environmental impacts it will cause over
the lifespan of its operations. But there are certainly some known environmental damages that
could be estimated. Companies would do better in restoring the trust of indigenous peoples if
they shared available information in a comprehensible manner. They also need to indicate where
mitigation might be possible along with the uncertainties. Since not everything can be known,
communities will have to decide given the information they have about environmental costs and
benefits of mining projects. The companies take a risk of being rejected, but the communities
absorb a much greater risk when they give consent to mining operations since after the lifetime
of the operations they are left to deal with the costs.
UNDERTAKING AN INDEPENDENT OR JOINT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT
The FPIC process should probably require an independent or joint Environmental Impact
Assessment. The neutral facilitator could set-up a process for involving external advisors to
prepare an EIA. These advisors should be selected by the parties. The NCIP and the neutral
could recommend possible candidates. The parties would also have to determine the questions
and information they want the external advisors to address. The external advisors, on the other
hand, would have to discuss with the parties how they intend to proceed. The timeline would
have to be agreed upon by the parties. What an independent or joint environmental impact
assessment does is incorporate the concerns of the IPs and the host barangays. A neutral
facilitator can provide a common frame for understanding the forecasts. Given uncertainties of
science-related matters, the neutral would help parties establish criteria for determining
acceptable levels of uncertainties as well as mechanisms for dealing with their implications.
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A shared understanding of the actual, perceived, and projected environmental costs of a project
would prepare local government and communities to make better decisions. If they decide to
give their consent, they need to know how they would allocate the mining benefits to develop
their communities and how they would mitigate the adverse impacts of mining. This includes a
decision about what to do with the mined properties when the mining company is gone. In
addition, the shift towards creating an informed process can open up a sustained partnership
among community members, indigenous peoples, the mining company, and other stakeholders.
In this manner, indigenous peoples can be treated as having a stake in the long-term development
of their ancestral lands. Memoranda of Agreement could be better formulated to reflect such
continuing relationships.
FRAMING THE FPIC PROCESS AS A CONSULTATION-NEGOTIATION PROCESS
In both cases, benefits were discussed solely in terms of money. At the outset of the
consultations, the companies highlighted royalty payments as benefit to the IPs. The council of
elders in Rosario, admitted giving their consent primarily because of the cash advance offered by
PHILASAGA. The Mamanwa tribal leaders found themselves formulating their demands within
the narrow parameters of the benefits identified by the Taganito Mining Corporation.
Emphasizing royalty payments at the very beginning of a consultation or during the FPIC
process downplays the importance of creating a channel through which the real concerns and
interests of the IPs can be articulated. Mining companies are well aware that the focus on
monetary benefits can be viewed as bribery. Given the economic circumstances of the IPs,
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putting at the forefront the offer of royalty payments and financial livelihood assistance has been
determinative of the decision of the Manobos and the Mamanwas to give their consent.
Furthermore, focusing on financial benefits alone has diverted the IPs from scrutinizing other
non-monetary concerns. Then again, given the limited time for consultation, there is really no
way all the concerns of the IPs could be addressed.
Several information needs were raised by the Mamanwas during the preliminary consultation.
The Manobo leaders indicated that they, too, would have brought out these concerns if there had
been a real opportunity for exchange during the preliminary meetings with the mining company.
One of their concerns was the connection between the royalty payment due to the IPs and the 1%
of the direct mining and milling costs also due to the barangay for community development.
Since the mining companies have been in operation for a number of years, the required payment
of a 1% of the direct mining and milling costs to the barangays has been on-going. While this
information was disclosed in the preliminary consultation with the Mamanwas, the relationship
of this benefit to the royalty payment due the IPs was not clarified. In both cases, the IPs did not
understand that whatever was used to support community development from the 1% of the direct
mining and milling costs could be charged against their royalty payment. This was apparently
the reason why in the end the Mamanwas were not given royalty payment but instead a
PhP500,000 [US$ 9,542.42] livelihood assistance grant. The Manobo leaders were not at all
informed during the FPIC process about the existence of the 1% of the direct mining and milling
costs being paid to the barangays. IP leaders did not understand that the other benefits stipulated
in the MOA were already part of the community development fund managed by the Community
Technical Working Group in the barangay.
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Mining companies may fear that disclosure of information clarifying the required royalty
payments to local government and to IPs could lead to the latter's realization that there is
actually little left for them thus encouraging them to withhold consent. But this information is
critical to the IPs' understanding of what they ought to be negotiating (both with the mining
companies and the local governments). Given that this information would bring local
governments into the picture, I would assert that the barangay governments should be included in
the FPIC process. How IPs and local government would negotiate for the allocation of their
shares of the same funds would require another venue in the FPIC process. The point is,
whatever development funds the barangay government has allocated for the IPs from its 1% of
the direct mining and milling benefit, need to be considered in the MOA between the mining
company and the indigenous tribes. More important, the IPs should be able to negotiate for an
appropriate allocation for their long-term development instead of just being at the receiving end
of what local governments plan for them. Local governments have long neglected the well-being
of IPs.
These are three conditions for what I consider to be a genuine consultation. First, consultation
has to extend over time; it cannot be a one shot activity. Consultation needs to be broken down
into several stages. Second, the outcomes of consultation should not be pre-determined. This
means that the process should not be reduced to nothing more than information dissemination.
Finally, consultation should involve principled 33 negotiations among numerous stakeholder
33 The term "Principled Negotiation" was coined by Roger Fisher and William Ury in Getting to Yes. For
Lawrence Susskind, this negotiation is known as "Interest-based Negotiation" or the "Mutual Gains Approach to
Negotiation". Both focuses on negotiating interests compared to the traditional hardline bargaining where
negotiations are based on positions. Interest is the defined as the reason behind a position. One of the arguments for
an interest-based negotiation is that there could be a number of options corresponding to an interest which is not true
for a positional bargaining approach.
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interests. It calls for stakeholders to do problem-solving dialogue aimed at meeting the interests
of all those at the table.
The preliminary consultation and the final community assembly/decision meeting in the two
cases were driven by the mining companies with the support of the NCIP Regional leadership
and the FBI Team. The Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in each case makes clear who was
running the process. While a review of the MOA, as well as all other pertinent documents
relating to the conduct of the FPIC process, was supposedly undertaken by the national office
before attaching its signature and/or issuing a Compliance Certificate, it is apparent that this task
was not taken seriously. That an NCIP legal officer helped draft and review the MOA with the
IP leaders does not guarantee that the document is fair. The MOA with the Mamanwas was the
product of a process that I consider far from "free and informed". Legal assistance should be
provided to the IPs to help them review the MOA before they sign.
Consensus Building
Consensus Building sessions are supposed to employ the traditional decision-making process of
the IPs. Customary decision-making process varies in each IP community. In addition, since the
IPs have been subjected to so many societal impacts, including those imposed by mining
operations, traditional decision-making process is often invisible.
In the case of the Mamanwas in Taganito and Urbiztondo, the elders were the decision-makers
prior to the arrival of government projects on their lands. These created a distinction between
tribal elders and leaders, the latter being elected or designated to engage with government. With
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the Manobos in Rosario, decision-making was shared among IP migrant leaders and "genuine"
IP leaders, i.e. those whose ancestors were rooted in the place. The concept of sectoral leaders
was introduced by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) when the
tribe was awarded its Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim (CADC). IP migrant leaders and
"genuine" IP leaders are both called sectoral leaders. The introduction of IPRA further required
them to determine who was "genuine" and who was entitled to make decisions for the IP
community.
The problem with this decision-making set-up is that most areas are not homogenously inhabited
by "genuine" IPs. There are migrant IPs as well as non-IPs. The determination of who is a
"genuine" IP leader impacts even the migrant IPs within each ancestral domain. The point is,
current decision-making in the Manobos in Rosario divides the IP community into migrant and
"genuine" IPs. Who, then, represents the sentiments and interests of the migrant IPs in the FPIC
process? Equally important, the use of the customary decision-making in Consensus Building
isolates the "genuine" tribal members.
The NCIP has not been able to ensure that the full range of community interests is discussed
among tribal leaders and members. That depends on the IPs' customary decision-making
process. Since the IPRA and its Guidelines require the creation of an IP organization to
represent the tribe in its ancestral claim and in the MOA signing, customary decision-making has
become centralized in IP communities. This is not to say that traditional, i.e. tribal ancestors'
decision-making was not centralized. In fact, the two IP communities in my case studies suggest
that the eldest chieftain considered to possess the "spirit" made decisions on behalf of the tribe.
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The difference is, this chieftain had legitimacy and was recognized by the whole community.
Equally important, decision-making for him was a lot less complex. He did not have to deal with
the external forces and entities that have become part of the realities that IP communities have to
engage today. Designating so many kinds of leaders, e.g. sectoral leaders, a council of elders,
tribal council leaders (required by various government policies including the IPRA) has
contributed to the cultural erosion of IP communities and resulted in centralized decision-making
that is probably not appropriate to the complex realities that IPs currently face. Such centralized
decision-making has led to divisions among IP leaders and isolation of tribal members. The
dynamics between IP leaders and members mimics what is happening between mining
companies and IPs - the absence of genuine consultation with tribal members.
The non-representation of community interests is most evident in the case of Rosario where the
royalty payment and the sacks of rice are being divided among IP leaders. While in Taganito, no
financial benefit goes directly to the leaders; the livelihood benefit is accessed by all community
members in affected areas. But this is the case because the mining company decided to do it this
way and NCIP is making sure that the benefits are spread out among community members. This
arrangement was possible because the Mamanwas did not have an organization at the time of the
FPIC process, not until they needed one at the last stage for the purpose of signing the MOA.
Because the company was not clear about who to talk to, this allowed the participation of tribal
leaders and members from the other barangays within the ancestral domain, even though they are
not part of the directly affected areas. Even then, tribal members were spectators to the
unfolding of the conversations that were taking place between their leaders and the mining
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company representatives. Many tribal elders felt displaced as they were not consulted during the
decision-making.
Now that the Mamanwas have an organization that represents IPs in the affected barangays, this
may become the new customary decision- making process when it comes to matters related to
the MOA with the Taganito Mining Corporation. When it comes time to make decisions for the
whole ancestral domain, however, customary decision-making process may take a different form.
How many "customary" decision-making process can there be for one ancestral domain?
When it comes to Consensus Building, the IPs could use their customary decision-making
process, which may mean including all leaders in each ancestral domain. But, when it comes to
the MOA signing, only those IP leaders in affected areas are going to give their consent because
decision regarding the allocation of benefits is within their authority. This divides the decision-
making process between those who are directly and not directly affected. This could be invoked
as the customary decision-making process, too. This was the case with the Manobos in Rosario.
This has created a conflict between "genuine" IP leaders in the directly affected and not directly
affected barangays of the ancestral domain. Just recently, their "customary" decision-making
process was changed to reflect the designation of the council of elders as "genuine" IP leaders.
This new decision-making structure has also exacerbated conflicts between migrant IP leaders
and "genuine" IP leaders. In the case of the Mamanwas, the FPIC process created a division
between the tribal leaders. The tribal leaders of Taganito and Urbiztondo (with the Provincial
Consultative Body Chairman) represented the organization that was then formed to become the
signatory to the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). The customary/traditional decision-
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making (which I prefer to call current cultural decision-making) whether it includes all IP leaders
or only the leaders of directly affected areas isolates tribal members, breeds conflict among
leaders, and benefits primarily only those in decision-making positions.
An equally important point about Consensus Building meetings is that a conversation among IP
leaders -- even if it includes those in the non-affected areas -- is inadequate given the complexity
of the issues at stake. There seems to be an assumption that indigenous decision-making
processes are sufficient to generate a comprehensive and informed conversation among IPs. But,
this disregards the fact that IPs have been and continue to be marginalized in Philippine society.
They need significant support to build their capacity to engage with government leaders and
investors.
The NCIP says it is just a documentor of Consensus Building meetings. The NCIP FBI Team
never pursued the questions and concerns of the IPs during the preliminary consultation. The
FBI Team also seemed to lack an understanding of the relevant information related to these
concerns. In both cases, the Consensus Building was shaped solely by the discussion of financial
benefits offered by the companies. The confusion of the IPs was not addressed and their
understanding of the situation they were in did not increase.
ENSURING AN INCLUSIVE CONSENSUS-BUILDING PROCESS
Given the complexity of issues surrounding mining and the free and informed consent being
sought from the IPs, a day of consensus building is not enough. Like consultation, Consensus
Building requires a process. Venues need to be arranged to help:
152
* Identify the various interests of all community members
* Surface the questions and information needs of the IPs
* Make sense of data or information provided to the IPs in the course of on-going
consultations with the company and the local government
* Identify data or information needs as well as outside sources of assistance
* Agree on how decisions are going to be made and how benefits are going to be
allocated, if the tribe gives its consent
* Formulate mechanisms for transparency and community involvement during the
FPIC process and post FPIC processes
* Formulate a community development vision and long-term plan; this needs to be done
regardless of whether a tribe gives or withholds consent
The consensus building process described above is not linear; it is iterative. The NCIP cannot be
mere documentors. Given the institutional limitations and personal biases of NCIP officers, it
seems inappropriate for them to facilitate a consensus building process of this kind. There is a
need for a neutral facilitator to assist the IPs in their consensus building efforts.
The Consensus Building portion of the FPIC process could still be limited to IPs, but it has
inclusive and fair, i.e. the scope of participation should include all relevant tribal members and
should capture their concerns and interests. Customary or current cultural decision-making
should probably not be left as is.
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EMPLOYING A NEUTRAL PARTY TO FACILITATE THE FPIC PROCESS
I have asserted the need for a neutral party to facilitate the FPIC process. Given the history of
mining in the Philippines, distrust pervades the relationships among mining companies,
government, and indigenous peoples. Today, this skepticism is aggravated by the inability of the
NCIP to facilitate the FPIC process and the undue influence exerted by mining companies.
A neutral party acceptable to the mining company, the IP tribe, and the barangay government
would be best. There are neutrals in the country who could manage these conversations. Unlike
an arbitrator, a mediator does not possess any decision-making power regarding the issues at the
table. The neutral's impartial stance towards the parties and on the substantive issues they face
helps to establish the integrity of the process. If any party thinks that the neutral has become
biased at any point, he/she would be disqualified. Among the challenging questions that need to
be tackled in employing a neutral are: Who are they? Who would pay for them? Who would hold
them accountable?
The NCIP would be most effective as the convenor of the FPIC process. Being a convenor
means maintaining a list of neutral facilitators from which the parties can select. The NCIP
should be responsible for contacting the selected neutral and briefing him/her about the task at
hand. In addition, NCIP will introduce the selected neutral to the parties who must then clarify
their expectations. The NCIP FBI Team should continue to conduct the Field Based
Investigation to verify whether an FPIC process is necessary. The task of determining the
customary decision-making process of the tribe should be the responsibility of the neutral rather
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than the FBI Team. The team would still join the FPIC process, mainly assisting the IPs in
generating data that could help them in the consultation-negotiations.
Prior to the first formal consultation-meeting of the parties, the neutral should undertake an
assessment of the interests and concerns of the stakeholders involved. This review would help
the neutral determine the best possible way to proceed, i.e. agenda, work plan, timetable, and
budget. The assessment would also help the neutral identify the most appropriate representative
of the mining company, the host barangay/s, and the IP tribe to bring into the consultation-
negotiation process.
Such assessments are produced by interviewing the barangay government and the mining
company officials to have a sense of the issues and concerns that are most important to them.
Potential representatives of the barangay/s and the mining company would be identified during
the interviews. For the indigenous peoples, the assessment could take the form of an initial
Consensus Building session among the IPs prior to the first meeting of all the stakeholder
representatives. At the first Consensus Building session, the customary/current cultural decision-
making process would be clarified. The choice representatives of the company and the
barangay/s would have to be agreed upon by the tribe. This approach would ensure that whoever
represents the tribe in the FPIC process has the legitimacy to negotiate on behalf of the tribe. The
tribe would also have to agree on transparency and feedback mechanisms between their
representative/s and the community members.
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Assist Parties to Articulate their Interests
The neutral would perform a number of roles and functions in facilitating the FPIC process,
including assisting the parties in clarifying their interests. Interests often encompass substantive,
procedural, and psychological needs. Many consultations and negotiations fail because they deal
only and immediately with substantive concerns without regard for people's concerns about a
respectful and fair process.
Establish Ground Rules
For the parties to be able to understand and respond to each other's multiple interests, the neutral
has to manage the conversation. To do this, ground rules are needed that can be developed based
on the initial interviews with the parties. Through the ground rules, the neutral ensures that the
parties treat each other with respect, recognize the legitimacy of each other's interests and right
to participate and be heard. It is therefore crucial that the neutral enforces the agreed upon
ground rules. The ground rules could also cover issues of interaction between the parties and the
media.
Assist Parties in Developiny and Weighin2 Options
An important role of the neutral is assisting parties to develop a number of options to address
each other's interests. The IPs would have to be reassured that withholding consent is a real
option. It is their task to weigh this option alongside others, i.e. assess which of the options
would best meet their most important interests. It is the neutral's role to help parties generate
and make sense of data to enable them to assess whether their options will be met. Note that the
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development of options and the assessment of options should be undertaken, separately. This is
to ensure that as many options as possible are generated before parties set out criteria for
choosing among them.
Ensure Follow-throueh Mechanisms
The neutral ensures that parties live up to what they have committed in the agreements, should a
consent be given by the tribe. In this capacity, the neutral assists the parties defining a detailed
and workable monitoring procedure to bind all the parties to their commitments.
What development plans were in effect in the indigenous community prior to the FPIC
process? Has the development resulting from the FPIC process been consistent with the
long-term development plans of the indigenous community?
BUILDING THE CAPACITIES OF INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES TO ARTICULATE
AND MANAGE THEIR DEVELOPMENT
Most IP communities do not have long-term development plans. Indigenous peoples live day-to-
day. Most are engaged in traditional agricultural practice known as swidden farming or shifting
cultivation. There is less and less land available for this subsistence means of livelihood, as
more and more so-called development interventions, including mining, encroach upon ancestral
domains. The IPs have been pushed out of their homelands and from their traditional sources of
livelihood. While these development interventions purport to provide new livelihood
opportunities for the IPs, the IPs have not been able to generate much employment. Education
for IPs remains wanting. Trainings that will help them find employment and move up the ladder
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in companies and even public offices within their ancestral domains are not provided.
Companies, as in the case of mining, often bring in outside works or employ migrant non-IPs
since they are the ones who meet job qualifications. IPs end up being contractual and seasonal
workers all their life, if they are ever employed at all by these companies. While mining
companies may provide livelihood training assistance, such is the case with the Taganito Mining
Corporation, the trainings are sporadic and not well thought out. Handbag-making training, for
example, is over but few trainees finish a product that can be sold. The market for products has
not been thoroughly researched. The mini grocery stores that the IPs have set-up in their homes
usually fail. Mining companies have yet to demonstrate that they have contributed to a change in
the well-being of IP communities. Most IP communities remain poor and the cultural integrity
of those communities continue to erode.
The NCIP is supposed to assist the IPs in the formulation of their Ancestral Domain Sustainable
Development and Protection Plans (ADSDPP). These are supposed to be "the manifestation of
their (IP) rights to self-governance and self-determination" (ADSDPP Guidelines, Section 2).
But the NCIP national leadership admits to having no available funds to assist IPs in formulating
their ADSDPPs. Further, the NCIP has to out source funds from other government agencies
and forge partnership with non-government organizations and external funding institutions to
help prepare ADSDPPs.
With government unable to assist the IPs in addressing their poverty situation, the IPs are left
with very little or no leverage at all in deciding whether to give or withhold consent. The
playing field is simply lopsided. While government has the responsibility to help level the
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playing field for the IPs, it does not have the capacity or the commitment to do so. In the end, IP
communities have no choice but give consent to mining companies even if the terms are
unfavorable. Whatever benefits companies offer, to the IPs they are a blessing. Ultimately, the
decisions of indigenous communities reflect their desperate need to survive. Given this fact, I
assert that the FPIC process requires neutral facilitation.
In addition, I propose that the formulation of an ADSDPP become part of the FPIC process,
especially in cases where a community does not have such a plan. If a community already has an
ADSDPP, it must be taken into account in making decisions about proposed mining operations.
The requirements and forms for ADSDPP formulation should be simplified. The NCIP FBI
Team should work closely with the IP community, assisting them in generating the data needed
to formulate their ADSDPP. I recommend that IP communities should be assisted by another
entity in the formulation and advocacy of their ADSDPP in the FPIC process. A number of non-
government organizations are already supporting indigenous communities in their ADSDPP
formulation.
I recognize that even with an ADSDPP, IPs could still end up having no choice but give consent.
After all, the ADSDPP does not necessarily guarantee development. What the ADSDPP does
provide is a basis for making demands of a mining company. The IP community should
determine whether the company's proposals will meet their development vision within the
lifespan of the mining operation. The IP community would then have a clearer basis for making
a decision.
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Indigenous communities might still feel that their choice is limited due to the fact that mining
companies have been operating in their ancestral domains for many years (as is the case with the
Manobos in Rosario and the Mamanwas in Taganito and Urbiztondo). Even in IP communities
where mining companies are just about to enter, the IPs could end up feeling pressured by the
government since the country's economic development relies heavily on investment of mining
operations. With these limitations, the ADSDPP could still be a tool to require accountability
from mining companies.
With an ADSDPP, the mining company should have a better appreciation as to which benefits it
needs to offer and how they can contribute to what IPs have defined for themselves as their long-
term development goals. Companies have a responsibility to ensure the development of IP
communities so that when their operations cease, communities are able to stand on their own.
The Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs) in my case studies do not reflect any such concern.
The ADSDPP should focus on not only economic benefits, but also capacity-building to ensure
livelihood assistance. Equally important, it should address environmental and cultural
considerations, e.g. protection of watersheds and sacred grounds. At present, the ADSDPP, the
FPIC process, and Environmental Impact Assessments are unrelated processes. They ought to
inform and reinforce each other.
What are the on-going involvements of IPs after mining is approved? What kind of
continuing monitoring and participation in the development activities of the mining
companies might be appropriate?
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CREATING ON-GOING SHARED DECISION-MAKING
The Memorandums of Agreement (MOAs) reflect what seems to be the understanding of mining
companies and the NCIP regarding FPIC - that the act of giving consent takes away any
authority from the IPs regarding subsequent regulation of the activities of mining companies.
The MOAs do not contain mechanisms through which IPs are involved in an on-going review of
the activities of mining companies, including the social and environmental impacts of their
operations over time. The IPs are hardly aware of the existence of monitoring mechanisms.
Often, IP leaders do not even know that they have been named as members of certain monitoring
mechanisms. If they do, they are unable to keep up with the conversation. Furthermore,
monitoring mechanisms often do not function as intended.
To be effective, I propose monitoring mechanisms that detail the procedures for on-going
managed efforts to deal with the limitations of the FPIC process. Furthermore, monitoring
mechanism should also assess whether known information is still true within what is sure to be a
changing environment surrounding the operation of mining projects. Monitoring procedures
require stakeholders to review their assumptions surrounding each agreement. The neutral
facilitator can help to ensure that part of the agreement covers the establishment of monitoring
procedures that provide the flexibility to accommodate new information to address emerging
stakeholder concerns.
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In light of my recommendations, legislative and policy reforms must be in place. To safeguard
the right of indigenous peoples to determine and pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development, the FPIC IRR and Guidelines need to include the use of a neutral whose task is to
guarantee a legitimate process. Also, policies have to stipulate provisions for ensuring external
support to indigenous communities to strengthen their negotiation capacities during the FPIC
process. External advisors or organizations could assist in the conduct of an independent or joint
environmental impact assessment and in the communities' formulation of long-term
development plans prior to negotiation with mining companies. External legal assistance should
be made available particularly during the review and signing of the Memorandum of Agreement.
In addition, the inclusion of the barangay in the FPIC process could better inform tribal
communities of the relationships of different payments made by mining companies. In this case,
IP communities would be in a better position to negotiate and make a decision whether to give or
withhold consent.
Since the Mining Act and its IRR were passed before the IPRA, revisions to reflect coherence
with the IPRA and a new FPIC IRR and Guidelines are called for. Particularly important is a
recognition of the indigenous peoples' right to say no to mining operations as a real option in the
exercise of FPIC. This requires conditions such as the inclusion of neutral facilitator, joint
environmental impact assessment, and joint monitoring procedures that build the capacities of
indigenous communities to engage in defining their development path and in managing their
ancestral domains.
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